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You are on your way home, and somebody asks you where she can find the train 
station. You know where it is and are happy to share this information. What is 
the best way in which you could give directions to the person in the street? In 
this thesis, I aim to get more insight in the nature of the cognitive processes, the 
neural correlates and the hormonal underpinnings that underlie the generation 
of comprehensible communicative behaviours. In particular, I will focus on 
whether the generation of these communicative behaviours entails distinct 
social processes or whether these are general-purpose. Specifically social  
processes might be necessary to account for the unique consequences of having 
an interaction with another human being, who like you, has her own perceptions, 
opinions and intentions. On the other hand, it is hard to answer the question 
how exactly these processes could be different from generic cognition. 
In this chapter, I describe the nature of the problem that communicators are 
faced with and why I think this is an instance of “abductive inference”. I argue 
that what is the “best” utterance to convey your intention is dependent on the 
presumed mental state of the person that is addressed. Next, I give a more 
formal definition of what I mean with social-specific and general-purpose 
processes, drawing from the notion of modularity (Fodor, 1983, 2001). Then I 
discuss existing accounts on the human communicative capacity and its neural 
and endocrine underpinnings in relation to the criteria of a modular social 
cognition. Lastly, I describe the methods and experimental procedures used 
in this thesis and give an outline of the remaining chapters. 
1.1. Mapping intentions and behaviours
The process underlying the generation of communicative behaviours may be 
considered as a form of signal processing (Shannon, 1948; see Fig. 1.1A). In such a 
framework, senders convert their intentions (input) to communicative behaviours 
(output) according to predefined agreements. In turn, receivers can decode the 
communicated behaviours by employing the same rules, comprehending what 
the sender has intended. So when you wish to give direction to the person on the 
street, you simply need to look up the proper item in your mental intention-to-be-
haviour “dictionary” in order to select the right behaviour. If in turn, the person 
who lost her way has access to the same “dictionary”, she will be able to decode 
your communicative behaviour and will smoothly find her way to the station. 
Unfortunately, the above description of cognitive processes underlying human 
communication is a misleading oversimplification. Intention-to-behaviour and 
behaviour-to-intention mappings are not one-to-one, but manifold (Brennan, 
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Galati, & Kuhlen, 2010). Interlocutors can express the same intention in different 
modalities, in different wordings and in different styles. For instance, the route to 
the station can be communicated by gesture, by spoken language or by drawing 
a map on a slip of paper. The route to the station can be explained by referring to 
a mental map of the environment or by referring to particular landmarks that 
one may pass along the way. The account of pre-defined intention-to-behaviour 
mapping does not describe how to select the “best” behaviour out of the mani-
fold options. Thus, if you intend to explain the route to the station, there is 
no unique best way to transduce your intention to behaviour.
Sender encoder
signal decoder
Receiver
received
signal
noise
Communicator intention
behaviour
1
behaviour
2
behaviour
3
behaviour
...
noise
intention
1
intention
2
intention
3
intention
...
Addressee
A. Shannon and Weaver’s model of communication
B. Communication model with abductive inference
observed
behaviour
Figure 1.1. Communication models. (A) Shannon and Weaver’s model of 
communication. Senders encode their intentions in signals. Referring to the 
same rule-set as the Senders, Receivers decode these signals so that they can 
understand the Sender’s underlying intentions. (B) Communication model with 
abductive inference. Out of manifold possible behaviours, Communicators 
select the behaviour that they think describes their intention best. They cannot 
know which behaviour this is for certain, but they can make inferences about 
what they think is best for an addressee given the current state of the world (in 
the case depicted above behaviour
3
 marked in gray). Out of manifold possible 
intentions, Addressees select the intention that they think best describes the 
intention underlying the observed behaviour. Similar to the Communicator, 
they cannot know for certain what the Communicator intended with her behav-
iour, but they can make inferences based on the information they have about 
the Communicator and the current state of the world (for instance intention
2
 
marked in gray).
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Even if it would be possible to captivate all potential utterances that exist in 
common language as well as all emblematic symbols (e.g. a thumbs-up as an 
indication that something is OK), such a dictionary would never be exhaustive, 
as interlocutors often generate novel intention-to-behaviour mappings. Such 
novel conventions may occur when interlocutors intend to share information on 
a phenomenon they have never encountered before or when they do not have 
access to the same language system (Galantucci & Garrod, 2011; Goldin-Meadow 
& Mylander, 1998). But even within a system of predefined conventions, innova-
tions may occur. For instance, if one intends to share information on the city of 
Nijmegen, one can also refer to “Havana at the river Waal”, referring to its status 
as the only major city in the Netherlands with a mainly left-wing city council.
1.2. Abductive inference
This thesis focuses on the ability of communicators to select out of the manifold 
options the communicative behaviour that they believe is “best” comprehen-
sible for their addressee (recipient design; see Fig. 1.1B; see Box 1.1 for a more 
detailed definition of “best”). This ability may be considered as an instance of 
“inference to the best explanation” (Blokpoel, 2015; Levinson, 2006; Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986). Inference to the best explanation is a type of inference that 
“takes as input partial information and as output a hypothesis that is sensible 
and explains the observations, but that cannot be logically warranted from the 
observations” (Haselager, van Dijk, & van Rooij, 2008). In the case of the genera-
tion of communicative behaviours, the information entails the mental state of 
the recipient and the current state of the world, whereas the output hypothesis 
would be the communicative behaviour that the communicator believes the 
most comprehensible for the addressee given the current state of the world. 
The information on the basis of which communicators design their behaviours 
is incomplete as the addressee’s mental states cannot be observed directly, 
but need to be inferred based on prior personal experiences or expectations 
about agents (global information, e.g. a recipient’s age and presumed cognitive 
abilities). Furthermore, the situation or the inferences made about the addressee 
may change over time (“local’ information”; Brennan et al., 2010). Observing 
that the lady who would like to go to the station walks with a stick (global infor-
mation) may lead you to believe that it might be “best” to give directions for 
travelling by public transport. During the course of the conversation, you may 
get a better idea of her level of familiarity with the city (local information) and 
you can use this information to tailor your directions. 
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The selection of the “best” comprehensible behaviour implies that there is a 
given set of candidate hypotheses to select from (Blokpoel, 2015). When there 
are communicative conventions, these candidate hypotheses already exist and 
need to be retrieved from memory. When innovations take place, these candidate 
hypotheses need to be generated de novo, a type of inference referred to as 
abduction proper (Haselager, 1997; Lipton, 1991). In this way, inference to the 
best explanation is strongly dependent on the set of candidate hypotheses, so 
that in the remainder of this chapter I will refer to the cognitive processes under-
lying the generation of candidate hypotheses and the selection of the “best” 
behaviour thereof as “abductive inference” (Blokpoel, 2015). 
Box 1.1. What is the “best” abductive inference?
There are various notions of “best” in abductive inference. Best can be 
the most likely (Lipton, 1991), the simplest (Chater, 1999; van der Helm, 
2000), the most coherent (Glass, 2007; Thagard, 2001) or a combination 
of each of these characteristics (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 
1986; Thagard, 1988). What is considered the “best” comprehensible 
behaviour may vary between individuals; therefore, I provide an external 
proxy of “best” for the communicative behaviours generated by the 
participants. In Chapter 2 and 3, the quality of communicative behaviour 
is quantified experimentally by asking a number of naive participants to 
guess the intention behind a communicative behaviour expressed during 
an interaction in which they did not take part. Behaviours of which the 
intentions were guessed correctly more frequently were rated to be 
“better” (see Chapter 2 and 3). In Chapters 4 and 5, the quality of 
communicative behaviours was quantified by an experimenter familiar 
with the communicative task. Communicative strategies with which a 
larger number of communicative problems could be solved (“most 
coherent”) were rated to be “better”.
1.3. Generation of communicative behaviours: a modular or 
non-modular process?
The central question in this thesis is, whether the above-described process of 
selecting the “best” communicative behaviour is devised by modular processes, 
by generic, non-modular processes or by a combination of the two (modest 
modularity). Interactions with humans may be fundamentally different from 
General introduction
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interactions with the non-social world, because agents have intentions of their 
own and mental states that are not directly observable and that are not static. 
On the other hand, it is hard to imagine exactly how processes underlying 
social and non-social information processing would differ. Although generally 
we do not assign intentionality to objects (though see for an alternative view of 
the possibility to take an intentional stance to objects Dennett, 1989; Heider & 
Simmel, 1944), oftentimes the state of the inanimate world is not directly 
observable too. In a similar way as it is not possible to directly observe the 
mental states of the person we are addressing, it is also not possible to 
directly perceive that the grey long-shaped surface in front of us is a street, 
neither is it possible for us to see the entire route and the end goal that we  
are moving towards when navigating through a city, as our view would be 
obstructed by buildings, trees or other objects. Similar to the dynamical 
process of establishing mutual understanding, during interactions with the 
world we too need to constantly incorporate novel information with what we 
already know, and adjust our actions accordingly. In this way, communicative 
adjustments after a misunderstanding can be viewed similar to adjusting our 
route after finding out along the way that one of the streets that we wished to 
pass is closed. 
Whether one assumes that generating communicative behaviours is specific or 
generic, strongly depends on one’s assumptions about the architecture under-
lying human cognition in general. A detailed account of criteria that distinguish 
“to some interesting extent” between specific and generic cognitive functions 
can be found in Fodor’s work on the modularity of mind (see Box 1.2; Fodor, 
1983, 2001). Assuming a mass-modular, modest-modular or non-modular 
architecture underlying social cognition has far-going consequences for the 
interpretation of existing findings and for the future questions that need to  
be addressed to accurately describe generating communicative behaviours 
(Mitchell, 2006; Wabeke, 2012). As we will see below, a mass-modular or 
modest-modular social cognitive architecture has various conceptual issues, 
while a non-modular architecture seems computationally intractable.
 
It is under debate if, should modularity exist, the criteria that describe it are 
too vague or too narrow (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Coltheart, 1999) or if the 
definition of modularity mainly comes down to a single property such as 
domain-specificity or information encapsulation respectively and that the other 
properties follow and should be tested experimentally (Coltheart, 1999; Fodor, 
2001). I have chosen to describe the nature of “social cognition”, “social 
brain” and “social hormones” according to all the criteria described by Fodor 
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(Fodor, 1983, p. 37) as I hope to provide converging empirical evidence for the 
validity of the viewpoint that the cognitive architecture underlying generating 
communicative behaviour is non-modular. Oftentimes theorists are not explicit 
about what architecture they assume to underlie their theory. Core criteria such 
as “domain-specificity” or “information encapsulation” are oftentimes not 
mentioned explicitly, whereas criteria that follow from these, such as “fixed 
neural architecture”, “mandatory operation” or “fast processing” are more 
frequently debated. Discussing all criteria of modularity might be helpful to get 
an indication of which architecture is assumed to underlie the communicative 
capacity in current theories of social interaction, and provides a more complete 
background for my experimental work. 
Box 1.2. Fodorian properties of modules
These are criteria that to “some interesting extent” characterise a cognitive 
sub-capacity
• Domain specificity – the module processes only certain kinds of input 
(Coltheart, 1999)
• Mandatory operation - the module processes specific information 
automatically
• Limited central accessibility – representations within a module are 
not accessible for higher-level modules or a central processor
• Fast processing - the module processes the information rapidly 
(<500ms)
• Information encapsulation - the processes in the module are only 
based on the information entailed by the input of the process and 
information stored in that module
• Shallow outputs - processes in the module are relatively superficial
• Fixed neural architecture - functional dissociable neural underpinnings
• Characteristic and specific breakdown patterns - the module can be 
selectively impaired
• Characteristic ontogenetic pace and sequencing - the module “devel-
op[s] according to specific, endogenously determined patterns under 
the impact of environmental releasers” (Fodor, 1983, p. 100)
General introduction
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Figure 1.2. Cognitive and neural architecture underlying the generation of 
communicative behaviours. The left hand side of the figure represents the input 
to the information processor, which in this case can be an intention of social 
simple, social complex or non-social nature. The outcome, the behaviour 
mapping the intention, is selected by the process, which can be coding and 
decoding of intention-behaviour mappings or selecting the “best” behaviour 
by means of abductive inference. (A) Mass modularity. Representation of the 
information processor as consisting solely of modules (indicated as “m”).  
(B) Modest modularity. The information processes are modular around the 
“edges”; belief-fixation is performed by the central processor (indicated as 
“g”). (C) Non-modularity. Information processes are non-modular. Image is 
courtesy of Mark Blokpoel.
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1.3.1. A mass modular architecture
Proponents of a mass-modular cognitive architecture assume that the entire 
mind is composed of modules (see Fig. 1.2A; Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Cosmides 
& Tooby, 1992; Pinker, 1997; Sperber, 1994, 2001). One of these modules would 
be “social” in nature. In turn, this “social” module may consist of sub-modules, 
such as a module for the generation of communicative behaviours and a module 
for the interpretation of these behaviours (mentalising). These sub-modules 
could consist of other sub-modules, for instance, the “generation of communica-
tive behaviours” sub-module would consist of sub-modules for the production 
of facial expressions, the generation of verbal expressions et cetera. Again, 
these sub-modules may consist of more sub-modules and so on and so forth. 
If one commits to a modular social cognition, the input to this module and its 
sub-modules can only be social in nature, and the module cannot process 
non-social information (criterion of domain-specificity). The criterion of infor-
mation encapsulation in a ‘social’ module entails that this module can process 
social information on its own, but it cannot access information of other modules. 
The representations and output of modular processes is not accessible for other 
modules (criterion of limited central accessibility). 
Because the potential information processed in an encapsulated module is 
limited to the input to the module and the information that is stored, modular 
processes are automatic, supposedly fast, and with superficial outcomes 
(criteria of mandatory operation, fast processing and shallow output). The  
idea that social cognition is organised in modules gets credibility from the 
observation that the pace of social interactions is high and that having such 
interactions is seemingly effortless. The criteria of automatic and fast play an 
important role in the alignment theory of interaction by Pickering and Garrod 
(2004). In this theory it is hypothesized that communication is oftentimes 
based on automatic and fast priming processes between speakers and listeners 
on the different levels of language processing. By aligning their utterances, 
speakers reach mutual understanding. The mirror neuron account draws on the 
same properties. In this system, observers of motion interpret the underlying 
intentions by considering what they themselves would intend if they would 
make such movements. These forms of imitation are fast, shallow and manda-
tory as well (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
Furthermore, modularity as the cognitive architecture underlying social cognition 
gets credibility from the observation that social functions can be impaired, 
while other functions stay intact (criterion of characteristic and specific break-
General introduction
1
21
down pattern), such as in high functioning individuals with autism spectrum 
disorder (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; but see for another view Friston, 
Lawson, & Frith, 2013; O’Laughlin & Thagard, 2000). The ontogeny of social 
cognition has a characteristic ontogenetic pace and sequencing (Leslie, 1991; 
Scholl & Leslie, 1999). For instance, as of age four, most children show evidence 
of false-belief understanding, being able to explicitly understand that the mental 
states of other people can be different from their own (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985; U. Frith & Frith, 2003; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).
At the neural level, evidence for a modular cognitive architecture can be found 
in the study of lesions. The attribution of mental states to others is performed 
in brain regions dedicated to social cognition: the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, the superior temporal sulcus, the anterior cingulate and the amygdala 
(Adolphs, 2009; Amodio & Frith, 2006; U. Frith & Frith, 2003). Lesions in one of 
these regions, such as for instance the medial prefrontal cortex, impair daily 
social interactions, while other functions such as language processing remain 
intact (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Stolk, D’Imperio, 
Di Pellegrino, & Toni, 2015).
In sum, assuming that the cognitive architecture underlying social cognition is 
modular accounts for the observation that processes in social cognition can be 
fast and automatic (computationally feasible) and the observation that social 
cognition can be impaired specifically while other cognitive capacities remain 
intact. However, theories of a modular social cognition cannot account for the 
complexity and flexibility of generating communicative behaviours as described 
above and, therefore, the outcome of such mental processes may be considered 
too shallow to be compatible with these properties (Brennan et al., 2010). 
1.3.2. A non-modular architecture
Proponents of a non-modular architecture argue the opposite, namely, that  
the mind cannot be modular at all (see for instance Prinz, 2006). Generating 
comprehensible communicative behaviours may be seen as an instance of a 
generic cognitive capacity (see Fig. 1.2C). Assuming a generic architecture of 
social cognition implies that a special modular social cognitive ability does 
not exist and that the cognitive process underlying selecting a communicative 
behaviour is similar to solving a non-social problem. As I have proposed earlier, 
a potential cognitive function that can account for the complexity, flexibility 
and generativeness of the on-going process of selecting the “best” behaviour 
out of an infinite amount of possible intention-behaviour mappings is abductive 
inference (Blokpoel, 2015; Levinson, 2006; Sperber & Wilson, 1986).
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The assumption of a non-modular cognitive capacity underlying the generation 
of communicative behaviour gets credibility from the observation that the topic 
of social interactions is not limited to the social domain. When explaining the 
route to the station, you may refer to places of reference for which world know-
ledge is required, such as that roundabouts are circular intersections for traffic, 
that Wednesdays are market days and that thus referring to this event as a 
point of orientation only makes sense on that day of the week. Interlocutors 
can access this non-social information whilst generating communicative 
behaviours. This makes an encapsulated module of social cognition conceptu-
ally unlikely. A potential solution would be to allow non-social information as 
input to encapsulated social modular processes when it is relevant for the social 
interaction. However, it is hard to determine on the basis of which criteria infor-
mation can be considered as relevant for social interactions. Furthermore, the 
relevance of non-social information might change over time (also referred to as 
the “frame problem”; Fodor, 2001; Haselager, 1997). For instance, information 
on traffic intersections might be irrelevant when you have a conversation about 
the weather, but might become relevant in the example demonstrated above. 
Therefore, unless there are other ways of distinguishing the nature of socially 
relevant or irrelevant information, it seems that at a minimum modular social 
cognition relies on domain-general cognitive inferences to identify inputs that 
do not belong to its domain (Wabeke, 2012).
A non-modular social cognition is in line with the observation that, to a certain 
extent, interlocutors can have top-down control over their communicative 
behaviours. For instance, they can reflect and learn from earlier interactions; 
they can choose to ignore “global information” (e.g. information about the 
addressee that they received beforehand) or “local information” (e.g. infor-
mation about the addressee that they gathered during an interaction). This 
observation is in contrast with the criteria of limited central accessibility and 
mandatory operation that do not allow for the control of behaviour. 
At first, a non-modular architecture does not seem to be in line with the obser-
vation that social cognition can have characteristic and specific breakdown 
patterns and can have fixed neural architecture. However, on further inspection, 
it can be questioned if impairments in social deficits are truly limited to the 
social domain. Autism spectrum disorder, which is considered to be a deficit of 
social capacities in particular, also entails symptoms that are non-social, such 
as a generic presumed weak central coherence of perception and cognition, 
and dysfunction of overall executive control (Friston et al., 2013; O’Laughlin & 
Thagard, 2000). The acquisition of social cognitive abilities indeed has its own 
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characteristic pace and sequencing, but its development is not isolated from 
the acquisition of other cognitive abilities such as language acquisition and 
executive control (Bull, Phillips, & Conway, 2008; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 
2007; Perner & Lang, 1999). In the brain, it is hard to pinpoint the exact locations 
of specific social modules, as cerebral regions are mostly involved in multiple 
cognitive functions. For instance, impairments in brain regions that are 
involved in more complex instances of generating communicative behaviours 
(such as mentalising), do not only lead to difficulty with daily social interactions, 
but also with the integration of novel non-social information with existing know-
ledge (V. E. Ghosh, Moscovitch, Melo Colella, & Gilboa, 2014; Kable & Glimcher, 
2007; Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 2011; Stolk, Verhagen, 
& Toni, 2016; van Kesteren, Ruiter, Fernandez, & Henson, 2012; Warren, Jones, 
Duff, & Tranel, 2014). 
Though a non-modular architecture resolves crucial conceptual issues consid-
ering the complex nature of such social interaction, its drawback is that it 
seems at best computationally slow, and at worst intractable (Kirby & Hurford, 
2002; Steels, 2003; van Rooij et al., 2011). This is often believed to be the case 
because, in principle, communicators have access to everything they know and 
the knowledge on which they draw is essentially boundless (isotropy). Though 
it is hard to estimate the upper-boundary of the knowledge on which inter-
locutors may draw, even examples at the lower-boundary quite easily become 
computationally intractable. For instance, it is very easy to come up with a list 
of hundred fairly common words. In order to encode one word out of this list of 
hundred, there are hundred options, which seems computationally feasible. 
However, because of exponential growth, the number of options easily becomes 
computationally intractable; looking up words out of this list of hundred for a 
two-word sentence leads to 100*100 options, looking up words for a sentence of 
seven words, there are already 100*100*100*100*100*100*100 options (see for 
further calculations on storage size and retrieval time for these type of look-up 
tables Parberry, 1992). Retrieving the proper entry out of such an immense 
number of options would take a very long time, and such long retrieval time is 
not in line with the speed with which daily interactions take place. A theory 
that unifies both the isotropic nature of communication whilst being computa-
tionally tractable does currently not exist. 
1.3.3. A modest modular architecture
Fodor proposes a theory of modest modularity of mind where input systems 
such as the sensory organs are assumed to be modular, but central systems, 
of which abductive inference might be considered an instance, are not (see 
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Fig. 2B; Fodor, 1983, 2001). Such a hybrid system of modularity would account 
for the differences in complexity of generating communicative behaviours. At 
one end, one would find relatively automatic shallow signal driven processing, 
and at the other end processes that are more context-dependent and dynam-
ical (Adolphs, 2009). For instance, generating a stereotypical facial expression  
to express fear, disgust or anger may be considered as less complex than 
generating a communicative behaviour de novo to explain to a stranger with 
whom you do not share the same language that you wish to go to the station.
The question that arises immediately is in which cases social interactions 
require complex cognitive processes and when modular processes suffice. 
Horton and Keysar (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar & Horton, 1998) argue that 
in principle fast, mandatory and shallow processing might suffice in most 
social situations, except when there are misunderstandings. Only in the case 
of repairs, interlocutors will make inferences about the mental states of the 
recipient and the context, requiring central processing. Like in a mass-modular 
account of social cognition, it is unclear how, if one commits to a modular 
architecture of social cognition at “the edges”, the modular processes and 
their output can be accessed and evaluated by a central system (violation  
of the criteria of information encapsulation, limited central accessibility).
Thus, a moderate modular architecture underlying social cognition accounts 
for the observation that the computational cost of different interactions can 
vary, and that most of the time, the generation of communicative behaviours  
is effortless. The question arises, when computationally costlier and generic 
functions come into play if modular processes are not sufficient. Furthermore, 
it remains unclear, if one commits to a modular architecture, how a central 
processor can access the processes and evaluate the outcomes of these 
modular processes (violation of the criteria of information encapsulation and 
limited central accessibility).
1.3.4. Intermediate conclusion
Taken together, assuming that the architecture that underlies the generation  
of communicative behaviours is modular or generic has its own strengths and 
drawbacks. Modularity has the advantage that it is computationally feasible, 
but has the disadvantage that it is conceptually unstable. Moderate modularity 
of mind is in line with the observation that the generation of communicative 
behaviours varies in complexity, however, this account is conceptually unstable 
because it is does not explicate when a particular social process is modular or 
not, and it is unclear how modular processes and their outcomes can be 
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accessed and monitored by a central processor. A generic architecture under-
lying social cognition is conceptually feasible, but seems computationally 
intractable (Blokpoel et al., 2012; van Rooij et al., 2011). Because in the real 
world human communication is tractable, the mind/brain seems to be somehow 
capable of generating communicative behaviours and on these grounds a 
generic architecture underlying social cognition could be rejected. However, the 
discrepancy between the conceptually stable and computationally unstable 
properties of a generic architecture underlying communicative behaviour are 
“informative for improving formal models and for rejecting claims that human 
communication is computationally trivial” (van Rooij et al., 2011) and I think 
that the intractability problem that comes with assuming a generic architecture 
can be overcome by determining constraints under which generating commu-
nicative behaviour can be performed in real life (Blokpoel et al., 2011; van Rooij 
et al., 2011). 
In this thesis, I hope to provide empirical evidence converging with the theo-
retical considerations provided above, namely, that the cognitive architecture 
of the generation of communicative behaviours is non-modular. In Chapter 2, I 
investigate this question at the cognitive level. In Chapter 3, I investigate the 
neural underpinnings of the generation of communicative behaviours and 
discuss how these findings could be interpreted in the context of non-modularity 
(Chapter 6). In the second part of this thesis, I investigate how oxytocin, a 
hormone known to be involved in social and affiliative behaviours, influences 
the generation of communicative interactions. Above, I argued that the genera-
tion of comprehensible communicative behaviours can be seen as non-modular. 
In Chapter 4, I explore the possibility that oxytocin not only alters “social” 
modular processes, but that it may also alter information processing in general 
(as performed by the central processor/non-modular processes), that is, I 
hypothesise that the neuropeptide’s function could be broader than social- 
specific. Furthermore, I study the effects of this neuromodulator on functional 
connectivity in the brain (Chapter 5), also assessing how a neural system can 
be computationally boosted by a relatively “simple” hormonal manipulation. 
1.4. The influence of oxytocin on generating communicative 
behaviours
In recent years, numerous studies have been conducted investigating the 
influence of hormones on social behaviour in humans. Oxytocin in particular 
has gained a lot of attention. Studies on the intranasal administration of this 
hormone in humans indicate that it influences mentalising and resource-
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sharing. Theories underlying these observations relate the effect of oxytocin to 
an increase in prosocial motivation (Ditzen et al., 2009; Kosfield & Heinrich, 
2005), increase in saliency of social stimuli (Bartz, Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 
2011; Bethlehem, Baron-Cohen, van Honk, Auyeung, & Bos, 2014; Churchland 
& Winkielman, 2012; Shamay-Tsoory & Abu-Akel, 2016) or reduction in social 
anxiety (Bale, Davis, Auger, Dorsa, & McCarthy, 2001; Heinrichs & Domes, 
2008; Labuschagne et al., 2010; Ring et al., 2006; Uvnäs-Moberg, Ahlenius, 
Hillegaart, & Alster, 1994). Below, I discuss the possibility that oxytocin’s 
influence may extend beyond social-specific processes. 
Studies on the neural mechanisms underlying the working of oxytocin focus on 
alterations in activation and functional connectivity between regions that are 
part of the so-called “social brain” (Bos, Panksepp, Bluthé, & Honk, 2012; see 
Box 1.3 for addiitonal information on oxytocin n the brain). The most consistent 
finding in humans is that intra-nasal administration of oxytocin is related to 
reduced amygdala activation, for instance, when participants observe threat-
ening scenes and faces (Domes, Heinrichs, Glascher, et al., 2007; Kirsch et al., 
2005). Other regions that are found to be affected by oxytocin are, amongst 
others, the prefrontal cortex, the insula and the anterior cingulate cortex (see, 
amongst others Bethlehem, van Honk, Auyeung, & Baron-Cohen, 2013). 
Though these regions certainly are correlated with social behaviour, this is not 
the only domain in which they are involved; the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
is certainly involved in mentalising (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Welborn  
& Lieberman, 2015) but is also involved in other functions that are non-social 
in nature such as value-based decision-making, schema-based memory 
processing and the integration of novel information to existing knowledge (V. 
E. Ghosh et al., 2014; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Rushworth et al., 2011; Stolk 
et al., 2016; van Kesteren et al., 2012; Warren et al., 2014). 
Oxytocin would fit the modular property of a fixed “endocrine” architecture 
affecting specifically cognitive abilities and neural correlates underlying a 
modular social cognition. The idea that oxytocin’s effects would be modular in 
nature gets credibility from the observation that this hormone is a moderator  
of social interactions across species: it is involved in the physiology of repro-
duction, mother-infant bonding, bonding between mates and the interaction 
with other members of the same species. However, this comparative argument 
does not preclude the possibility that this hormone affects cognitive processes 
and neural mechanisms that are “outside” social cognition or the “social brain”. 
The demand of the complexity of social interactions may have driven the devel-
opment of general human intelligence and increase in brain size (Dunbar, 1998). 
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In a similar way, a hormone that boosted social and affiliative behaviours and 
shapes neural activity could also influence general cognitive abilities and neural 
underpinnings well outside the “social” brain. The function of oxytocin may 
then be enhancing the ability to solve complex problems in general, reducing 
general anxiety and/or changing the balance in the exploration-exploitation 
trade-off in both social and non-social situations (Chang & Platt, 2014; Windle, 
Shanks, Lightman, & Ingram, 1997).
Box 1.3. Oxytocin in the brain
Oxytocin has both central and peripheral functions. Peripheral oxytocin 
is synthesised in the heart, gastrointestinal and reproductive tract. 
Central oxytocin is synthesised in magnocellular and parvocellular cells 
of the hypothalamus. When oxytocin is synthesised in magnocellular 
neurons in the hypothalamus, it is stored in vesicles at these neurons’ 
axonal ends. These vesicles can be released in the bloodstream when 
the neuron fires. Oxytocin then reaches the central system via the 
extracellular space as a neuromodulator or neurotransmitter via the 
magnocellular neurons’ dendrites, where it can reach distant targets 
through diffusion. When produced in parvocellular cells, oxytocin can be 
projected directly to target regions in the brain including the amygdala, 
nucleus accumbens, hippocampus, striatum, suprachiasmatic nucleus, 
bed nucleus of stria terminalis and brainstem, where oxytocin receptors 
are expressed. It is under debate how exactly peripheral and central 
oxytocin levels are regulated, and how they interact (Leng & Ludwig, 
2016; Veening & Olivier, 2013). 
The relation between oxytocin and behaviour can be measured by 
correlating (social) behaviours with endogenous oxytocin levels in the 
periphery (blood, saliva or urine), central system, or variations in the 
genome (Heim et al., 2009; Jacob et al., 2007; Light, Grewen, & Amico, 
2005; Nagasawa, Kikusui, Onaka, & Ohta, 2009; Weisman, Zagoory-
Sharon, & Feldman, 2012). As mentioned before, it remains unclear if 
and how peripheral and central oxytocin levels influence one and 
another; therefore, these findings should be interpreted with care.  
It is also possible to actively manipulate oxytocin levels by administering 
the neuropeptide intravenously or by intranasal spray. The latter is the 
most common way for the study of its effects in human behaviour and 
this is also the method I employ in Chapter 4 and 5, although the exact 
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neural and cognitive dynamics underlying the effect of intranasal 
administration need further investigation.
 
Currently, the reliability of and methodology by which oxytocin studies 
are conducted is under debate (Walum, Waldman, & Young, 2016). 
Several researchers have started attempts to replicate studies on 
oxytocin’s effect on brain and behaviour (Chapter 5, Lane et al., 2015; 
Nave, Camerer, & McCullough, 2015; Radke & de Bruijn, 2015). Replica-
tion of earlier reported effects can fail due to various reasons, such as 
publication bias, the large effect of individual variations and strong 
context dependency of the working of this hormone (Chapter 5; Bartz et 
al., 2011; Walum et al., 2016). This should not discourage, but encourage 
further research on the working of oxytocin on the brain and on human 
cognition.
1.5. Thesis outline
The central question in this thesis is, if the cognitive processes underlying the 
generation of communicative behaviours and their neural correlates and endo-
crine underpinnings are mass-modular, modest-modular or non-modular in 
nature. Current research has mainly focused on passive observation of commu-
nicative behaviours at the signal level. However, passive observation of others 
cannot captivate the complexity and flexibility of actual daily human interactions 
(Schilbach et al., 2012; Stolk et al., 2016). I employ experimental designs that 
do not rely on conventions by asking participants to make verbal descriptions 
by not using words that are closely-semantically related to a target word (Chapter 
2 and 3) or by asking them to generate a novel communication system without 
using speech or gesture (Chapter 4 and 5). I add to current findings on the 
mechanisms underlying social interactions, observations from experiments 
that entail complex, active and live participation of dynamical human interaction, 
taking the perspective of the communicator.
In the first part of this thesis I investigated the cognitive mechanisms under-
lying the capacity to communicate, and the neural correlates that underlie 
them. In Chapter 2, I employed individual variations to test which cognitive 
abilities predict the generation of communicative behaviours that are “best” 
understood. Psychometric measures were taken from communicators on 
cognitive abilities and motivation that are general-purpose (logical reasoning, 
general intelligence and the motivation to solve complex problems) and that 
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are considered to be modular (verbal intelligence and mentalising). Quality of 
communicative behaviours was indexed by asking a group of naïve participants 
to rate verbal descriptions made during a communicative language game (see 
Box 1.4 for more information on the nature of the Taboo Game).
In Chapter 3, the neural underpinnings of the communicative capacity were 
studied. Communicators were asked to generate communicative messages  
in the same interactive linguistic game as in Chapter 2, while lying in the  
MRI scanner (see Box 1.5 for additional information on magnetic resonance 
imaging). It was tested if communicative capacity was neurally dissociable 
from linguistic abilities. These findings are discussed in relation to the question 
if communicative abilities are dependent on linguistic abilities. In Chapter 6, it is 
discussed how dissociable neural underpinnings of these cognitive abilities 
can be related to our understanding of a mass-modular, modest-modular or 
non-modular architecture underlying the generation of communicative abilities.
In the second part of this thesis I investigate if our understanding of the function 
of oxytocin on cognition and brain can be informed by our understanding of the 
cognitive architecture underlying the generation of communicative behaviours. 
In Chapter 4, it was investigated if and in what way oxytocin influences complex 
and dynamic interactions in the context of a live interactive game (see Box 1.4 
for information on the Tacit Communication Game). In this game, participants 
that either self-administered a placebo or oxytocin nasal spray were asked  
to generate novel idiosyncratic communicative behaviours. It was tested if 
oxytocin influenced the quality of these communicative solutions. Second,  
it was investigated if oxytocin influenced the way in which communicators 
adjusted their behaviours for the addressee (recipient design) based on global 
and local information. Recipient design was operationalised by making partici-
pants believe that they were generating behaviours for two different recipients 
that varied in age and cognitive ability (adult or child). If oxytocin influenced 
recipient design only, this might be evidence that its working is social-specific. 
If oxytocin influences recipient design and the quality of the generation of 
communicative solutions, this opens a possibility that the influence of oxytocin 
on higher-order cognitive functions is non-modular.
In Chapter 5, I investigate the influence of oxytocin on the brain at rest (see Box 
1.5 for more information on resting state functional MRI). I attempt to replicate 
the finding that oxytocin enhances connectivity between the amygdala and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, two regions that lie at heart of the presumed 
“social brain”. If oxytocin influences complex reasoning in general, then there 
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is a possibility that this hormone alters functional connectivity outside the 
“social brain” (Chapter 6).
In Chapter 6, I discuss the findings of Chapter 2 to 5 in relation to the central 
question of the thesis: are the cognitive processes, neural and endocrine 
underpinnings underlying communicative behaviour modular, modest-modular 
or non-modular? Lastly, I will suggest directions for further research. 
 
Box 1.4. Director-matcher games
Communicative interaction can be investigated in director-matcher games 
in which one person (director or Communicator) attempts to share infor-
mation to which another (matcher or Addressee) does not have access. 
The means of communication can either be conventional or a system  
of communication that has to be generated de novo (semiotic games;  
De Ruiter et al., 2010; Galantucci, 2005; Scott-Phillips, Kirby, & Ritchie, 
2009). These games strike a balance between being ecologically valid; 
e.g. both interlocutors actively participate in the game, and being 
quantifiable, whilst having the freedom to experimentally manipulate 
factors of interest. 
In both director-matcher games in this thesis, participants are challenged 
to generate communicative messages that capture the flexible and 
generative nature of human communication, rather than conventionalised 
stimulus-response mappings. In Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, a verbal 
communication game was designed and employed named the “Taboo 
game” (for example trials see Fig. 1.3A). In each trial, the aim was for 
Communicators to describe a Target-word and for recipients to guess the 
Target-word based on the Communicator’s Target-word description. 
Communicators generated descriptions of these Target-words (such as 
“Beard”) without using five Taboo-words (such as “chin”, “man”, “shave”, 
“hair” and “moustache”). In order to avoid movement artefacts in brain 
images of the Communicators, Communicators were asked to plan their 
behaviours (Phase 1 of Fig. 1.3B; unlimited planning time) before 
speaking their Target-word descriptions out loud (Phase 2; cut-off time 
of 10 seconds). The Addressee (confederate) attempted to guess the 
Target-word on the basis of the Communicator’s Target-word description 
(Phase 3) and spoke his guess out loud (Phase 4). Afterwards, Communi-
cator and Addressee received feedback on their joint communicative 
performance (Phase 5). All functional magnetic resonance imaging analysis
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focused on the planning phases (Phase 1 marked in grey), in which the 
Communicator planned the generation of a communicative act. The 
Communicator was inside the MR scanner wearing MR proof headphones 
and a microphone, while the Addressee (confederate) was outside the 
scanner room. The interlocutors could communicate via an intercom. 
All materials were in Dutch.
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Figure 1.3. Taboo Game. (A) Experimental conditions. (B) Trial time-course. 
Communicative setting and linguistic difficulty were manipulated to 
dissociate cognitive abilities and neural correlates underpinning the 
generation of communicative behaviours. Communicative setting was 
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manipulated by asking Communicators to either address an Addressee 
(confederate), who was not familiar with the Target-word and spoke out 
loud his guess on the basis of the Communicator’s description (Targeted 
setting; red), or to address an Addressee that was already familiar with the 
Target-word that was described (Non-targeted setting; depicted in orange). 
Participants were reminded in which condition they were by the display of 
the Target-word, one in their own box in the Targeted setting, and one in 
their own box and in the box of the Addressee in the Non-targeted setting. 
Linguistic difficulty was manipulated by varying the semantic distance 
between the Target-word and the five Taboo-words. The semantic distance 
could be loose (Linguistically Easy; lighter colours; see Fig. 1.3A) or could 
be semantically tight (Linguistically Difficult; darker colours).
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Figure 1.4. Tacit Communication Game. (A) Trial time-course. (B) Task  
time-course. 
In Chapter 4 and 5, a non-verbal communication game was employed in 
which Communicators innovatively generated an idiosyncratic communi-
cation system over multiple trials (Tacit Communication Game, TCG; see 
Fig. 1.4; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Stolk et al., 2015; Stolk, Hunnius, 
Bekkering, & Toni, 2013). In each trial, the aim was for Communicators to 
indicate with their token (bird) the location of a target (acorn) and for 
recipients to retrieve this token on the basis of the Communicator’s 
movements on a 3x3 digital game board. This was the only means of 
communication as interlocutors could not hear or see each other. First, 
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Communicators had unlimited time to plan the movements they wanted 
to make with the bird token (see Fig. 1.4A; Event 1). Next, they executed 
the planned movements within 5 seconds (Event 2). There was a spatial 
disparity between the possible movements a Communicator could make 
with the bird token and the potential locations where the token could be 
located. That is, a Communicator’s bird could not be overlaid on the 
target location (one of the fifteen white circles; referred to as Target- 
location), as birds could only move across the centre of a field (one of 
the nine squares) in which in some cases multiple Target-locations could 
be found. Therefore, Communicators had to generate novel communicative 
behaviours. For instance, to indicate the Target-location at the middle field 
of the top row on the left hand side, Communicators could move their 
bird to that field, and quickly move back and forth to the field adjacent 
to the Target-location (a wiggle as displayed in Fig. 1.4A; arrows on the 
grid are added for clarification purpose). Note that this is only one of the 
many ways in which participants solved the communicative problem. 
Next, the Addressee guessed the Target-location on the basis of the 
Communicator’s movements (Event 3), and moved his token (a squirrel) 
to that Target-location accordingly (Event 4). Both Communicator and 
Addressee received feedback on their joint communicative success 
(Event 5). 
Both the quality of the idiosyncratic novel communicative behaviours and 
recipient design were indexes of variations in communicative behaviours 
(see for information on the quality of communicative behaviours Chapter 
4). An index of recipient design was employed by making Communicators 
believe that they were addressing two recipients with different age and 
cognitive abilities (Adult or Child Addressee; see Fig. 1.4B). Communica-
tive adjustments to the recipients were indexed as the time spent on the 
field on which the target was located, a behaviour functionally comparable 
to prosodic stress to emphasise the importance of a particular word or 
sentence (Bolinger, 1972; Halliday, 1967; Selkirk, 1995). In fact, the 
Addressee was a confederate performing both Adult and Child roles.  
In this way, it could be measured how quickly Communicators adapted 
their adjustment behaviours based on to the global information about their 
Addressees (information given at the start of the experiment and photo-
graph of an Adult or a Child at the right upper corner of the screen) on 
the basis of the information obtained during the course of the experiment 
(local information). 
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Box 1.5. Functional and resting state MRI
A magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner uses a strong magnetic 
field to align the magnetic dipole moments of the hydrogen protons in 
the body (in this case the brain) and to induce a net magnetisation. 
Radio-frequency (RF) pulses can be used to manipulate this magnetisa-
tion. While relaxing back to the initial direction after an RF pulse, the 
magnetisation will precess around the main magnetic field and this can 
be measured using the receiver coils. Gradients in the magnetic field are 
applied to encode spatial information in the measurable signal.
Structural images of the brain can be made because relaxation after an 
RF pulse is faster or slower for different anatomical structures (white 
matter, grey matter, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and fat). This causes the 
signal intensity between these regions to differ in an MRI acquisition. In 
a similar vein, neural activation can be detected. It is generally believed 
that when a neural population becomes more active, it will consume 
more oxygen. The increase in oxygen consumptions causes a number  
of effects, including a change in oxygenation ratio, increased flow and 
vasodilation, which in turn influence the strength of the MR signal. This 
Blood-oxygen-level-dependent or BOLD response peaks a few seconds 
after neural activation and takes another few seconds to decrease to 
baseline. This means that the temporal resolution of the BOLD response 
is relatively low. However, the spatial resolution of MRI is in the order of 
millimetres, allowing us to localise neural activity with high precision.
Head motion, respiratory movements and cardiac pulsation are serious 
causes of noise in measuring brain signals with functional MRI. In order 
to control for the effects of head motion, a set of parameters on head 
displacement can be taken from volume realignment and entered as 
nuisance regressor in the statistical model of brain signal variation 
(nuisance regression; Friston, Williams, Howard, Frackowiak, & Turner, 
1996). Furthermore, noise components can be detected in a data-driven 
fashion. In that case, the data is decomposed into components with 
independent component analysis (ICA). Based on the location (edge of 
the brain or edge to CSF), correlation with motion parameters and 
frequency spectrum of the signal in the components, it is automatically 
detected which components are noise and which ones are not. If the 
component is labelled as noise, it will be regressed out (ICA-AROMA; 
Pruim, Mennes, Buitelaar, & Beckmann, 2015; Pruim, Mennes, van Rooij, 
et al., 2015).
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Brain activity can be measured during the performance of a task and 
during rest. Task-related fMRI is measured by subtracting neural activation 
between two or more different closely related tasks that only differ in the 
effect of interest. By subtracting brain activation during these conditions, 
the subtraction paradigm controls for variations in non-task related 
neural activation. Resting state functional MRI (rsfMRI) measures sponta-
neous fluctuations in the brain that are distinct, reliable and reproducible 
(Beckmann, DeLuca, Devlin, & Smith, 2005; Biswal et al., 2010; Bressler, 
1995; Damoiseaux et al., 2006). Those spatially and temporally consistent 
patterns of intrinsic activation are thought to reflect the neuronal 
dynamics that propagate through anatomically connected networks (A. 
Ghosh, Rho, McIntosh, Kötter, & Jirsa, 2008; He, Snyder, Zempel, Smyth, 
& Raichle, 2008; Honey, Kötter, Breakspear, & Sporns, 2007; Honey et 
al., 2009). Individual variations in connectivity strength between nodes 
can be measured reliably, as well as variation within an individual after 
the administration of a drug such as oxytocin (Damoiseaux et al., 2006; 
Dodhia et al., 2014; Greicius, 2008; Riem et al., 2013).

2. 
What drives successful verbal 
communication?
There is a vast amount of potential mappings between behaviours and inten-
tions in communication: a behaviour can indicate a multitude of different 
intentions, and the same intention can be communicated with a variety of 
behaviours. Humans routinely solve these many-to-many referential problems 
when producing utterances for an addressee. This ability might rely on social 
cognitive skills, for instance, the ability to manipulate unobservable summary 
variables to disambiguate ambiguous behaviour of other agents (“mental-
ising”) and the drive to invest resources into changing and understanding the 
mental state of other agents (“communicative motivation”). Alternatively, the 
ambiguities of verbal communicative interactions might be solved by general- 
purpose cognitive abilities that process cues that are incidentally associated 
with the communicative interaction. In this study, we assess these possibilities 
by testing which cognitive traits account for communicative success during a 
verbal referential task. Cognitive traits were assessed with psychometric scores 
quantifying motivation, mentalising abilities, and general-purpose cognitive 
abilities, taxing abstract visuo-spatial abilities. Communicative abilities of 
participants were assessed by using an on-line interactive task that required  
a speaker to verbally convey a concept to an addressee. The communicative 
success of the utterances was quantified by measuring how frequently a number 
of evaluators would infer the correct concept. Speakers with high motivational 
and general-purpose cognitive abilities generated utterances that were more 
easily interpreted. These findings extend to the domain of verbal communica-
tion the notion that motivational and cognitive factors influence the human 
ability to rapidly converge on shared communicative innovations.
Based on: 
De Boer, M., Willems, R.M., & Toni, I. (2013). What drives successful verbal communication? 
Frontiers in Human Neurosciences, 7, 622. 
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2.1. Introduction
Daily human communication is surprisingly effective, even though it involves 
producing and understanding utterances that are inherently ambiguous. The 
potential mapping between behaviour and intentions in communication is very 
large and many-to-many, such that similar behaviours can indicate different 
intentions and vice versa.
The ability of humans to map behaviour to intentions has been labelled inter-
active intelligence (Levinson, 2006) and might be supported by motivational 
factors and cognitive abilities. The cognitive abilities implicated in under-
standing the intentions, feelings or thoughts of others, are often labelled as 
Theory of Mind or mentalising abilities (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; C. 
D. Frith & Frith, 2012; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Motivational factors refer to 
the drive to invest resources to understand another individual, the willingness 
and motivation to spend energy understanding the mental states of others 
(Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 2009). In an alternative account, it is proposed 
that most of the time interlocutors would not have to infer the mental state of 
the other’s mind at all. Automatic alignment of representations of the other’s 
intention-to-behaviour mapping by tight coupling of production and comprehen-
sion (Pickering & Garrod, 2004) or the many cues generated during interaction 
(Shintel & Keysar, 2009) would suffice. Under most circumstances, no specific 
mentalising skills would be needed to solve the many-to-many mapping problem. 
In this perspective, communicative coordination relies on general-purpose 
cognitive abilities, as if communication would be similar to complex problem 
solving. The latter account gets credibility from the finding that, considering 
the speed of human communication, mentalising as the only strategy to solve 
the multi-mapping problem is implausible as it would require extensive cognitive 
and temporal resources (Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010; Shintel & Keysar, 2009).
Here, we test whether motivational factors, mentalising abilities, or general 
cognitive abilities in speakers predict successful tailoring of a message in a 
verbal communication game. For instance, an agent might have extremely 
sophisticated computational abilities and be able to store/retrieve a very large 
set of intention-to-behaviour mappings, but fail to do anything if not motivated 
to communicate, or fail to adjust a sophisticated intention-to-behaviour mapping 
to an addressee and make it comprehensible. Different cognitive abilities 
involved in human communication might be differently sensitive to the expres-
sion of psychological traits across a group of individuals (Baron-Cohen, Knick-
meyer, & Belmonte, 2005; De Ruiter et al., 2010). Individual variation can help 
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us understand the general principles of human communication (Levinson & 
Gray, 2012). In this study we investigate which psychometric scores indexing 
motivational factors and cognitive abilities, contribute most to a communicator’s 
success.
Previous research investigated individual sources of variation in subject pairs 
engaged in a non-verbal communication game (Volman, Noordzij, & Toni, 2012). 
The design in that study focused on how pairs of communicators establish 
communicative strategies, and how inter-subject differences influence commu-
nicative success. Communicators’ motivation to solve complex tasks, as indexed 
by the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), predicted 
communicative success. General intelligence of the addressees, as indexed by 
the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM; J. Raven, Raven, & Court, 
1995) accounted for higher accuracy scores. Although attribution of mental 
states to another person (mentalising) seems an important capacity for creating 
a new communication system that both communicator and addressee can 
comprehend, the speed and success with which such a new communicative 
system was established could not be explained by the participants’ score on 
the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), or a similar 
measure for empathy, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1983). In a 
related study using the same non-verbal communication game, the magnitude 
of communicative adjustments to a presumed addressee was explained by the 
EQ (Newman-Norlund et al., 2009). Communicators high in empathy put greater 
emphasis on crucial communicative elements when they believed their 
addressee was a child compared to when they believed their addressee was an 
adult. In contrast, individuals with high motivation for complex problems (NCS) 
were less likely to adapt their communicative behaviour toward their addressee.
The picture that emerges from those studies on non-verbal communication 
systems is that empathic traits may be beneficial for adapting communicative 
behaviour to another individual. In contrast, the ability to generate effective 
communicative acts might be mainly influenced by the motivation and ability 
to solve complex problems.
Here, we tested the role of trait variables on the ability to generate successful 
communicative interaction in the verbal domain by indexing individual differ-
ences in empathizing (EQ and IRI, respectively Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004; Davis, 1983), need for cognition (NCS, Cacioppo et al., 1984), general 
intelligence (J. C. Raven, 1962) and verbal intelligence (Groninger Intelligentie 
Test Matrix reasoning, and the Wexler Adult Intelligence Scale Similarity and 
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Vocabulary subscale, respectively Kooreman, 1987; WAIS-III., 1997). Abstract 
visuo-spatial abilities were indexed as part of the RAPM (Carpenter, Just, & 
Shell, 1990; Mackintosh & Bennett, 2005). We will examine how these factors 
in the communicator contribute to successful communication, that is, generating 
an accurate and easy interpretable message for an addressee (see Ickes, Gesn, 
& Graham, 2000 on the role of motivaiton on empathic accuracy in observators) 
in the context of an interactive word game.
In the interactive word game, both communicative setting and linguistic difficulty 
were independently manipulated. We used a paradigm called the Taboo game 
(see for additional information also Chapter 3) where a communicator had to 
describe a Target-word (e.g., “Beard”) to an addressee in one sentence without 
using Taboo-words (e.g., “chin,” “man,” “shave,” “hair” and “moustache”; 
see Fig. 2.1A). An indication of the Target-word description’s communicative 
success was obtained by evaluation of these utterances by a new group of 
subjects (labelled as evaluators, see Fig. 2.1B). The data reported in this 
manuscript relates the performance of these evaluators to the psychometric 
scores of communicators. We predict to find a similar pattern as described 
above: not mentalising abilities per se, but the motivation or general cognitive 
ability to solve complex tasks will account for effective communication in an 
existing verbal communication system. This study aims to open the way for 
understanding variations in visual perspective-taking abilities during social 
interactions. Accordingly, we pay particular attention to the RAPM as an index 
of visuo-spatial abilities (Carpenter et al., 1990; Mackintosh & Bennett, 2005).
2.2. Material and methods
2.2.1. Participants
Sixteen participants (labelled as Communicators, four males, mean age = 21 
years old, SD = 3 years) played the Taboo game in the context of an fMRI experi-
ment (see for further information Chapter 3) and completed several psychometric 
tests. All had Dutch as their mother-tongue, and did not have a known neuro-
logical history, hearing problems, dyslexia, stuttering or other language-related 
problems. In a separate experimental session, sixteen subjects naive to the 
Taboo game evaluated the Target-word descriptions generated by the Commu-
nicators. These Evaluators (four males, mean age = 20 years old, SD = 3 years) 
did not have language, hearing or eyesight difficulties and had Dutch as their 
mother tongue. The data reported in this manuscript relates the performance of 
the Evaluators to the psychometric scores of Communicators.
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Figure 2.1. Experimental procedure. (A) Obtaining Target-word descriptions. In 
an fMRI experiment Communicators had to describe a Target-word (“beard”) to 
an Addressee (confederate) without using Taboo-words (“chin,” “man,” “shave,” 
“hair” and “moustache”). In the Targeted setting (depicted in red), Communica-
tors were made to believe that the Addressee was unbeknownst of the Target-
word (right empty box next to the Target-word “beard”). In the Non-targeted 
setting (depicted in orange), Communicators were aware that the Addressee 
already knew the Target-word. Communicators were reminded of this by printing 
What drives successful verbal communication?
2
43
the Target-word twice on the Communicator’s screen. (B) Obtaining indications 
of communicative success (in gray). First, Evaluators, naive of the Taboo game 
experiment, listened to the Target-word description made during the Taboo 
game. Second, Evaluators were asked to consider which Target-word they 
thought was described. Third, they were to type in their answer (Guess-word) 
and lastly, they filled out how difficult they found it to come up with their answer 
on a scale from one till five (1 “difficult,” 5 “easy”; referred to as “certainty 
scores”). A measure of Communicators’ success was obtained by counting the 
Evaluators’ correct guesses divided by the total amount of trials per condition.
2.2.2. Procedure
2.2.2.1. Descriptions from Communicators
Experimental material was obtained in the context of an fMRI study (for further 
details see Chapter 3). Communicators generated descriptions for a confederate 
(referred to as Addressee) after which we obtained their psychometric scores on 
various cognitive abilities and motivational factors (for details of the acquisition 
of the Communicators’ psychometric scores, see “Psychometric indexes of 
individual cognitive abilities of Communicators”). In a separate study, a group 
of new participants labelled as Evaluators rated these descriptions’ commu-
nicative success.
Communicators made descriptions of 60 concrete nouns (Target-words). They 
would for instance have to describe the Target-word “Beard” without using five 
so called Taboo-words “chin,” “man,” “shave,” “hair” and “moustache” (see 
Fig. 2.1A). Communicator and Addressee could clearly hear each other’s 
utterances via MR (Magnetic Resonance) compatible headphones, with the 
Addressee inferring the Target-word that the Communicator described. Since the 
Communicator was lying in the MR scanner, we filtered out scanner noise using 
the audacity noise reduction function (Audacity from http://audacity.source-
forge.net/) to increase the audibility of the Target-word descriptions. Descrip-
tions lasted on average 5.14 seconds (SD = 0.68 seconds). In the Taboo game, 
two factors were manipulated: COMMUNICATIVE SETTING and LINGUISTIC DIFFI-
CULTY. COMMUNICATIVE SETTING was manipulated by changing the Communi-
cator’s belief of the Addressee’s knowledge of the Target-word. In the Targeted 
setting the Communicator generated the description for a specific other (a 
confederate), who gave wrong answers on a prescribed set of trials (30% of the 
trials). In case of a wrong trial, Communicators were asked to generate a new 
Target-word description consecutively. These repeated trials were not rated by 
the Evaluators. In the Non-targeted setting, it was explained to Communicators 
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that the Addressee was already aware of the Target-word and that this person 
was only overhearing the Communicator’s Target-word description. Communica-
tors were reminded that the Addressee already knew the Target-word by printing 
the Target-word twice on the Communicator’s screen (see Fig. 2.1A). LINGUISTIC 
DIFFICULTY was manipulated by varying the semantic distance between Target-
word and Taboo-words. During Easy trials, Communicators described Target-
words without using Taboo-words that were loosely semantically related to the 
Target-word (e.g., Target-word “Rainbow,” Taboo-words: “water,” “sound,” 
“poem,” “clover,” “violet”). During Difficult trials, Communicators described 
Target-words without using Taboo-words that were closely semantically related 
to the Target-word (such as the “Beard” example above).
During the Targeted and the Non-targeted setting, half of the trials were Easy, 
and half of the trials were Difficult. Lexical frequency of Target and Taboo-
words was matched between all conditions (CELEX database; Baayen, Piepen-
brock, & Gulikers, 1995). Stimulus lists were pseudo-randomised in two sets 
such that participants did not describe the same Target-words in Targeted and 
Non-targeted setting. Half of the Communicators described Target-words of set 
A in the Targeted setting and Target-words of set B in the Non-targeted setting. 
The other half of the Communicators described Target-words in the opposite 
settings, meaning set B in the Targeted setting and set A in the Non-targeted 
setting. More Communicators completed Set A during the Targeted setting. To 
prevent Evaluators from hearing certain Target-word descriptions more often 
generated in the Targeted or the Non-targeted setting, four out of the twenty 
Communicators of the original Taboo game experiment were excluded at 
random. With sixty Target-word descriptions of sixteen Communicators; there 
were a total of 960 unique Target-word descriptions.
2.2.2.2. Evaluators
In the current experiment, a new group of participants evaluated these Target-
word descriptions from Chapter 3 to obtain an indication of the Communicator’s 
communicative success. After reading a written instruction, Evaluators 
completed three practice trials not used in the remainder of the experiment, 
and then performed the actual task in two blocks of approximately thirty minutes 
each. Trials were separated in different phases. At first, a black screen was 
presented in which a fixation cross appeared. The Evaluators heard a Target-
word description made by one of the Communicators, e.g., “Something on your 
face that goes from ear to ear.” Evaluators planned their response with a cut-off 
time of twenty seconds and typed which Target-word they thought was described 
(Guess-word). Thereafter, Evaluators were asked to give a score from one to 
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five on how difficult they found it to generate their answer with “1” meaning 
that they found this very difficult and “5” meaning that they found this very easy 
(from now on referred to as “certainty score”). After a randomised inter-trial 
interval (mean = 4.5 s, SD = 0.93 s), the next trial was presented.  
The experiment was performed using Presentation software (Version 10.2, 
www.neurobs.com) and presented on a laptop computer via earphones.  
Stimulus presentation was pseudo-randomised such that each Communicator’s 
Target-word description was rated by two different Evaluators. In total, each  
Evaluator heard a total of 120 unique Target-word descriptions, eight from the 
same Communicator: two recorded during the Targeted Easy condition, two 
recorded during the Targeted Difficult condition, two during the Non-targeted 
Easy and two during the Non-targeted Difficult condition. Descriptions of the 
same Communicator or the same Target-word would never be presented in 
immediate succession; neither would Evaluators hear a description of a 
particular Target-word more than once per block. For instance, in the first block, 
Evaluators would hear a recording of a Target-word description of “Beard” by 
Communicator A, and in the second block they would hear a recording of a 
Target-word description of “Beard” by Communicator B.
2.2.2.3. Psychometric indexes of individual cognitive abilities of Communicators
After playing the Taboo game, each Communicator completed psychometric 
tests to characterize their empathising abilities (EQ and IRI, respectively Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Davis, 1983), motivation for complex tasks (NCS, 
Cacioppo et al., 1984), general intelligence (RAPM; J. Raven et al., 1995) and 
verbal intelligence (GIT Matrices, WAIS Similarity and WAIS Vocabulary 
subscale, respectively Kooreman, 1987; WAIS-III., 1997) Since the focus of our 
paper was on the Communicator, no psychometric indexes of cognitive abili-
ties or motivational factors were taken from the Evaluators.
The EQ indexes both cognitive and affective empathy. It characterizes cognitive 
empathy (mentalising), reactivity and social skill but is not correlated with 
social desirability (Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 
2003; Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004). Instead of calcu-
lating one scale, empathy can also be indexed in four subscales as is done in 
the IRI (Davis, 1983). The Perspective Taking subscale indexes the ease with 
which one can take the point of view or perspective of the other. The Fantasy 
subscale indexes how easily somebody can identify himself/herself with a 
fictional character. There are two subscales of emotional reactions: the Empathic 
Concern subscale indexes feelings of compassion and warmth, while the 
Personal Distress subscale indexes the tendency to feel discomfort when 
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observing another person in distress. Motivation to be engaged in complex 
tasks, such as we assume the Taboo game is, was indexed with the NCS 
(Cacioppo et al., 1984). The EQ, IRI and NCS are self-report Likert scale type 
questionnaires. All three questionnaires were completed with paper and pencil.
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (J. Raven et al., 1995) index general intelli-
gence. Two separate factors underlie performance on the RAPM. Part of the items 
are solved by verbal-analytical rules, whereas other items tend to be solved using 
visual-spatial rules (Carpenter et al., 1990; DeShon, Chan, & Weissbein, 1995). 
Communicators had to complete as many of the 36 items (RAPM set II) as 
possible within twenty minutes. The Communicator’s RAPM score was calculated 
by adding up the number of correctly completed items within that time.
Communicators high in verbal intelligence may have a larger vocabulary and, 
due to their increased word reasoning skills, have easier access to alternatives 
for Taboo-words. The WAIS Vocabulary subscale (WAIS-III., 1997) indexes word 
understanding and how well this word understanding can be expressed. Partic-
ipants are asked to give definitions of words that become increasingly more 
unfamiliar. Word reasoning skills were indexed by the Groninger Intelligence 
Test Matrix Reasoning subscale (GIT Matrix Reasoning; Kooreman, 1987). 
Participants are asked to solve analogies, such as “if table is to wood, stove  
is to iron, thus shoe is to ...” During the WAIS Similarity subscale (WAIS-III., 
1997), participants are asked to describe how common objects or concepts are 
similar, e.g., “what is the similarity between a bike and a car?” All the verbal 
intelligence subscales were taken orally and scored according to prescribed 
standards (Kooreman, 1987; WAIS-III., 1997).
2.2.2.4. Communicative success
Our measure of communicative success was based on the correct guesses  
of the Evaluators divided by the total amount of trials per condition. In the 
following cases, we rated the Evaluators’ guesses as correct: if the Guess-word 
had exactly the same word form as the Taboo-word, if the Guess-word was a 
compound instead of a head, or vice versa (for example “woonwijk” or “wijk” 
meaning “living district” and “neighbourhood”), if it was a synonym (“leunstoel” 
by “fauteuil,” meaning “armchair” and “lounge chair”), or if it was a diminutive 
(e.g., “munt” by “muntje” meaning “coin” and “little coin”). In this manner, 
we were able to consider successful communication of word meaning.
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2.2.3. Statistical analysis
Accuracy and certainty scores of Evaluators were analyzed using a 2 × 2 within 
subjects ANOVA with factors COMMUNICATIVE SETTING (Targeted and Non- 
targeted) and LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTY (Easy and Difficult). First, to assess which 
psychometric indexes explained variance in description quality, we performed a 
regression analysis with communicative success in the Targeted setting as a 
dependent variable. Second, to correct for the individual differences in general 
performance on the Taboo game, a second analysis was conducted comparing 
the Targeted to the Non-targeted setting by subtracting the communicative 
success scores obtained from the Targeted and the Non-targeted setting. Third, 
regression analyses were conducted to investigate which cognitive traits 
explained communicative success during our manipulation of LINGUISTIC DIFFI-
CULTY (Difficult, Easy and Easy subtracted from Difficult). In each regression 
analysis, the Communicators’ psychometric scores on all tests were entered as 
independent regressors in a stepwise fashion: a variation on the forward algo-
rithm. Only those independent factors whose contribution was unique and signifi-
cant were entered in the model (p < 0.05), while at each subsequent search step 
redundant factors were removed. Since questionnaires indexing the same cogni-
tive ability may potentially correlate, e.g., mentalising ability was indexed by both 
the EQ and the IRI), we considered whether predictors correlated strongly with 
one another, but Pearson’s correlation coefficients were <0.8 across regressors. 
Only independent variables explaining unique variance are reported. All statistical 
analyses were conducted with IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows (Version 19.0).
2.3. Results
2.3.1. Reaction times, certainty ratings and accuracy scores
Evaluators on average took 2.5 s (SD = 0.5 s) to generate a Guess-word. Evalu-
ators found the task rather difficult (mean certainty rating = 2.25, SD = 0.29, 
1–5 scale). However, Evaluators comprehended the Communicators’ Target-
word descriptions well (mean percentage correct = 73%, SD = 5%, minimum 
score 62% and maximum 83%). There was no interaction in reaction times, 
certainty ratings, or accuracy scores between COMMUNICATIVE SETTING 
(Targeted, Non-targeted) and LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTY (Easy, Difficult), neither 
was there a main effect of COMMUNICATIVE SETTING (Targeted, Non-targeted). 
Evaluators planned shorter, were more certain and more accurate for Target-
word descriptions made in the Easy condition (for statistics see Table 2.1).
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Measure and effect df F MSE p
Reaction time
Communicative setting 1,15 < 1 32.2 0.73
Linguistic difficulty 1,15 11.25 30.66 < 0.01
Communicative setting*linguistic difficulty 1,15 1.48 53.37 0.24
Certainty rating
Communicative setting 1,15 2.78 0.05 0.12
Linguistic difficulty 1,15 11.75 0.06 < 0.01
Communicative setting*linguistic difficulty 1,15 1.53 0.07 0.24
Accuracy
Communicative setting 1,15 < 1 0.02 0.87
Linguistic difficulty 1,15 7.45 0 <0.05
Communicative setting*linguistic difficulty 1,15 < 1 0.01 0.91
Table 2.1. Repeated measures analysis of variance was applied on reaction 
times, certainty ratings and accuracy scores of Evaluators when listening to 
Target-word descriptions made by Communicators in an earlier conducted 
fMRI experiment. The model contained the factors COMMUNICATIVE SETTING 
(descriptions that Evaluators listened to were made in the Targeted or the 
Non-targeted setting) and LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTY (descriptions were made in 
the Easy or Difficult condition). Evaluators planned shorter (F(1,15) = 11.25,  
p < 0.01), were more certain (F(1,15) = 11.75, p < 0.01) and more accurate (F(1,15) 
= 7.45, p < 0.05) for Target-word descriptions made in the Easy condition.
2.3.2. Communicative success and individual differences
Only those regressors explaining a statistically significant portion of variance 
are described here (for statistics see Table 2.2.). Communicative success 
during the Targeted setting was positively driven by the Communicators’ moti-
vation to solve complex tasks as indexed by the NCS (Table 2.2, see Fig. 2.2A). 
No such effect was observed during the Non-targeted setting. Indexes of 
empathy (IRI, EQ) did not account significantly for variance in performance.
To correct for individual differences in general performance on the Taboo 
game, a model to account for communicative success during the Targeted 
setting compared with the Non-targeted setting was created. The difference  
in accuracy scores between the two conditions was positively driven by the 
Communicator’s general intelligence as indexed by the RAPM (see Table 2.2, 
Fig. 2.2B). Neither the EQ, nor any of the IRI subscales could account for the 
difference in success across the communicative settings.
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R2 = 0.32, p < 0.05
R2 = 0.3, p < 0.05
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Figure 2.2. Communicative success as evaluated by a new group of participants 
(in percentage correct) plotted against the psychometric indexes of the 
Communicators. (A) Communicators’ scores on motivation for complex tasks  
as indexed by the NCS drive communicative success in the Targeted setting.  
R2 = 0.3, p < 0.05, regression line is solid, data points represented as dots.  
(B) Communicators’ scores on general intelligence as indexed by Raven’s 
Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM) drive communicative success in the 
Targeted setting compared to the Non-targeted setting. R2 = 0.32, p < 0.05, 
regression line is solid, data points represented as closed dots. A positive 
difference score indicates that Communicators performed better in the Targeted 
setting, a negative score that Communicators performed better in the Non-tar-
geted setting. 
Experimental condition Psychometric index Beta df F p Effect size
Targeted NCS 0.54 1,14 5.86 < 0.05 0.3
Targeted - 
Non-targeted
Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrices
0.56 1,14 6.43 < 0.05 0.32
Difficult WAIS Vocabulary 0.65 2,13 9.98 < 0.01 0.61
IRI Personal distress 0.46
Easy
 
NCS 0.55 2,13 8.4 < 0.05 0.56
IRI Personal distress 0.51        
Table 2.2. Overview of psychometric indexes significantly accounting for 
communicative success in the different experimental conditions. Effect size  
is R2.
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Verbal abilities as indexed with the WAIS vocabulary subscale positively 
accounted for communicative success during Difficult trials (collapsed across 
Targeted and Non-targeted settings). Furthermore, the Communicator’s score 
on the IRI personal distress subscale, which indexes the tendency to feel 
discomfort when observing somebody else’s distress, was predictive of accu-
racy scores on Difficult trials. For Easy trials, the same subscale (IRI personal 
distress) and the Communicator’s NCS positively accounted for communicative 
success. None of the psychometric indexes explained variance of communica-
tive success in Difficult compared to Easy trials. 
2.4. Discussion
We have employed inter-subject differences in trait parameters and commu-
nicative performance to examine whether motivational factors, mentalising 
skills, or general-purpose cognitive abilities preferentially accounted for 
communicative success. In an interactive verbal communication task, partici-
pants (communicators) were asked to describe concepts without using a 
number of semantically related words (Chapter 3). Successful communication 
was quantified by how frequently a group of new participants (evaluators) 
would infer the correct concept. We found that motivational factors, as indexed 
by the communicator’s motivation to solve complex tasks (NCS), were positively 
driving successful communication in a communicative (“Targeted”) setting. 
These findings extend previous observations (Volman et al., 2012) to the 
domain of verbal communication, to show the importance of motivational 
factors in communicative behaviour. Communicators high in need for cognition 
may make more effort to select the intention-to-behaviour mapping that is best 
comprehensible. They may be more flexible in finding alternatives, if the solution 
they generated turned out to be incomprehensible for their addressee (Cacioppo 
et al., 1984; Evans, Kirby, & Fabrigar, 2003). However, need for cognition did not 
explain variance in communicative success, when we directly compared the 
Targeted versus the Non-targeted settings. That is, need for cognition was 
important in explaining performance during the communicative (Targeted) 
trials overall, but not when directly comparing Targeted versus Non-targeted 
trials. Comparing Targeted versus Non-targeted settings directly revealed that 
communicative success was significantly predicted by communicators’ gener-
al-purpose cognitive ability as indexed by Raven’s Advanced Progressive 
Matrices (J. Raven et al., 1995). A communicator’s high general intelligence 
may be beneficial for the generation of efficient behaviours in several ways. It 
may help storage of speaker history (Galati & Brennan, 2010; Horton & Gerrig, 
2005; Shintel & Keysar, 2009), executive control (Ybarra & Winkielman, 2012), 
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and working memory capacity (Lin et al., 2010). This idea fits with recent 
evidence showing tightly matched neural dynamics in subjects solving 
communicative and rule-based solo problems (Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013).
From our findings, we can only speculate as to whether communicator’s success 
in this communication game is driven by general cognitive abilities, or more 
specifically by visuo-spatial abilities. Research on the underlying cognitive 
processes of the RAPM has suggested that some of Raven’s matrices are solved 
using a visuo-spatial strategy (Carpenter et al., 1990; DeShon et al., 1995; but 
for an alternative view see Plaisted, Bell, & Mackintosh, 2011). This abstract 
visuo-spatial ability may positively drive effective search of alternatives for 
words that cannot be used to generate the Target-word description (Taboo-
words). Communicators with a high RAPM score may be more skilful in finding 
words that can be easily interpreted by the addressee, and as a consequence, 
be more effective in solving the intention-to-behaviour mapping problem.
Given that the communication task used in this study relied on verbal material, 
it might appear surprising that the psychometric indexes of verbal ability (GIT 
or WAIS subscales, Kooreman, 1987; WAIS-III., 1997) did not significantly 
account for variation in communicative success. Yet, the verbal intelligence  
of the communicator (WAIS) was important for solving trials where the Taboo-
words were closely semantically related to the Target-word (Difficult trials).  
This may be an indication that linguistic abilities accounted for communicative 
success in semantically difficult trials in general, but not for communicative 
trials specifically. These findings support the notion of a cognitive difference 
between linguistic and communicative abilities (Chapter 3; Willems & Varley, 
2010).
Importantly, mentalising abilities, as indexed by general cognitive empathy, 
emotional reactivity, social skill (EQ: Lawrence et al., 2004) or as indexed by 
the Perspective Taking, Fantasy, Empathic Concern and Personal Distress 
subscales (IRI; Davis, 1983), were also not significantly related to communica-
tive success as a function of the communicative setting. Yet, a communicator’s 
personal distress was important for solving trials where Taboo-words were 
closely semantically related to the Target-word (Difficult trials). This result is not 
immediately compatible with the idea that mentalising abilities are important for 
generating a comprehensible message. However, this does not preclude the 
possibility that mentalising abilities are important for implementing communica-
tive adjustments toward a specific addressee, as previously shown in the context 
of non-verbal communication (Newman-Norlund et al., 2009). Nor does it 
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preclude that mentalising abilities are employed in communicative task 
settings. As a matter of fact, the fMRI data of the study from which our materials 
were taken, shows that participants activate mentalising related brain areas 
when designing a communicative message for a specific other (Chapter 3).  
The present findings add to this that the individual differences in mentalising 
abilities are not indicative of communicative success, but this obviously 
does not mean that such abilities are not used in communication.
The current study is a first step in the direction to point out the role of motiva-
tional factors and cognitive abilities on verbal communicative success. Given 
that the main experiment was performed in an MR environment, the interaction 
was quite rigidly structured and, as a consequence, not all constituents of social 
interaction (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010; Schilbach et al., 2012) were 
present during the game. For instance, the role of communicator and addressee 
was fixed, and there was a maximum duration of the time interval during which 
communicator and addressee were allowed to speak. Our task was interactive 
in the sense that communicators were actively engaged in our verbal interaction 
game. Interlocutors’ performance depended on the clarity of the description of 
the communicator and the comprehension of the addressee. The interlocutors 
could to some extent monitor and adjust their behaviour on the basis of feed-
back (correct or incorrect), and on the timing of the on-line interaction (e.g., 
time interval required by a communicator to organize an utterance, and by an 
addressee to reply). In this study, we focussed on the role of the communicator. 
Future research should study the effect of cognitive abilities and motivational 
factors on both interlocutors and should investigate additional factors that 
could be of influence on communicative success, such as the role of motivation 
to engage in social interaction or the extent of the pre-existing common ground 
(e.g., strangers or close friends). Not only should these factors be studied at the 
individual level, but also on the “second person” level, the level that comes 
about between interlocutors (Becchio, Sartori, & Castiello, 2010; De Jaegher et 
al., 2010; Schilbach et al., 2012).
More generally, our data speak to the observation that if a communicator has a 
global idea of her addressee, she may not always need to employ mentalising 
abilities immediately or exclusively (Shintel & Keysar, 2009). As Zaki and 
Ochsner (2012) put it, in communication it is not either mentalising, or general 
cognitive abilities, but more a question of “when/how” the one system is used 
and when/how the other system is used.
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2.4.1. Conclusion
We have employed individual variation to examine whether motivational factors, 
mentalising skills, or general cognitive abilities preferentially accounted for 
communicative success. We found that motivational factors (“need for cogni-
tion”) and general-purpose cognitive abilities (Raven’s Advanced Progressive 
Matrices) were positively driving successful communication in an interactive 
communication task. These findings extend previous observations (Volman et 
al., 2012) to the domain of verbal communication and stress the importance of 
motivation and general-purpose cognitive abilities in communicative success. 
Mentalising or empathy scores did not explain communicative success in the 
paradigm that we employed here. Future research should be directed toward 
understanding under which circumstances communicative behaviour is most 
driven by motivational and general cognitive factors, and when differences in 
mentalising abilities between individuals do make a difference.
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3. 
A dissociation between linguistic 
and communicative abilities in the 
human brain
Although language is an effective vehicle for communication, it is unclear how 
linguistic and communicative abilities relate to each other. Some researchers 
have argued that communicative message generation involves perspective 
taking (mentalising), and—crucially—that mentalising depends on language. 
We employed a verbal communication paradigm to directly test whether the 
generation of a communicative action relies on mentalising and whether the 
cerebral bases of communicative message generation are distinct from parts of 
cortex sensitive to linguistic variables. We found that dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex, a brain area consistently associated with mentalising, was sensitive 
to the communicative intent of utterances, irrespective of linguistic difficulty. 
In contrast, left inferior frontal cortex, an area known to be involved in language, 
was sensitive to the linguistic demands of utterances, but not to communicative 
intent. These findings show that communicative and linguistic abilities rely on 
cerebrally (and computationally) distinct mechanisms. 
Based on:
Willems, R.M.*, De Boer, M.*,  de Ruiter, J.P., Noordzij, M.L, Hagoort, P., & Toni, I. (2010).  
A dissociation between linguistic and communicative abilities in the human brain.  
Psychological Science, 21(1), 8-14.
* R. M. Willems and M. de Boer made equal contributions to this work. 
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3.1. introduction
Language is an enormously effective means of communication, and it might 
appear that human communicative abilities are just a subset of linguistic 
skills. In fact, the cognitive and evolutionary relation between language and 
communication is actively debated (Carruthers, 2002; Levinson, 2006; Newton 
& de Villiers, 2007; Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & 
Moll, 2005; Varley & Siegal, 2000). In this report, we address a crucial element 
of this debate, namely, whether linguistic and communicative abilities are 
linked by their reliance on mentalising; the capacity to deal with mental states 
of other people (C. D. Frith & Frith, 2006; Levinson, 2006; Newton & de Villiers, 
2007; Varley & Siegal, 2000). 
Some scholars have argued for the primacy of linguistic skills in supporting  
the cognitive architecture of human mentalising abilities (Carruthers, 2002; 
Newton & de Villiers, 2007). For instance, Newton and de Villiers showed that 
performance on a mentalising task (false-belief task) was impaired when 
paired with verbal shadowing, but was not impaired when paired with rhythmic 
finger tapping. The authors suggested that taxing the language system via 
verbal shadowing hindered performance on the false-belief task and that 
therefore language is needed for mentalising. Contrary evidence comes from 
aphasic patients with severely impaired linguistic abilities, who nonetheless 
perform well on mentalising tasks (Varley & Siegal, 2000). 
In this study, we contributed to this debate by asking whether the generation 
of communicative intentions relies on the same cognitive mechanisms that 
support mentalising abilities (C. D. Frith & Frith, 2006; Levinson, 2006; 
Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello et al., 2005). We hypothesized that mentalising 
is essential for selecting communicative actions, and more specifically, that 
it is essential for adapting communicative behaviours to what an interlocutor 
knows and believes (Clark, 1996). If the mentalising abilities used during 
communicative behaviour are related to the language system (Carruthers, 2002; 
Newton & de Villiers, 2007), there should be overlap between cerebral structures 
supporting mentalising and linguistic processes. Previous studies of mentalising 
reported activations in language-related brain areas (Sassa et al., 2007; Tylén, 
Wallentin, & Roepstorff, 2009), and studies of language reported activations in 
the mentalising network (Ferstl, Neumann, Bogler, & Von Cramon, 2008; Mason & 
Just, 2006). However, those studies were not designed to dissociate mentalising 
and linguistic effects. In our study, we independently manipulated communica-
tive intent and linguistic processing to directly test whether the neuro-cognitive 
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bases of communicative and linguistic abilities are distinct, and how they relate 
to mentalising (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello et al., 2005). 
We measured cerebral activity (with functional magnetic resonance imaging, 
fMRI) while healthy participants engaged in a verbal communication task. We 
compared brain states during the generation of utterances differing in commu-
nicative intent and investigated how these cerebral responses were modulated 
by linguistic difficulty. If the generation of a communicative act for a specific 
agent (audience design; Clark, 1996) involves mentalising, then cerebral struc-
tures previously associated with mentalising (medial prefrontal cortex; posterior 
superior temporal sulcus, or pSTS; and temporo-parietal junction; C. D. Frith & 
Frith, 2006) should be sensitive to the subjects’ communicative intent. Further-
more, if linguistic abilities are dependent upon communicative abilities, then 
activity in these mentalising-related structures should be modulated by 
linguistic difficulty. Alternatively, if communicative and linguistic capacities 
are supported by cognitively distinct mechanisms, then different cerebral 
structures should be sensitive to communicative intent and linguistic difficulty. 
3.2. Material and methods
3.2.1. Participants
Twenty healthy right-handed participants (16 female and 4 male; mean age = 22 
years, range = 18–30) without known neurological history, dyslexia, or hearing 
complaints, and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, took part in the 
study. All participants had Dutch as their mother tongue. 
3.2.2. Procedure
Participants (Communicators) were asked to describe concepts (Target-words; 
e.g., “Beard”) to another person (the Addressee, a confederate) by using a single 
sentence and avoiding pre-specified words (Taboo-words; e.g., “chin,” “man,” 
“shave,” “hair” and “moustache”; see Fig. 3.1A). The Communicator and 
Addressee could clearly hear each other’s utterances (by means of magnet-
ic-resonance-imaging-compatible headphones). The Addressee inferred the 
Target-word on the basis of the utterances generated by the Communicator, 
who was lying in an MRI scanner. 
3.2.3. Experimental design
We independently manipulated COMMUNICATIVE SETTING and LINGUISTIC DIFFI-
CULTY in a 2 × 2 factorial design (see Fig. 3.1A). The first factor was COMMUNICA-
TIVE SETTING, which involved a manipulation of the communicative intent of the 
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Communicator. Communicative intent was operationalised as the presence or 
absence of the need to convey a specific concept to a specific agent. In the 
Targeted setting (depicted in red), the Communicator was told that the Addressee 
did not know the Target-word. In the Non-targeted setting (depicted in orange), 
the Communicator was told that the Addressee already knew the Target-word. 
 In fact, in both trial types, the Addressee was a confederate with previous know-
ledge of the Target-word. The second factor was LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTY. In Difficult 
trials (in darker colours), the Taboo-words were semantically closely related to the 
Target-word, and the Communicator needed to build an utterance by searching 
distant portions of the semantic space surrounding the Target-word. In Easy trials 
(depicted in lighter colours), there was a large semantic distance between 
Target and Taboo-words, and the Communicator could use the semantic space 
adjacent to the Target-word. For instance, an Easy trial could contain Target-word 
“Rainbow” with Taboo-words “water,” “sound,” “poem,” “clover,” and “violet”).
The experiment was run in two consecutive sessions: one session in the 
Targeted setting and one session in the Non-targeted setting. The order was 
counterbalanced across participants. Each session contained 30 task trials 
(15 Easy and 15 Difficult) and 30 control trials, in which the Communicator was 
presented a list of words to be read and uttered out loud. 
Lexical frequency of Target- and Taboo-words was matched between all  
conditions (using CELEX; Baayen et al., 1995). Stimulus lists were pseudo- 
randomised to avoid having participants describe the same Target-word in 
Targeted and Non-targeted settings. All materials were in Dutch. 
Task trials consisted of five phases (Fig. 3.1B). First, Communicators were 
presented with Target- and Taboo-words and were required to plan their utter-
ance. Second, Communicators uttered their one-sentence description, which 
they had to do within at most 10 s. Third, the Addressee planned his answer, 
and fourth, he uttered the answer. Fifth, the experimenter provided feedback 
by presenting a green (correct) or red (incorrect) square. In the Targeted setting, 
the Addressee (confederate) gave wrong answers on a prescribed set (30%) of 
trials. A red square was presented after these trials, and each such trial was 
immediately repeated to give the Communicator a second chance to describe 
the Target-word (repeat trials). Repeat trials were modelled in the fMRI anal-
ysis, but were not used for statistical inference. In the Non-targeted setting, 
the Addressee did not utter a response, and, hence, there was no Phase 3 in 
which the Communicator listened to the Addressee’s response. Feedback in 
the Non-targeted setting was always a green square (correct). 
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Figure 3.1. Stimuli and experimental design. (A) Example trials. (B) Trial time-
course. The tasks of the Communicator and Addressee during the five phases  
of a task trial are shown. All functional magnetic resonance imaging analysis 
focused on the planning phases (Phase 1), in which the Communicator generated 
a communicative act. All materials were in Dutch. 
The Communicator and Addressee pressed a button to proceed from one 
phase of a trial to the next. In the fMRI analysis, we distinguished the planning 
phase (Phase 1, phase of interest) from the other phases (phases not of interest 
Noordzij et al., 2010; Toni, Schluter, Josephs, Friston, & Passingham, 1999). This 
allowed us to isolate cerebral responses associated with the planning of an 
utterance from artifacts linked to speech production. Participants were familiar-
ized with the paradigm by means of five practice trials in the Targeted setting, 
and by five practice trials in the Non-targeted setting.
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3.2.4. Data acquisition and analysis
Echo-planar images were acquired with an eight-channel head coil on a 3-T 
Siemens magnetic resonance imaging system (repetition time = 2,060 ms; echo 
time = 30 ms; flip angle = 85°, field of view = 224 mm; 31 transversal slices; 
voxel size = 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.5 mm). Pre-processing involved realignment by means 
of rigid body registration, slice timing correction to the onset of the first slice, 
normalization to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space, interpolation to 
2 × 2 × 2-mm voxels, and spatial smoothing (8 mm full-width at half-maximum).
First-level analysis was done in the context of the general linear model and 
involved a multiple regression analysis with regressors describing the planning 
phases of the different trial types (Easy, Difficult, control) and the speaking and 
listening phases of the Communicator. Regressors describing repeat trials (in 
the Targeted setting only) were also included. Magnetic resonance disturbances 
induced by speaking were accounted for by including the full Volterra expansions 
of the scan-by-scan estimated head motion and scan-by-scan average signals from 
outside the brain, white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid as regressors (Verhagen, 
Grol, Dijkerman, & Toni, 2006). Head motion never exceeded 3 mm, or 3°. 
The second-level group analysis was a factorial design with the factors of 
COMMUNICATIVE SETTING (Targeted, Non-targeted) and LINGUISTIC DIFFI-
CULTY (Easy, Difficult). This analysis was based on four contrast images from 
the planning stage for each subject: “Easy > control” and “Difficult > control” 
independently estimated for Targeted and Non-targeted trials. Correction for 
violation of the sphericity assumption was applied when appropriate. All 
results were corrected for multiple comparisons by combining a p < .001 voxel-
level threshold with a cluster extent threshold to obtain a p < .05 whole-brain-
corrected significance level (Friston et al., 1996). Given our previous work, we 
assessed the contribution of pSTS (15-mm spherical region of interest with MNI 
coordinates of [50 –42 14] and [–50 –42 14]; Noordzij et al., 2010) by masking 
the simple main effect of semantic difficulty during Targeted trials with the 
COMMUNICATIVE SETTING × LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTY interaction, using small-
volume correction at p < .05. 
Behavioural data analysis involved repeated measures analysis of variance on 
planning duration, speaking duration, and the number of words per description. 
The factors in these analyses were COMMUNICATIVE SETTING (Targeted, Non- 
targeted) and LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTY (Easy, Difficult). 
BETWEEN THE LINES62
3.2.5. Post-test
In a separate post-test, we assessed whether the quality of Communicators 
descriptions was influenced by COMMUNICATIVE SETTING or LINGUISTIC DIFFI-
CULTY. Sixteen new participants listened to 192 utterances (equally distributed 
across conditions) from Communicators in the fMRI experiment, and guessed 
which Target-word was described in each utterance. Semantic distance 
between their answer and the Target-word was computed using a distribution-
al-proximity-based method on a large corpus of written Dutch (van der Plas, 
2008). The computation of semantic distance gave a number indicating the 
amount of overlap between two words (from 0, indicating no overlap, to 1, 
indicating perfect semantic overlap). This additional analysis allowed us to 
assess whether the quality of Communicators’ descriptions varied by COMMU-
NICATIVE SETTING and LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTY.
3.3. Results
There were no behavioural differences between the Targeted and the Non- 
targeted setting, as indexed by planning times, speaking times, or number of 
words used in the utterances (Fig. 3.2A and 3.2B; Table 3.1). Moreover, the 
post-test on the quality of the descriptions showed that there was no effect of 
COMMUNICATIVE SETTING on quality of description (Fig. 3.2C; Table 3.1). 
Measure and effect df F MSE
Planning time
Communicative setting 1,19 < 1 28.69
Linguistic difficulty 1,19 57.81 21.32
Communicative setting*linguistic difficulty 1,19 < 1 7.35
Speaking time
Communicative setting 1,19 1.35 0.53
Linguistic difficulty 1,19 10.55 0.25
Communicative setting*linguistic difficulty 1,19 < 1 0.38
Number of words
Communicative setting 1,19 2.64 4.29
Linguistic difficulty 1,19 1.95 0.75
Communicative setting*linguistic difficulty 1,19 1.16 1.11
Quality of descriptions
Communicative setting 1,15 < 1 0.006
Linguistic difficulty 1,15 4.54 0.007
Communicative setting*linguistic difficulty 1,15 < 1 0.001
Table 3.1. Behavioural results. 
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Figure 3.2. Behavioural results. (A) Mean planning duration. (B) Speaking 
duration. (C) Quality of descriptions. Quality was determined by the post-test 
as a function of COMMUNICATIVE SETTING (Targeted and Non-targeted) and 
LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTY (Easy and Difficult). For statistical analyses, see Table 
3.1. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
Despite this behavioural equivalence for Targeted and Non-targeted trials, 
Targeted trials evoked stronger responses than Non-targeted trials in a 
confined portion of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (Fig. 3.3A; Table 3.2), a 
region known to be involved in tasks requiring mentalising (C. D. Frith & Frith, 
2006; Northoff et al., 2006), including making inferences about mental states 
of agents different from oneself (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). We show 
that the same area is involved in the generation of a communicative utterance 
provided that the recipient of that utterance is believed not to have the same 
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knowledge as the speaker.1 No areas were sensitive to the opposite contrast 
(Non-targeted > Targeted trials). Table 3.2 shows the contrasts from an fMRI 
whole-brain analysis.
As expected, it took Communicators longer to plan their utterances in the Diffi-
cult trials than in the Easy trials (Fig. 3.2A; Table 3.1). Also, participants in the 
post-test guessed the Target-word descriptions from the Easy trials more accu-
rately than those from the Difficult trials (Fig. 3.2C; Table 3.1). Activation levels 
in bilateral, but strongly left-lateralized, inferior frontal cortex (LIFC, including 
Brodmann’s areas 44 and 45; Eickhoff et al., 2005) and bilateral inferior parietal 
cortex likewise showed stronger activation for Difficult as compared with Easy 
trials (Fig. 3.3B; Table 3.2). LIFC is known to be involved in a wide variety of 
language production and comprehension tasks (Hagoort, 2005; Vigneau et al., 
2006). The opposite contrast (Easy > Difficult trials) led to increased activation 
levels in left dorsal precentral sulcus and left inferior occipital gyrus. We had 
no a priori hypothesis about this comparison and interpretation of these find-
ings does not add to understanding of the main findings. 
Finally, the left pSTS showed a supra-additive response when semantically 
difficult communicative problems needed to be solved (COMMUNICATIVE 
SETTING × LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTY interaction; see Fig. 3.3C). 
 Coordinates   
Contrast and area x y z t (max) Number of voxels
Targeted > Non-targeted
Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex -2 38 44 4.91 217
Difficult > Easy
Left Inferior Frontal Sulcus -42 34 26 6.07 1,664
Right Inferior Frontal Sulcus 50 8 24 4.95 233
Left Inferior Parietal Lobe -34 -50 46 8.25 3,658
Right Inferior Parietal Lobe 50 -36 46 6.06 1,678
Left Middle Frontal Sulcus -26 2 60 5.25 211
Left Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus -64 -46 8 5.02 328
Easy > Difficult
Left Dorsal Precentral Sulcus -32 -24 48 3.86 195
Left Inferior Occipital Gyrus -10 -80 -2 4.41 339
Table 3.2. Results of fMRI whole-brain analysis.
1.  A feedback-related interpretation was not supported: A region-of-interest analysis indicated 
that this region was sensitive to negative feedback (red square), t(19) = 2.30, p = 0.02 
(Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004), but not differentially so in the two 
communicative settings (F < 1).
A dissociation between linguistic and communicative abilities in the human brain
3
65
Target
Easy
Target
Dicult
Non-Target
Easy
Non-Target
Dicult
Target
Easy
Target
Dicult
Non-Target
Easy
Non-Target
Dicult
Targeted
Easy
Targeted
Dicult
Non-Target
Easy
Non-Target
Dicult
Target
Easy
Target
Dicult
Non-Target
Easy
Non-Target
Dicult
Target
Easy
Target
Dicult
Non-Target
Easy
Non-Target
Dicult
Targeted
Easy
Targeted
Dicult
Non-Target
Easy
Non-Target
Dicult
Target
Easy
Target
Dicult
Non-Target
Easy
Non-Target
Dicult
Target
Easy
Target
Dicult
Non-Target
Easy
Non-Target
Dicult
Targeted
Easy
Targeted
Dicult
Non-Target
Easy
Non-Target
Dicult
Figure 3.3. Imaging results. (A) Brain areas showing differential activity for 
Targeted versus Non-targeted trials. (B) Difficult versus Easy trials.  
(C) Effect of the interaction between COMMUNICATIVE SETTING and 
LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTY. The accompanying graphs depict the percentage of 
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blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) signal change for task trials relative 
to control trials. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Asterisks 
indicate a significant difference in activation. pSTS = posterior superior 
temporal sulcus; SVC = Small Volume Correction. All results are corrected for 
multiple comparisons at the p < .05 level.
3.4. Discussion
Our results shed light on two issues concerning the relationship between 
communicative and linguistic abilities. First, we have shown that generating a 
targeted communicative message for a specific other relies on mentalising 
capacities. This is evidence against the notion that communication involves  
a reflex-like mirroring mechanism rooted in the motor system (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). Rather, our results support the notion that planning an effec-
tive communicative act involves the generation of social constructs (what an 
agent supposes his or her interlocutors know and believe) that guide selection 
of an appropriate communicative action (C. D. Frith & Frith, 2006; Levinson, 
2006; Toni, de Lange, Noordzij, & Hagoort, 2008). Future research should 
establish that activations in the mentalising network are necessary for plan-
ning communicative acts, and should research the scope of communicative 
acts that is related to the activation of the mentalising network. 
Second, we have provided evidence that the cognitive and cerebral mechanisms 
involved in communication and language are distinct. The dorsomedial 
prefrontal area sensitive to communicative intent was not sensitive to linguistic 
difficulty. An opposite pattern of response was observed in inferior frontal and 
inferior parietal cortex, activity in these regions was indifferent to the 
communicative intent of the utterances being processed (Fig. 3.3B). Given 
the well-known role of LIFC in language (Hagoort, 2005; Vigneau et al., 2006; 
Willems, Ozyurek, & Hagoort, 2007), it is likely that LIFC activation in our study 
reflected increased semantic processing load, phonological processing load, 
or both2. This interpretation is strengthened by the left-hemispheric lateralization 
in our participants, who were right-handed (Knecht et al., 2000). The bilateral 
inferior parietal cortex activations could be related to increased attentional 
load in Difficult trials, rather than linguistic processes per se (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002). 
2. For our argument, it is not directly relevant exactly which language-related processes caused 
this effect. It is crucial that this area had similar activation regardless of the communicative 
intent of the utterances.
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Our finding that distinct networks were activated by the communicative and 
linguistic manipulations is not compatible with the notion that communicative 
and mentalising abilities are ultimately dependent upon language (Carruthers, 
2002). The present findings might also appear at odds with a study from 
Newman and De Villiers (2007) which found that verbal shadowing, but not 
rhythmic finger tapping, interfered with performance on a false-belief task. In 
fact, as suggested by the authors (p. 578), verbal shadowing could have inter-
fered with the phonological loop, leading to reduced working memory resources. 
Accordingly, reduced performance in the false-belief task during verbal shad-
owing could have been a consequence of reduced working memory resources, 
rather than altered linguistic processing. 
Our results confirm and extend previous results showing that severely aphasic 
patients can solve mentalising tasks (Varley & Siegal, 2000). Perhaps these 
patient data are not decisive because the “logical form” of language was still 
intact in these patients (Carruthers, 2002). This argument does not apply to our 
findings because the language system was intact in our participants, and still 
we found that separate cerebral systems were sensitive to communicative and 
linguistic effort. Although we argue that communicative and language abilities 
are cerebrally and cognitively distinct, we do not deny that these systems interact 
closely, for instance, during discourse comprehension (Mason & Just, 2006). 
Finally, we observed an interaction between communicative setting and 
linguistic difficulty in left pSTS. We previously observed a similar effect in right 
pSTS in a visuo-spatial communication paradigm (Noordzij et al., 2010), which 
suggests that pSTS is influenced by the format of communication (cf. Saxe, 
Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004). 
We conclude that the generation of communicative utterances relies on a neuro- 
cognitive system that is involved in understanding intentions of others, and that 
is distinct from the language system. 
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4. 
Oxytocin modulates human  
communication by enhancing 
cognitive exploration
Oxytocin is a neuropeptide known to influence how humans share resources. 
Here we explore whether oxytocin influences how we share knowledge. We 
focus on two distinguishing features, namely the ability to select communica-
tive signals out of many-to-many mappings that exist between a signal’s form 
and meaning (“referential flexibility”), and adjustments of those signals to the 
presumed cognitive characteristics of the addressee (“audience design”).  
Fifty-five males participated in a randomised, double-blind, placebo controlled 
experiment involving the intranasal administration of oxytocin. The participants 
produced idiosyncratic non-verbal communicative signals towards two different 
addressees, an adult or a child, in an experimentally-controlled live interactive 
setting. We found that oxytocin administration drives participants to generate 
signals with which more communicative problems can be disambiguated, and 
to rapidly adjust those signals to what the addressee understands. The 
combined effects of oxytocin on referential flexibility and audience design fit 
with the notion that oxytocin administration leads participants to explore more 
pervasively behaviours that can convey their intention, and diverse models of 
the addressees. These findings suggest that, besides affecting prosocial drive 
and salience of social cues, oxytocin influences how we share knowledge by 
promoting cognitive exploration.
Based on:
De Boer, M., Kokal, I., Blokpoel, M., Stolk, A., Roelofs, K., van Rooij, I., & Toni, I. (under review). 
Oxytocin modulates human communication by enhancing cognitive exploration. 
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4.1. Introduction
Oxytocin is a neuro-modulatory hormone involved in controlling the physiology 
of reproductive behaviour across several species (Donaldson & Young, 2008). 
In social mammals, oxytocin is involved in social and affiliative behaviours, 
reducing social anxiety and increasing sensitivity to social cues (Bate et al., 
2015; Heinrichs, Baumgartner, Kirschbaum, & Ehlert, 2003; Liu et al., 2015; 
Marlin, Mitre, D’Amour, Chao, & Froemke, 2015; Preckel, Scheele, Eckstein, 
Maier, & Hurlemann, 2015; Windle et al., 1997). In humans, administration  
of this hormone influences a number of cognitive processes involving other 
agents, enhancing mental-states recognition and resource-sharing with 
familiar partners (Declerck, Boone, & Kiyonari, 2010; Domes, Heinrichs, Michel, 
Berger, & Herpertz, 2007; Kirsch et al., 2005; Kosfield & Heinrich, 2005; Meyer- 
Lindenberg, Domes, Kirsch, & Heinrichs, 2011; Shamay-Tsoory & Abu-Akel, 
2016). Humans routinely share knowledge, but in an evolutionarily unusual 
manner. This resource is not simply broadcasted (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2008; 
Danchin, Giraldeau, Valone, & Wagner, 2004), but shared by generating 
signals out of the manifold possibilities by which one can express meaning 
(“referential flexibility”; Centola & Baronchelli, 2015; Levinson, 2006; Tomasello 
et al., 2005). Those signals are also continuously adjusted to the presumed 
characteristics of an addressee (“audience design”; Brand, Baldwin, & 
Ashburn, 2002; Campisi & Ozyürek, 2013; Grieser & Kuhl, 1988; Levinson, 
2006; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Snow & Ferguson, 1977; Tomasello, 
2008). These two distinctive features of human knowledge-sharing have been 
extensively described (Brennan et al., 2010; Clark, 1996; Galantucci & Garrod, 
2011), but mechanistic insights on their neurobiological implementation are 
lacking. Given oxytocin’s ability to influence motivational and cognitive 
processes involving resource-sharing with other agents, here we explore 
whether and how this neuropeptide modulates those two distinctive features 
of human knowledge-sharing, namely the generation of signals with new 
meanings (to capture referential flexibility), and the adjustment of those 
signals to the presumed characteristics of an addressee (to capture audience 
design). 
We consider three non-mutually exclusive possibilities grounded on different 
models of oxytocin function. Those predictions are tested by quantifying the 
production of idiosyncratic communicative behaviours during live interactions 
with an adult and a child addressee. First, if oxytocin operates by uncondition-
ally enhancing prosociality (Ditzen et al., 2009; Kosfield & Heinrich, 2005), 
then oxytocin administration should have a directional effect on audience 
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design, i.e. enhancing the spontaneous adjustments that adult communicators 
produce when directing their speech, gestures, and accompanying motions 
towards child addressees (Brand et al., 2002; Campisi & Ozyürek, 2013; Grieser 
& Kuhl, 1988; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Stolk, Hunnius, et al., 2013). 
Second, if oxytocin increases sensitivity to social cues (Bartz et al., 2011; 
Lambert, Declerck, & Boone, 2014; Leknes et al., 2012; Shamay-Tsoory & 
Abu-Akel, 2016), then oxytocin administration should have a different effect on 
audience design, i.e. leading interlocutors to make their communicative behav-
iour as emphatic and referentially precise as required by the cues reflecting the 
level of comprehension of the addressee (Grice, 1969; Newman-Norlund et al., 
2009). Third, if the social anxiolytic effects of oxytocin promote social explora-
tion (Bale et al., 2001; Chang & Platt, 2014; Ring et al., 2006; Windle et al., 
1997), then oxytocin administration should influence both referential flexibility 
and audience design. Namely, oxytocin could drive interlocutors to explore 
more pervasively possible behaviours for conveying their intention (De Dreu  
et al., 2013; Hare, Melis, Woods, Hastings, & Wrangham, 2007), leading them 
to generate signals that solve a larger portion of a communicative challenge. 
By the same token, oxytocin could also drive interlocutors to explore diverse 
models of the addressees, leading to rapid communicative adjustments to the 
level of comprehension of the addressee. 
4.2. Material and methods
4.2.1. Participants
Fifty-eight right-handed healthy males (mean age = 22, SD = 3 years) partici-
pated in this study. A power analysis (power = 80%) based on the medium-large 
effect size (d=0.5 and d=0.7) of previous studies assessing the effects of 
oxytocin intervention on human social behaviour (Kosfield & Heinrich, 2005; 
Zak, Stanton, & Ahmadi, 2007) indicated that a sample size between N=26 
and N=49 would be adequate to assess the presence of an effect of oxytocin. 
Although those studies were not addressing exactly the same question studied 
in this report, those data were the best available estimate for performing a 
power analysis during the planning of this study, leading us to consider a 
sample size of N=40 for each of the two groups. However, recruitment rate 
prevented us from completing the full sample within the time available for this 
study. Participants gave written informed consent according to the institutional 
guidelines of the local ethics committee (Committee on Research Involving 
Human Subjects, Region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands; study protocol 
registration number 37419.091.11), and were compensated by study credits or 
at a rate of €10 per hour of participation in the experiment, and €10 for taking 
Oxytocin modulates human communication by enhancing cognitive exploration
4
73
the drug/placebo. Three participants were excluded from the analyses: one 
participant did not seem to understand the instructions (< 20% of trials 
correct), one participant reported that he did not believe the experimental 
manipulation, and for one participant data acquisition failed. See “Supporting 
Information” for additional information on hormonal and psychometric traits of 
the participants.
4.2.2. Experimental design and procedure
This study was a double-blind, randomised, placebo-controlled between-
group design. This study was designed to assess the effects of oxytocin on 
communicative behaviour. Participants self-administered a nasal spray (3 
puffs per nostril each with a dose of 4 IU) containing either 24IU of oxytocin 
(Syntocinon, Novartis, Basel, Switzerland; N = 28) or a saline solution (a 
placebo; N = 27). See “Supporting Information” for additional information on 
the pharmacological intervention.
Following drug administration, participants were given written task instructions, 
and familiarized themselves with the mechanics of a game-controller by 
completing three practice trials. Execution of the communicative task (see 
“Communicative interactions”) started 45 minutes after drug administration, 
and lasted about 30 minutes. Immediately afterwards, participants filled out a 
questionnaire on the characteristics of the recipients (Fig. 4.S1; Newman-Norlund 
et al., 2009).
4.2.3. Communicative interactions
The communicative behaviour of the participants was quantified with an 
experimentally controlled communicative task (“Tacit Communication 
Game”; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Stolk et al., 2015; Stolk, Hunnius, et al., 
2013). On each trial, the joint goal of a Communicator-Addressee pair was to 
collect a target from a digital game board. Only the Communicator knew the 
target’s location, and only the Addressee could collect the target, leading the 
Communicator to select behaviours that the Addressee could interpret for 
understanding where the object was located (Target-location; Fig. 4.1A). In this 
game, Communicators and Addressees converge on idiosyncratic signals from 
an open-ended set of possibilities, such that different pairs use novel and 
different signals to convey the same meaning (De Ruiter et al., 2010; Stolk et 
al., 2014; Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013). This variation in communicative signals 
makes it possible to test whether oxytocin administration influences the 
referential quality of the signals generated by the participants (see Fig. 4.2A; 
“Referential flexibility”). The experimental circumstances also afford a stringent 
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test on whether oxytocin administration influences prosocial behaviour and 
how communicative behaviour is adjusted to implied knowledge about the 
Addressee, other factors being kept equal. This was achieved by informing 
each participant that he would be playing the communicative game with two 
different addressees, either an Adult or a Child, sitting in separate rooms with 
their own monitors to see the Communicator’s token moving on the game 
board. In reality, a confederate blindly performed the role of both Adult and 
Child Addressee such that the two Addressees differed only in terms of the 
Communicator’s expectations about their cognitive abilities. Previous work has 
repeatedly shown that participants spontaneously generate communicatively 
specific adjustments towards a younger Addressee (Newman-Norlund et al., 
2009; Stolk et al., 2015; Stolk, Hunnius, et al., 2013). This experiment exploits 
those communicative adjustments as a quantitative index of audience design 
(see Fig. 4.1B; “Audience design”).
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Figure 4.1. Participants communicated non-verbally with two different Addressees, 
an Adult or a Child, in an experimentally-controlled live interactive setting.  
(A) Trial time-course. The task involved a Communicator (i.e. a participant 
receiving either an Oxytocin or Placebo nasal spray); and an Addressee (i.e. a 
confederate). The joint goal of the players was for the Communicator (in blue) 
to signal the location of the target (an acorn) and for the Addressee (in green) 
to retrieve the target on the basis of the signal generated by the Communicator. 
Communicator and Addressee could not see or hear one another, and thus 
could only communicate by movements of their tokens (a bird and a squirrel 
respectively). Their game-board consisted of 9 fields (3x3 squares in a grid 
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lay-out) containing a total of 15 potential locations for the target (Target-loca-
tions; represented by the 15 white circles). Each trial consisted of 5 successive 
events. Event 1: The Communicator was provided with an unlimited amount of 
time to plan how to convey the acorn’s location to the Addressee. The acorn’s 
location was visible only to the Communicator. Event 2: The Communicator 
moved his bird token across the board with a hand-held game controller 
(maximum movement time: 5 seconds). The movements of the bird token were 
visible to both Communicator and Addressee. The Communicator could only 
make horizontal or vertical displacements over the centre of each field and, as  
a consequence, the bird token could not be overlaid on some of the Target- 
locations. During the game, the Communicator had to generate novel signals  
to solve these spatial disparities. Event 3: The Addressee planned on which of 
the 15 Target-locations he/she would move his/her squirrel token to retrieve  
the acorn. Event 4: The Addressee moved his or her squirrel token across the 
board. The Addressee’s squirrel token was visible to both Communicator and 
Addressee. The squirrel could be precisely overlaid on each Target-location. 
Event 5: Both players received feedback on their joint communicative success 
(correct or incorrect). (B) Task time-course. Communicators were made to believe 
they played with an Adult (represented by a photograph of a 25-year old male) or 
Child Addressee (represented by a photograph of a 5-year old boy), in alterna-
tion. In fact, an adult confederate performed both roles blindly, with matched 
response times and performance (see Fig. 4.S2) such that the two Addressees 
differed only in terms of the Communicator’s expectations about their cognitive 
abilities. Before the onset of each block of 5 trials, a digital photograph of the 
current presumed Addressee was presented on the screen. A smaller picture 
was shown in the top right corner during each trial to remind participants with 
whom they were playing (figure adapted from Stolk, Hunnius, et al., 2013).
4.2.3.1. Referential flexibility
An experimenter familiar with this communicative task (MdB) performed trial-
by-trial classification of the communicative signals used by the participants 
during the task (2750 trials), while remaining blind to which substance (Oxytocin 
or Placebo) was received by which participant. A communicative signal was 
defined as a sequence of movements with which a Communicator described 
the Target-field, and/or the Target-location. Communicative behaviours (e.g. 
pausing on a field to indicate that it contains the Target-location) were distin-
guished from instrumental behaviours (e.g. moving back to the nest swiftly) by 
the degree from which they deviated from optimal behaviour should the behav-
iour have been executed to fulfil an instrumental goal (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). 
We considered two types of detours. The first was a deviation on the time spent 
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on a field; a behaviourally functional equivalent to the use of prosodic markers 
during verbal communication (Bolinger, 1972; Halliday, 1967; Selkirk, 1995): 
e.g. spending a long time in a field serves no instrumental purpose in the game. 
The second detour was a deviation in the path towards a field: taking a detour 
to reach a field is suboptimal, hence the detour itself can be considered 
communicative. In some trials, it was unclear whether a movement or a pause 
was communicative or instrumental. Behaviour was coded as communicative  
if it occurred consistently in more than two subsequent trials. To achieve a 
balance between identifying an interpretable (i.e. limited) number of signal 
types and capturing the considerable inter-trial and inter-subject variability,  
we considered five broad categories: Field-Only, Target-Anchor, Nest-Anchor, 
Draw-On-Board and a fifth category Miscellaneous. 
Moving the token bird to, and spending time on the field containing the target 
(i.e. the Target-field), is a signal adequate to indicate the Target-field to the 
Addressee, but insufficient to disambiguate between multiple potential loca-
tions within that field (i.e. Target-locations, represented with white circles in 
Fig. 4.1A and with Arabic numbers in Fig. 4.2A; Field-Only signal; see Video S1 
for an example trial performed by one of the Communicator-Addressee pairs; 
all supplementary videos can be found at www.miriamdeboer.nl/thesis). 
Therefore, only 20% of the Target-locations (3 out of the 15 potential Target- 
locations) could be indicated with this signal. 
Accordingly, participants used systematic detours into their movement trajec-
tories and pauses in their movements to suggest the precise Target-location 
within the Target-field. Those detours might appear intuitive and unequivocal. 
In fact, those signals need to be generated ex-novo, and understood by the 
Addressee. This generative element requires complex relational reasoning 
(Blokpoel, 2015), involving the search for an analogous overlap between the 
representational structures of the Target-location and of the movements 
(Gentner, 1983). The Target-location could be indicated by a detour consisting 
of a movement to the field adjacent to the Target (Target-Anchor signal). With 
this signal 80% of the Target-locations could be indicated (Fig 4.2A, Video S2).  
The Nest-Anchor signal suggested the relevant Target-location with a visit to  
a field adjacent to the central field (Nest): The spatial relation between the 
visited field and the Nest was isomorphic to the spatial relation between the 
Target-location and the centre of the Target-field. With this signal every poten-
tial Target-location could be disambiguated (Fig. 4.2A; Video S3). Draw-On-Board 
signals were identified as such when a participant represented the configuration 
of the potential Target-locations in the Target-field with movements across the 
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whole game board. With this signal every potential Target-location could be 
disambiguated (Fig. 4.2A; Video S4). Miscellaneous signals were signals that 
did not correspond to any of the categories mentioned above.
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Figure 4.2. Oxytocin drives participants to generate communicative signals 
that disambiguate more communicative problems than the signals preferen-
tially used by the Placebo group. (A) Communicative problems. Depicted is a 
schematic representation of the game board representing all 15 Target-loca-
tions and the communicative signals by which their position can be disambigu-
ated. With the Field-Only signal (in blue; see Video S1; all supplementary 
vide s can be found at www.miriamdeboer.nl/thesis, the Communicator 
could not disambiguate between multiple Target-locations (Arabic numbers) 
within one Target-field (Roman numbers), as the bird token could only be over-
laid in the centre of a field but not on a specific Target-location. Thus, only 20% 
of Target-locations (3 out of 15 possible locations) could be disambiguated with 
the Field-Only signal. With the Target-Anchor signal (in red; see Video S2),  
the Target-location is indicated by making a detour in path or time on the field 
adjacent to the Target-location. This approach cannot disambiguate Target- 
locations that had no unique adjacent field (Arabic numbers: 6, 14, and 15). 
Thus, only 80% of Target-locations could be disambiguated with the Target- 
Anchor signal. The Nest-Anchor signal (in green; see Video S3) and the Draw-
On-Board signal (in purple; see Video S4) could unambiguously mark each  
of the 15 Target-locations. Communicators using these signals relied on an 
isomorphism between their movements from the Nest and the spatial relation 
between the Target-location and the centre of the Target-field. A fifth category 
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(“Miscellaneous”) included signals that could not be assigned to any of the 
previous categories. (B) Signal distribution. % of signals used across all 2750 
trials. Communicators in the Placebo group (darker coloured histograms) prefer-
entially used the Field-Only and Target-Anchor signal, whereas Communicators in 
the Oxytocin group (lighter coloured histograms) preferentially used the Nest-An-
chor signal (see Table 4.S3 for statistical information; error bars represent ± 1 SEM).
4.2.3.2. Audience Design
From previous experiments, we learned that time on Target-field can be used  
as an index of audience design behaviour in this particular game. More 
precisely, time on Target-field was defined as the time interval between 
entering the Target-field (one of the 9 squares marked with Roman numbers  
in Fig. 4.2A) and the first button-press within that field. In case the Target- 
field was visited multiple times within a trial, we have chosen, as in previous 
studies (Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Stolk et al., 2015; Stolk, Hunnius, et  
al., 2013; Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013), the mean time on Target-field as a 
conservative measure of this index of audience design (see “Supporting infor-
mation” for control analyses of the effect of DRUG and ADDRESSEE on planning 
time, movement time, number of fields visited during one signal (“number of 
moves”) and the ratio of time on Target-field and time on Non-target-field). 
We considered the effect of two additional factors on the time on Target-field 
index: adjustments following an error and time-varying adjustments to the 
Addressees over the course of the experiment. First, we considered whether 
Oxytocin and Placebo would differentially influence adjustments to the 
presumed Addressee over the course of the experiment. Previous work has 
shown that participants reduced their time on Target-field as they experienced 
matched behaviour across the Child and Adult Addressees (Newman-Norlund 
et al., 2009; Stolk et al., 2015; Stolk, Hunnius, et al., 2013). We tested whether 
the communicative behaviour evoked in the first block (first five trials) spent 
with either one of the two Addressees differed from the performance evoked 
during the remaining trials (last twenty trials) according to the formula: time on 
Target-fieldAdjustment = [time on Target-field(Childj ) – time on Target-field(Adultj)]/
time on Target-field(Adult
j
), with j = trials 1 to 5 or trials 6 to 25. Second, we 
considered whether Oxytocin and Placebo would differentially influence trial-
by-trial adjustments to a communicative error, according to the formula: time 
on Target-field
Post-error
 = [time on Target-field (trial
i+1
) – time on Target-field (trial
i
)]/
time on Target-field (trial
i
), with i = an incorrect trial. This index did not include 
trials where trial
i-1
 was also erroneous or trials where trial
i-1
 involved a change 
in Addressee. 
Oxytocin modulates human communication by enhancing cognitive exploration
4
79
There were a total of 50 trials, subdivided in ten blocks of five trials (Fig. 4.1B; 
total testing time: ~30 min). The sequences of communicative problems and 
the order of presentation of the presumed Addressees (starting with either 
Adult or Child) were counter-balanced between participants. The experiment 
was programmed using Presentation® software (Neurobehavioral Systems, 
Albany, CA, USA) on a Windows XP personal computer, and performed in a 
magneto-encephalograph (CTF275, VSM MedTech Ltd, Coquitlam, BC, Canada) 
for measuring neural activity during the communicative game (neural data will 
be described in a separate report). 
4.2.4. Statistical analysis
The statistical model employed to test our index of referential flexibility 
consisted of the percentages of occurrence of the five types of communicative 
signals (Field-Only, Target-Anchor, Nest-Anchor, Draw-On-Board and Miscel-
laneous) for each participant. These numbers were entered as dependent 
variables in a multivariate ANOVA with DRUG (Oxytocin or Placebo) as a between- 
subject factor. Post-hoc tests were conducted with a between-subject factor 
DRUG for each signal. The within-subject factor ADDRESSEE was tested in separate 
post-hoc tests for each communicative signal for the Oxytocin and Placebo group.
The statistical model employed to test our index of audience design used trial 
level observations and assessed the effects of two experimental manipulations 
and their interaction on the time on Target-field. There was a within-subjects 
factor (ADDRESSEE), with two levels (Child, Adult); and a between-subjects factor 
(DRUG), with two levels (Oxytocin, Placebo). To control for unspecific effects due 
to variation in movement speed over the course of the experiment, the analysis 
of time on Target-field considered the time participants spent moving around 
fields that did not include the target (time on Non-target-field) as a nuisance 
covariate. Trials during which participants did not visit a Non-target-field (such 
as when indicating Target-location9 on Target-fieldVI) were excluded, given 
that those trials prevented estimating the effect of general movement speed. 
Mixed linear regression models were estimated in R (lmer function of the 
lme4 package, version 1.0-4; www.R-project.org, Vienna, Austria; Bates, 
Maechler, & Bolker, 2012). The repeated-measures nature of the data within 
participants was taken into account by considering participant as a random 
factor and ADDRESSEE as its random slope. 
A test for time-varying adjustments on the parameter time on Target-field towards 
the Addressees was implemented as a Mixed linear model with factors DRUG 
(Oxytocin, Placebo) and BLOCK (Early, Late). A non-parametric One-Sample 
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Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test was performed to test if participants in the Oxytocin 
group made communicative adjustments for the Addressees at the beginning 
of the experiment. There were 314 trials suitable for analysis of trial-by-trial 
adjustments to a communicative error. Given the limited power afforded by this 
sample, we focused this analysis on testing whether the group median 
(Oxytocin, Placebo) of post-error adjustment was different from zero with a 
non-parametric One-Sample Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test. 
4.3. Results
The first finding of this study pertains to oxytocin-related variations in the refer-
ential quality of the communicative behaviours generated by the participants 
(capturing referential flexibility; Fig. 4.2B). Communicators in the Oxytocin and 
Placebo group composed communicative signals with different referential quality 
(main effect of DRUG: F(4,50) = 3.88, p = 0.008, η2 = 0.237) in the context of 
statistically matched production of communicative signals addressed to an 
Adult or a Child (main effect of ADDRESSEE: F(4,50) = 1.07, p = 0.373, η2 = 
0.080; Fig. 4.2B). Communicators receiving Placebo preferentially used the 
Field-Only and Target-Anchor signals (see Video S1 and S2; for all supplemen-
tary videos see www.miriamdeboer.nl/thesis;  Field-Only: 36% ± 13% of all 
trials; main effect of DRUG; Target-Anchor: 37% ± 27% of all trials; main effect 
of DRUG; Fig. 4.2B and for statistics Table 4.S3). With these signals, respec-
tively 20 and 80% of the Target-locations could be indicated unambiguously. 
Communicators receiving Oxytocin preferentially used the Nest-Anchor signal 
(see Video S3; 25% ± 33% of all trials; main effect of DRUG, Fig. 4.2B and Table 
4.S3) with which all of the potential Target-locations could be indicated unam-
biguously. The majority of the participants did so from the start of the experi-
ment onwards, already before they encountered communicative problems that 
could not be disambiguated by signals with weaker referential quality (Field-
Only and Target-Anchor signals). This bias was not influenced by which 
Addressee the signal was directed to (no main effect of ADDRESSEE for any of 
the signal types, see Table 4.S3). Neither did this bias alter the overall 
dynamics of the movements involved in the signals (relative time on Target-field 
and Non-target-field; no main effect of DRUG: for statistics see Table 4.S5). 
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Figure 4.3. Oxytocin administration drives participants to rapidly adjust their 
communicative behaviour to the actual level of understanding experienced in 
the Addressees and away from expectations about the cognitive abilities of the 
Addressee. (A) Communicative adjustments. Communicators who received a 
Placebo made communicative adjustments based on their expectations of the 
cognitive abilities of the Addressees, holding their token longer on the field 
where the target was located (time on Target-field) when they believed to be 
communicating with a Child Addressee (filled histograms) than with an Adult 
Addressee (dotted histograms). Communicators who received Oxytocin held 
their token on the Target-field for time-intervals similar across Addressees 
(see Table 4.S4 for statistical information; error bars represent ±1 SEM).  
(B) Temporal dynamics of communicative adjustments. A post-hoc analysis 
revealed that participants who received Oxytocin (lighter histograms) made 
communicative adjustments based on expectations about the cognitive abilities 
of the Addressee in the first five trials, spending longer time on the Target-field 
when the Addressee was believed to be a Child. In the subsequent trials, this 
adjustment disappeared, and the communicative behaviour of the Oxytocin 
group adapted to the matched performance across Addressees (DRUG by 
BLOCK interaction: no main effect of DRUG and BLOCK; see Table 4.S4 for 
statistical information; error bars represent ±1 SEM).
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The second finding of this study pertains to the oxytocinergic modulation  
of the magnitude of systematic variations in movement time on the field 
containing the target object as a function of the presumed abilities of the 
Addressees, an index of audience design (Fig. 4.3). Namely, Communicators  
in the Placebo group spent longer time holding their token on the Target-field 
when they believed to be communicating with a Child than with an Adult 
Addressee. In contrast, Communicators in the Oxytocin group did not differen-
tiate between the two presumed Addressees (DRUG by ADDRESSEE interaction 
on the time on Target-field parameter: Fig. 4.3A; main effect of ADDRESSEE for 
Placebo; Child: 1504 ± 977 ms, Adult: 1417 ± 951 ms; no main effect of ADDRESSEE 
for Oxytocin; Child: 1447 ± 997 ms, Adult: 1436 ± 1006 ms; see Table 4.S4 for 
statistics). The DRUG by ADDRESSEE interaction (p = 0.029) would not pass the 
alpha-level Bonferroni-corrected for the two comparisons performed in this 
study (i.e. oxytocinergic effect on referential flexibility and audience design). 
However, given that these two measures capture theoretically and experimen-
tally independent metrics of communicative behaviour, it seems questionable 
to sacrifice statistical sensitivity by applying a Bonferroni correction across 
those two outcome measures.
Additional observations indicate that the lack of communicative adjustments 
induced by oxytocin administration (Fig. 4.3A) was not due to negligence of the 
Addressees’ presumed abilities. Namely, participants receiving Oxytocin 
attributed different ages and abilities to the two presumed Addressees, and 
their attributions did not differ from those made by the Placebo group (see 
Table 4.S2). Participants receiving Oxytocin communicated as effectively as 
participants receiving Placebo (69% success, chance level: 7%; Fig. 4.S2B), 
and displayed communicative adjustments to the presumed abilities of the 
presumed Addressees in the first few trials of the experiment (One-Sample 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test of time on Target-field: p = 0.005). Furthermore, 
Oxytocin administration did not blunt participants’ motivation to generate 
communicative adjustments when the performance of the Addressee required 
it. In trials that followed a communicative error, participants receiving Oxytocin 
made more emphatic communicative movements, spending more time on the 
Target-field than in trials following a successful communicative interaction 
(One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test of time on Target-field: p = 0.012). 
Given the raising concerns on limited statistical power and effect size inflation 
of oxytocin studies (Walum et al., 2016), the statistical inferences of this study 
were verified by bootstrapping the parameter estimates of the relevant statistics, 
thus providing statistical inferences independent from an assumed reference 
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distribution. Concerning the referential quality of the communicative signals,  
we have assessed the reliability of this statistical inference by resampling the 
statistical metric of the MANOVA (Pillai’s trace), using the sample function of 
the R base package (Becker, Chambers, & Wilks, 1988; Ripley, 1987). By 
calculating the proportion of resampled Pillai’s trace values greater than or 
equal to the observed Pillai’s trace value, we could provide a statistical infer-
ence independent from an assumed reference distribution. This statistical 
analysis shows that 99.75% of the resampled Pillai’s trace values had a value 
above the observed Pillai’s value of 0.024, corresponding to a p-value of 0.0025. 
Concerning the communicative adjustments, we have assessed the reliability 
of this statistical inference by bootstrapping the parameter estimates of the 
mixed-linear models using the bootMer function of the lme4 R package (Davison 
& Hinkley, 1997; Morris, 2002). By calculating the proportion of bootstrapped 
parameter estimates greater than or equal to the observed parameter estimate, 
we could provide a statistical inference independent from an assumed reference 
distribution, using the PBmodcomp function of the pbkrtest package (Halekoh & 
Højsgaard, 2013). This new statistical analysis confirms the presence of an 
interaction between DRUG and ADDRESSEE (p(PBtest) = 0.029), driven by the 
presence of an ADDRESSEE effect in the Placebo group (p(PBtest) = 0.013) and 
not in the Oxytocin group (p(PBtest) = 0.557).
4.4. Discussion
This study tests if and how oxytocin influences two distinctive features of human 
knowledge-sharing, the generation of novel idiosyncratic signals with new mean-
ings (capturing referential flexibility) and their adjustment to the presumed 
characteristics of an addressee (capturing audience design). The effects of 
oxytocin on those features have been quantified with an open-ended commu-
nication game, using non-verbal signals, over multiple live interactions with 
human interlocutors. There are two main findings. First, oxytocin drives partici-
pants to generate signals that provide an unambiguous solution for a larger 
portion of the problems afforded by the communicative challenge, as compared 
to the signals preferentially used by the placebo group. Second, oxytocin drives 
participants to rapidly adjust their communicative behaviour to the actual level of 
understanding experienced in the addressees, and away from their expectations 
of the addressees’ cognitive abilities. In the following section, we elaborate on the 
notion that the combined effects of oxytocin on referential flexibility and audience 
design, namely rapid generation of possible behaviours to convey their intention 
and rapid updating of an addressee’s model, might stem from a fundamental 
oxytocinergic role in regulating a cognitive exploration/exploitation trade-off. 
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The rapid adaptation of the oxytocin group to the actual performance of the 
addressees could fit with the hypothesis that oxytocin enhances processing 
and saliency of social information (Bartz et al., 2011; Lambert et al., 2014; 
Leknes et al., 2012; Shamay-Tsoory & Abu-Akel, 2016). Namely, oxytocin could 
enhance processing of the communicative cues produced by the two putative 
addressees, driving the oxytocin group to rapidly adjust their communicative 
behaviour towards the matched performance experienced in those addressees. 
However, enhanced sensitivity to social cues might not parsimoniously explain 
the second oxytocinergic effect of this study, i.e. increased proficiency in 
generating a general-purpose solution of the possible communicative prob-
lems. Crucially, the oxytocin group generated signals able to disambiguate 
multiple communicative problems already before being confronted with 
communicative problems that could not be disambiguated by signals that were 
less general-purpose. All potential communicative problems were graphically 
available on the board to every participant, at every trial, from the onset of the 
experiment. Rather than reacting to a series of cues contingent to the current 
communicative problem and adjust their signals accordingly, the oxytocin 
group appeared to consider all potential possible communicative problems 
from the start. We suggest that the two effects evoked by oxytocin in this study 
might be instances of an enhanced cognitive exploratory tendency induced by 
that neuropeptide. Namely, participants receiving oxytocin might be more 
inclined to explore alternative models of the presumed characteristics of the 
addressees, and rapidly re-evaluate the model evoked by the current visual 
appearance of the addressees. Similarly, participants receiving oxytocin might 
be more inclined to explore alternative solutions to the communicative chal-
lenge, and rapidly re-evaluate the solution evoked by the current trial in the 
game. In a similar way, it was found that oxytocin attenuated the N400 signal, 
a well-known electrophysiological marker of semantic integration, suggesting 
that oxytocin drives listeners to comprehend speech containing information 
that was incongruent with facts of the world, possibly by promoting the 
exploration of alternative world scenarios (Ye, Stolk, Toni, & Hagoort, 2016). 
The notion of oxytocin promoting cognitive exploration in humans unifies a 
number of existing observations on the behavioural consequences and neuro-
biology of oxytocin administration. For instance, it has been shown that oxytocin 
promotes social exploration in other mammals, possibly by boosting pre-existing 
social tendencies through a reduction in social anxiety (Chang & Platt, 2014; 
Radke, Roelofs, & De Bruijn, 2013). Reduced social anxiety can release the 
expression of cognitive competences that would be otherwise inhibited by 
competitive social dynamics (Burkart, Hrdy, & Van Schaik, 2009; Hare et al., 
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2007; Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006), driving individuals to take more risky 
foraging decisions (Baumgartner, Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 
2008; Kosfield & Heinrich, 2005; Lynn, Hoge, Fischer, Barrett, & Simon, 2014), 
an indication of enhanced exploratory tendencies. At the neurobiological level, 
several effects of oxytocin are mediated through the dopaminergic system 
(Rilling & Young, 2014; Skuse & Gallagher, 2009), a neuromodulator involved 
in controlling the exploration/exploitation trade-off (Humphries, Khamassi, & 
Gurney, 2012; Kayser, Mitchell, Weinstein, & Frank, 2015).
It remains to be seen whether the effects of enhanced cognitive exploration 
evoked by oxytocin in this study are specifically social. Although the live 
communicative interactions used in this study are prototypically social, it has 
been argued that solving referential communicative problems requires domain- 
general inferential capacities (Fodor, 1983, 2001; Sperber & Wilson, 1986), i.e. 
the ability to generate connections between different conceptual structures 
that make up potential solutions to the communicative problem (Blokpoel, 
2015; Blokpoel et al., 2011; Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013; van Rooij et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that oxytocin might enhance risky economic deci-
sions regardless of whether the risk has a social component (Lynn et al., 2014). 
4.4.1. Interpretational issues 
A number of alternative interpretations are excluded by features of the experi-
mental design and by empirical observations. First, the lack of communicative 
adjustments induced by oxytocin administration was not due to negligence  
of either the addressees’ presumed abilities (Declerck et al., 2010), or the 
addressees’ role. For instance, the oxytocin group might have considered the 
addressees as members of an out-group unworthy of investing “communica-
tive resources” in (De Dreu, Greer, Van Kleef, Shalvi, & Handgraaf, 2011), or 
they might have solved the communicative problems as an individual puzzle 
(De Ruiter et al., 2010). In fact, the oxytocin group attributed different ages and 
cognitive abilities to the two presumed addressees, adjusted their communica-
tive behaviour to expectations about the cognitive abilities of the addressee in 
the first few trials of the experiment, and remained sensitive to the addressees’ 
performance throughout the experiment, as indicated by their communicative 
adjustments following a communicative failure. Second, it might be argued 
that the current results cannot be generalized, since the task setting fails to 
capture the rapid multimodal nature of the interactions occurring during daily 
human communication. For instance, the roles of the communicator and 
addressee were fixed, and the communicator was allowed to respond only within 
a limited time window. Yet, even within the constraints of these experimental 
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simplifications, it has been shown that this task captures communicatively 
relevant adjustments generated on the basis of on-going communicative 
behaviour of an addressee and of the shared communicative history of a pair 
(De Ruiter et al., 2010; Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013). Furthermore, differently 
from several works focused on eliciting verbal reports when studying humans’ 
ability to attribute mental states to other people (Aoki et al., 2014; Wade, Hoff-
mann, & Jenkins, 2015), this task addresses this issue by considering partici-
pants’ ability to influence the mental states of others through non-verbal 
behaviours, i.e. the magnitude of their spontaneous referential flexibility and 
communicative adjustment. This approach provides a sensitive index of 
communicative abilities, minimizing demands on cognitive control abilities 
collateral to the question at hand. However, the current experimental design 
does not allow for distinguishing between adaptations in audience design 
driven by better-than-expected performance of the presumed child addressee 
in comparison to the adult addressee, or by worse-than-expected performance 
of the presumed adult in comparison to the child addressee. 
The effect size reported in three independent studies that have already used 
the same task (Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Stolk et al., 2015; Stolk, Hunnius, 
et al., 2013) indicate that the current study is adequately powered for detecting 
communicative adjustments in the placebo group (power (1-β) = 0.88). Given 
the lack of specific reports on oxytocin effects on metrics of human communi-
cation, the effects size found in this study can inform future replications or 
exploratory studies on this issue. Furthermore, given the raising concerns on 
limited statistical power and effect size inflation of oxytocin studies (Walum et 
al., 2016), the statistical inferences of this study were verified by bootstrapping 
the parameter estimates of the relevant statistics, thus providing statistical 
inferences independent from an assumed reference distribution. 
4.4.2. Conclusion
This study provides evidence that oxytocin alters two distinguishing features  
of human knowledge-sharing during live communicative interactions: namely 
reliance on the flexibility of the many-to-many mappings that exist between a 
signal’s form and meaning (“referential flexibility”), and adjustments of those 
signals to the presumed cognitive characteristics of the addressee (“audience 
design”). Oxytocin enhances participants’ ability to pro-actively consider 
possible communicative problems when generating a solution to a specific 
communicative challenge. Furthermore, oxytocin drives participants to rapidly 
adjust their behaviour towards ongoing performance and away from prior 
expectations about those addressees. Taken together, these findings support 
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the notion that besides affecting prosocial drive and salience of social cues,  
in humans, oxytocin might enhance exploratory tendencies of the potential 
communicative behaviours afforded by a (social) challenge.
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4.6. Supplementary information
4.6.1. Supplementary material and methods
4.6.1.1. Pharmacological intervention
Participants were screened for psychiatric, endocrine, or neurological disorders, 
alcohol or drug abuse, smoking more than five cigarettes per day, medication 
use (except for intake of paracetamol), presence of metal objects in the body, 
participation in other pharmacological studies or blood donation within the 
last two months. Participants were tested in the afternoon. Twenty-four hours 
before the start of the experiment, participants were requested to refrain from 
alcohol, caffeine and cigarettes. Two hours before substance administration, 
they were asked to refrain from food and drink, except for water. Upon arrival 
at the Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging (Nijmegen, The Netherlands), 
they self-administered a nasal spray (3 puffs per nostril each with a dose of 4 IU) 
containing either 24IU of oxytocin (Syntocinon, Novartis, Basel, Switzerland;  
N = 28) or a saline solution (a placebo; N = 27). At the end of the experiment, 
participants were asked to make an attempt to identify the intervention and 
dosage of the substance they had received, using a 7-points Likert scale 
(substance: from -3 “I definitely received a placebo” to +3 “I definitely received 
a drug”; dosage: from -3 “I definitely received a low dose” to +3 “I definitely 
received a high dose”). Participants provided similar guesses on the identity or 
dosage of the substance received (substance: t(53) = -0.22, p = 0.8; dosage: 
t(45) = 0.33, p = 0.7).
4.6.1.2. Control analyses
A number of collateral measurements and observations support the specificity 
of the findings on referential flexibility and audience design, showing that the 
participants in the placebo and oxytocin groups were matched along several 
dimensions. 
4.6.1.2.1. Cortisol and testosterone levels
Salivary samples were collected to measure cortisol and testosterone levels. 
Salivary samples were obtained prior, 15 minutes after, and 100 minutes after 
substance administration using salicaps (Immuno-Biological Laboratories 
GmbH, Hamburg, Germany). Samples were stored at -25° and analysed in 
duplicate for both cortisol and testosterone. Hormone concentration was 
measured using luminescence Immunoassays (Immuno-Biological Laboratories 
GmbH, Hamburg, Germany). The intra-assay and inter-assay coefficients of  
variation were less than 4% for cortisol, and 0-2% and 5-9% for testosterone 
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respectively. In this report, we consider the average of the three time points  
for each hormone. The distributions of hormonal traits in the two experimental 
groups (Oxytocin, Placebo) were compared with a series of t-tests for inde-
pendent samples (alpha-level: 0.05). Participants receiving Oxytocin or Placebo 
had similar levels of steroid hormones (cortisol: 8.5 ± 4.0 nmol/l, t(53) = 0.77, 
p = 0.443; testosterone: 88.4 ± 67.5 pg/nl, t(53) = -0.31, p = 0.756).
4.6.1.2.2. Psychometric differences
Immediately following drug administration, self-report questionnaires were 
administered to index the participant’s empathy (Empathy Quotient; Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1983), 
systemizing abilities (Revised Systemizing Quotient; Baron-Cohen et al., 
2003), social anxiety (Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale; Liebowitz, 1987) and 
need for cognition traits (Need for Cognition Scale; Cacioppo et al., 1984).  
The distributions of the psychometric traits in the two experimental groups 
(Oxytocin, Placebo) were compared in a similar fashion as the hormonal traits. 
Psychometric traits were statistically matched (no main effect of DRUG for the 
Empathy Quotient, Systemizing Quotient Revised, Need for Cognition Scale, 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale and one of the subscales of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index, for statistical information see Table 4.S1). 
4.6.1.2.3. Additional behavioural data analyses
In order to provide a comprehensive view of the specificity of the main findings, 
additional analyses were performed on the following behavioural measures: 
planning time, movement time of Communicator, response time of confederate, 
number of moves, relative time on Target-field and Non-target-field and the 
percentage of correct trials. The experimental design consisted of a within-sub-
jects factor (ADDRESSEE), with two levels (Child, Adult); and a between-subjects 
factor (DRUG), with two levels (Oxytocin, Placebo). Mixed linear regression 
models were estimated in R (www.R-project.org, Vienna, Austria; lmer function 
of the lme4 package, version 1.0-4; Bates et al., 2012). The statistical model 
used trial-level observations. The repeated-measures nature of the data within 
participants is taken into account by considering participant as a random 
factor and ADDRESSEE as its random slope. P-values for the linear regression 
models were determined using conditional F-tests with Kenward-Roger correction 
of degrees of freedom (which can lead to fractional degrees of freedom) as 
implemented in the Anova function (with type III F-tests) from the package car 
(version 2.0.19; J. Fox & Weisberg, 2010; this function calls the KRmodcomp 
function from the package pbkrtest; Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2013). The P-values 
from the generalized linear model for % of correct trials were determined using 
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Likelihood Ratio Tests as implemented in the ‘anova’ function of the R base 
package. This differential effect of oxytocin administration was specific to the 
index of referential flexibility and audience design. It did not extend to other 
indexes of task performance. For instance, participants’ planning time (Event 1 
in Fig. 4.1A) was influenced by their expectation of interacting with a Child 
(main effect of ADDRESSEE, 1937 ± 2033 ms, B = 140.44, SE = 3.02), but there 
were no differences related to drug administration or interactions between 
DRUG and ADDRESSEE (Fig. 4.S3). Similar results were obtained for movement 
time (Event 2 in Fig. 4.1A), number of moves (number of button presses 
producing a visible movement on the screen) and accuracy (Event 4 in Fig. 
4.1A; for statistical information see Table 4.S5). 
Below are several questions that we would like you to answer about  
your partners in the game. Please fill them out as best as you can and  
as honestly as possible.
Your younger partner
How old do you think your younger partner is? 
Do you think your younger partner has used a computer before?
If so, how often do they use it? 
How alike do you think your younger partner is to you on a scale of 
1-10, 10 being exactly like you, 1 being nothing like you?
Do you think your younger partner...
 Yes  No
Rides a bike
Can Count to 100
Can do multiplication problems
Knows the rules for driving a car
Owns stuffed toys/animals
Plays video games
Goes to the store on their own
Had read The Diary of Anne Frank
Can sing the song, “Zakdoekje Leggen”
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General questions
Did you find the game difficult? What was most difficult for you?
Do you think you behaved differently with your younger partner than with 
your older partner? If yes, how so?
Who do you think played better, the adult or the child?
Figure 4.S1. Questionnaire on characteristics and abilities of the Addressees. 
The same questions were asked about the older Addressee). 
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Figure 4.S2. A confederate blindly performed the role of both Adult and Child 
Addressee, with matched response times and performance. (A) Response 
times of confederate were matched when the confederate blindly performed 
the role of Adult or Child (ADDRESSEE: F(1,53) = 0.86, P = 0.357), and when the 
confederate blindly played with participants who received Placebo or Oxytocin 
(DRUG: F(1,53) = 0.07, p = 0.799). There was no interaction effect (ADDRESSEE x 
DRUG: F(1,53) = 0.77, p = 0.386). (B) Performance of confederate was matched 
for ADDRESSEE: chi-squared test: p = 0.901; DRUG: chi-squared test: p = 0.136; 
and ADDRESSEE x DRUG: chi-squared test: p = 0.641).
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A
Measurement and effect df t p
Empathy quotient 53 -1.1 0.257
Systemising quotient 53 -1.65 0.106
Need for cognition scale 53 0.04 0.963
Liebowitz social anxiety scale 53 -1.06 0.296
Interpersonal reactivity index
Fantasy subscale 53 -0.75 0.456
Empathic concern 53 0.46 0.646
Perspective taking 53 1.07 0.289
Personal distress 53 -0.9 0.375
B
Measurement and effect Mean Sd Standard error
Empathy quotient
Placebo 37.37 12.226 2.353
Oxytocin 33.89 11.127 2.103
Systemising quotient
Placebo 50.96 14.896 2.867
Oxytocin 57.36 13.918 2.630
Need for cognition scale
Placebo 9.74 8.663 1.667
Oxytocin 9.64 9.113 1.722
Liebowitz social anxiety scale
Placebo 26.93 18.202 3.503
Oxytocin 31.93 16.977 3.208
Interpersonal reactivity index
Fantasy scale
Placebo 16.33 4.019 .773
Oxytocin 17.18 4.355 .823
Empathic concern
Placebo 15.67 3.328 .641
Oxytocin 15.18 4.414 .834
Perspective taking
Placebo 17.15 4.680 .901
Oxytocin 15.93 3.721 .703
Personal distress
Placebo 9.93 3.037 .585
Oxytocin 10.81 4.170 .802
Table 4.S1. Statistical information about differences in psychometric traits  
of the Oxytocin and Placebo group. (A) Statistical information. (B) Descriptive 
statistics.
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Figure 4.S3. The effect of Oxytocin administration was specific to the index of 
audience design (time on Target-field), and it did not extend to other indexes 
of task performance. (A) Planning time of Communicator. Communicators 
planned longer when playing with a presumed Child or Adult Addressee (Event 
1 in Fig. 4.1A; main effect of ADDRESSEE, 1937 ± 2033 ms), but there were no 
differences in planning time related to Placebo or Oxytocin administration  
(no main effect of DRUG), neither was there an interaction effect of DRUG and 
ADDRESSEE on planning time. (B) Movement time. There was no main effect of 
DRUG, ADDRESSEE or their interaction for movement time of Communicator 
(Event 2 in Fig. 4.1A), (C) Number of moves. There was no effect of DRUG, 
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ADDRESSEE and their interaction on the number of button presses producing  
a visible movement on the screen. (D) Relative time on Target-field and 
Non-target-field. No effects on the [time on Target-field – time on Non-target- 
field]/time on Non-target-field (for statistics see Table 4.S5).
A
Measurement chi-squared p 
Did you think you played differently for one of the partners? 0.11 0.743
Who do you think played better? 0.25 0.881
B
Measurement and effect To whom? df t P Effect Size
How old do you think your 
partner is?
attributed to Child 53 -0.31 0.757
attributed to Adult 53 -0.72 0.477
How alike do you think your 
partner is?
attributed to Child 53 2.72   0.009** -0.73
attributed to Adult 53 -0.41 0.686
C
Measurement To whom? chi-squared p
Used a computer before? attributed to Child       0     1
attributed to Adult       0 0.985
Rides a bike? attributed to Child       0     1
attributed to Adult       0     1
Counts to 100? attributed to Child       0     1
attributed to Adult       N/A
Can do multiplication problems? attributed to Child 5.41 0.02*
attributed to Adult       N/A
Knows the rules for driving a car? attributed to Child       0     1
attributed to Adult       N/A
Owns stuffed toys/animals? attributed to Child       0     1
attributed to Adult       0     1
Plays video games? attributed to Child       0     1
attributed to Adult 0.03 0.869
Goes to the store on their own? attributed to Child       0     1
attributed to Adult       N/A
Has read the diary of Anne Frank? attributed to Child 0.48 0.488
attributed to Adult       0     1
Can sing the song “zakdoekje leggen”?
 
attributed to Child 1.27 0.259
attributed to Adult 0.15 0.703
Table 4.S2. Statistical information about differences in age and cognitive abilities 
attributed to the Child and Adult Addressee by the Oxytocin and Placebo group. 
(A) General questions. (B) Questions related to the age and likeness of self to 
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Addressees. Effect sizes are Cohen’s d. At the end of the experiment, participants 
in the Oxytocin group felt more similar to the Child Addressee than participants in 
the Placebo group (Placebo: M = 4.43, SD = 1 79, SE = 0.35; Oxytocin: M = 5.77, 
SD = 1.86, SE = 0.35). This finding may reflect the observation that during the 
course of the experiment participants in the Oxytocin group more quickly adapted 
themselves to the ongoing behaviour of the presumed Child Addressee, who was, 
in fact, an adult, like themselves. (C) Questions related to cognitive abilities of the 
Addressees. Every participant thought that the Adult Addressee could count to 
100, could multiply, knew the rules of driving a car and could go to the store 
alone; therefore, no statistical test could be executed for these measures.
A
Communicative signal and effect df F p Effect size
All signals
Drug effect 4,50 3.88 0.008 0.237
Addressee effect 4,50 1.07 0.373 0.08
B
Communicative signals and effect df t p Effect size
Field-only
Drug effect 53 -2.92 0.005 ** 0.138
Addressee effect (Placebo group) 26 -1.85 0.076 0.116
Addressee effect (Oxytocin group) 27 0.04 0.972 0.000
Target-anchor
Drug effect 53 -2.96 0.005 ** 0.142
Addressee effect (Placebo group) 26  0.65 0.519 0.016
Addressee effect (Oxytocin group) 27 -1.5 0.145 0.077
Nest-anchor
Drug effect 53 3.11 0.003 ** 0.155
Addressee effect (Placebo group) 26 1.09 0.287 0.043
Addressee effect (Oxytocin group) 27 0.84 0.406 0.026
Draw-on-board
Drug effect 53 1.06 0.294 0.021
Addressee effect (Placebo group) N/a
Addressee effect (Oxytocin group) 27 -0.44 0.663 0.007
Miscellaneous
Drug effect 53    1.4 0.168 0.036
Addressee effect (Placebo group) 26    1 0.327 0.037
Addressee effect (Oxytocin group) 27    1.1 0.283 0.043
Table 4.S3. Statistical information about differences in signals used by the 
Oxytocin and Placebo group. (A) Overall effect of DRUG and ADDRESSEE on 
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signal use. (B) Effect of DRUG and ADDRESSEE on separate signals. Effect sizes 
for between subject ANOVAs are R2s, effect sizes for MANOVAs and repeated- 
measures ANOVA are partial η2.
Measurement and effect  B Standard  
error
df F p Model effect size
Time on Target-field
Time on Non-target-field  -0.25  0.07 1,2286.18 12.65  < 0.001 ** 0.550
Addressee effect  19.48 13.4 1,52.47    2.11    0.152
Drug effect  2.49 94.82 1,53.05   0    0.979
Addressee *drug effect 30 13.39 1,52.42  5.01    0.029 *
Placebo group
Addressee effect 49.74 19.56 1,25.77 6.45    0.017 * 0.511
Oxytocin group
Addressee effect -11.01 18.97 1,26.6 0.34    0.567 0.585
Relative adjustment for Addressee on time on Target-field
Block effect -0.04 0.03 1,53 2.28    0.137 0.043
Drug effect   0 0.03 1,53 0.02    0.884 0.001
Block*drug effect   0.06 0.03 1,53 4.84    0.032 * 0.073
Table 4.S4. Statistical information about the time on Target-field and the 
relative adjustment for Addressee on time on Target-field. R2 of the mixed 
linear models was calculated by calculating the square root of the correlation 
coefficient between the fitted and observed values. Effect sizes of the repeat-
ed-measures ANOVA modelling relative adjustment for addressee on Time on 
Target-field are partial η2s for each parameter.
Measurement and effect B Standard error Df F P Effect size
Planning time of Communicator
Addressee effect 141.31 46.61 1,53 9.19 0.004 ** 0.26
Drug effect -52.24 136.48 1,53 0.15 0.703
Addressee*drug effect -5.28 46.61 1,53 0.01 0.910
Movement time of Communicator
Addressee effect 24.94 16.92 1,53 2.17 0.146
Drug effect -12.31 104.62 1,53 0.01 0.907
Addressee*drug effect 1.98 16.92 1,53 0.01 0.907
Number of moves
Addressee effect 52.07 56.2 1,53 0.86 0.358
Drug effect -48.08 187.3 1,53 0.07 0.798
Addressee*drug effect 49.3 56.2 1,53 0.77 0.384
Relative time on Target-field and Non-target-field
Addressee effect 0.01 0.06 1,52.4 0.03 0.866
Drug effect 0.18 0.37 1,53 0.24 0.627
Addressee*drug effect 0.09 0.06 1,52.46  2.6 0.113
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Table 4.S5. Statistical information about the planning time of Communicator, 
the movement time of Communicator, the number of moves and the relative 
time on Target-field and Non-target-field. R2 of the mixed linear models was 
calculated by calculating the square root of the correlation coefficient between 
the fitted and observed values.
4.6.2. Supplementary videos
These videos provide representative examples of communicative behaviour 
recorded during task execution. To facilitate visibility, one second has been 
added before and after each transition across trial events (Events 1 to 5) and a 
slow-motion repetition of the Communicator’s movement has been added at the 
end of Event 2 (adapted from Stolk et al., 2014; Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013). 
Each video contains an example of the different communicative signals  
spontaneously generated by the participants during the game. Videos can  
be found at www.miriamdeboer.nl/thesis.
Video S1. Field-Only. Communicators generating this signal indicated which of 
the nine fields contained the target by making a detour in time or path on the 
Target-field adjacent to the Target-location. 
Video S2. Target-Anchor. Communicators generating this signal used the 
Target-field as an anchor to indicate the Target-location. Information on the 
Target-location was conveyed by visiting the field adjacent to the Target-location. 
Video S3. Nest-Anchor. Communicators generating this signal used the Nest as 
an anchor to indicate the Target-location. The Target-location was disambiguated 
by visiting the field adjacent to the Nest (middle field) that was spatially 
isomorphic to the position of the Target-location relative to the centre of the 
Target-field.
Video S4. Draw-On-Board. Communicators generating this signal used the 
entire game board to indicate the Target-location. The Target-location was 
disambiguated by ‘drawing’ the configuration of the Target-locations within the 
Target-field on board, marking the relevant Target-location with an additional 
movement or pause to the field containing the relevant Target-location.

5. 
Does oxytocin modulate 
vmPFC-amygdala resting 
state functional connectivity? 
A failed replication study
In humans, most of the existing work on the neural mechanisms modulated  
by oxytocin has focused on circuits supporting social-emotional processing. 
Particular attention has been given to the role of the amygdala and to its 
resting state functional connectivity with the ventral medial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC). In this study, we aimed to replicate an earlier reported finding that 
oxytocin alters vmPFC-amygdala resting-state fMRI connectivity. We also 
assessed whether the oxytocinergic modulation of vmPFC-amygdala connectivity 
has cognitive-behavioural consequences, namely on knowledge sharing and 
adjustment to recipient’s mental states. Forty-eight right-handed males self- 
administered a nasal spray containing either 24 IU of oxytocin or a placebo 
control in a randomised double-blind between-subject design. Despite sufficient 
power to replicate a large effect reported previously, we did not detect an 
oxytocinergic modulation of vmPFC-amygdala resting-state fMRI connectivity. 
Furthermore, we did not find a relation between cerebral and cognitive- 
behavioural consequences of oxytocin administration. This study suggests 
that, if oxytocin has an effect on vmPFC-amygdala connectivity, that this effect 
is not strong. This finding emphasises careful interpretation of current reports 
on the effect of this neuropeptide on brain and behaviour, and stresses the 
importance of replication studies. 
De Boer, M., Visser, E., Kokal, I., Radke, S., Stolk, A., Mars, R.B., Roelofs, K.,  
& Toni, I. (in preparation).
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5.1. Introduction
The neuropeptide oxytocin plays an important role in social and affiliative 
behaviour in mammals (Bate et al., 2015; Donaldson & Young, 2008; Heinrichs 
et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2015; Preckel et al., 2015; Windle et al., 1997; Young & 
Wang, 2004), through relatively well-understood neural mechanisms (Ferguson, 
Aldag, Insel, & Young, 2001; Gimpl & Fahrenholz, 2001; Huber, Veinante, & 
Stoop, 2005; Landgraf & Neumann, 2004; Shapiro & Insel, 1992; Viviani et al., 
2011). However, it remains largely unclear how oxytocin modulates neural 
circuits in humans, in particular those functions supporting higher-order cognitive 
functions like resource sharing and recognition of mental states (Declerck et 
al., 2010; Domes, Heinrichs, Michel, et al., 2007; Kirsch et al., 2005; Kosfield & 
Heinrich, 2005; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory & Abu-Akel, 2016). 
Most of the existing work has focused on neural circuits supporting social- 
emotional processing (Bartz et al., 2011; Bos et al., 2012; Domes, Heinrichs, 
Glascher, et al., 2007; Hurlemann et al., 2010; Kirsch et al., 2005) and in 
particular oxytocin’s effect on the amygdala and its functional connectivity with 
the medial frontal cortex (vmPFC; Dodhia et al., 2014; Domes, Heinrichs, 
Glascher, et al., 2007; Fan et al., 2014; Kirsch et al., 2005; Kovacs & Keri, 2015; 
Labuschagne et al., 2010; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2011; Riem et al., 2012; 
Sripada et al., 2013; Striepens et al., 2012). This focus is justified by the obser-
vation that the amygdala is a major node in the central oxytocinergic system, 
with a strong expression of oxytocin-receptors (Gimpl & Fahrenholz, 2001; 
Huber et al., 2005), and direct, reciprocal connections to the vmPFC (Amaral, 
Price, Pitkanen, & Carmichael, 1992; Freese & Amaral, 2009; Ghashghaei, Hilg-
etag, & Barbas, 2007). Neural coupling between vmPFC and the amygdala has 
been interpreted in relation to emotion and anxiety regulation (Banks, Eddy, 
Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2007; Bishop, 2007; Fan et al., 2014; Kim, Gee, 
Loucks, Davis, & Whalen, 2011; Kim, Loucks, et al., 2011; Liao et al., 2010; 
Stanton, Wirth, Waugh, & Schultheiss, 2009; van Wingen et al., 2014) so that 
an oxytocinergic effect on this cerebral correlate might be anxiolytic in nature 
(Dodhia et al., 2014; Sripada et al., 2013). However, the evidence is mixed. 
Some studies have reported a large increase (Kovacs & Keri, 2015; Sripada et 
al., 2013), another study a large attenuation (Dodhia et al., 2014), and some 
others an absence of effect on cerebral coupling between these regions (Fan et 
al., 2014; Kumar, Völlm, & Palaniyappan, 2014; Riem et al., 2013). A somehow 
parallel literature has linked the vmPFC to the implementation of higher-order 
cognitive operations, including value-based decision-making, schema-based 
memory-processing and person-specific mentalising (Amodio & Frith, 2006;  
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V. E. Ghosh et al., 2014; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Rushworth et al., 2011; van 
Kesteren et al., 2012; Warren et al., 2014; Welborn & Lieberman, 2015; Wunder-
lich, Dayan, & Dolan, 2012). Those cognitive operations might be instances of 
decisions based on the ability to rapidly explore and update internal models 
of the (social) environment (Stolk et al., 2015; Stolk et al., 2016). In this 
study, we aim to replicate the large effect reported by Sripada et al. (2013)  
that oxytocin enhances vmPFC-amygdala functional connectivity, and assess 
whether oxytocin’s influence on enhanced cognitive exploration are reflected 
in this cerebral effect.
This study builds on the observation that, besides social-emotional effects, 
oxytocin also influences how humans share knowledge (Chapter 4). More 
precisely, during ostensive referential communication, oxytocin administration 
leads participants to explore more pervasively the potential communicative 
behaviours by which they could convey their intention. Given the state-related 
characteristics of that oxytocinergic effect on communicative behaviour, here 
we assess the effect of oxytocin on cerebral correlates of state-related cognitive 
biases.  
We index these cerebral effects with a measure well-suited to capture state- 
related modulations of cerebral connectivity unbiased by specific task opera-
tionalisations. Namely, we focus on consistent temporal couplings between 
intrinsic blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) fluctuations, as measured with 
resting-state fMRI. This index captures distinct, reliable and reproducible spon-
taneous fluctuations in brain intrinsic activity (Beckmann et al., 2005; Biswal 
et al., 2010; Bressler, 1995; Damoiseaux et al., 2006). Those spatially and 
temporally consistent patterns of intrinsic cerebral covariance are thought to 
reflect the hemodynamic consequences of neuronal dynamics that propagate 
through anatomically connected networks (A. Ghosh et al., 2008; He et al., 
2008; Honey et al., 2007; Honey et al., 2009). Accordingly, we compare rest-
ing-state functional connectivity measured in forty-eight males who self-admin-
istered 24 IU of oxytocin nasal spray (N = 23) or a placebo control (N = 25), 
employing a seed based approach (M. D. Fox & Raichle, 2007). Furthermore, we 
assess whether oxytocin’s influence on vmPFC-amygdala functional connectivity 
is related to the behavioural effect of oxytocin reported in Chapter 4, namely the 
observation that oxytocin enhances (communicative) exploratory tendencies. 
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5.2. Material and methods
5.2.1. Participants
Forty-eight right-handed healthy males (mean age = 22, SD = 3 years) partici-
pated in this study. Participants gave written informed consent according to 
the institutional guidelines of the local ethics committee (Committee on Research 
Involving Human Subjects, Region Arnhem-Nijmegen, the Netherlands), and were 
compensated financially or by study credits for participation. Participants were 
excluded from participation if they had any psychiatric, endocrine or neurolog-
ical disorders, abused alcohol or drugs, smoked more than five cigarettes per 
day, used medication (except for paracetamol), had any metal objects in the 
body, participated in other pharmacological studies or had donated blood within 
the last two months. Out of fifty-eight recruited participants, eight participants 
were excluded due to technical problems, one participant was excluded because 
he did not understand the behavioural task, and one participant was excluded 
because he did not believe the experimental manipulation.
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Figure 5.1. Time-course of the experiment.
5.2.2. Experimental design and procedure
In this experiment we employed a randomised, placebo, controlled, double-
blind, and between-subjects design. Data reported here were collected as part 
of a larger study on the effect of oxytocin on social behaviour (for an overview 
of the study’s time course see Fig. 5.1). Following drug administration (see 
“Pharmacological intervention”), participants filled out self-report questionnaires 
(see “Hormonal and psychometric traits”). They played a communication game 
BETWEEN THE LINES104
and performed a pragmatics task in the MEG scanner (Chapter 4; Ye et al., 
2016). One hour and forty minutes after the administration of the first spray, 
they were given a booster spray (24 IU), performed a social approach- 
avoidance task in an MR environment (reported in Radke et al., 2017) and 
underwent resting state functional MRI (rsfMRI; see “Image acquisition” and  
“Data analysis”). Resting state connectivity data was analysed by employing 
a seed-based analysis and it was assessed whether oxytocin’s influence on 
enhanced cognitive exploration is reflected in altered vmPFC-amygdala functional 
connectivity. 
5.2.3. Pharmacological intervention
Twenty-four hours before the start of the experiment, participants were 
requested to refrain from alcohol, caffeine and cigarettes. Two hours before 
substance administration, they were asked to refrain from food and drink, 
except for water. Upon arrival at the Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging 
(Nijmegen, the Netherlands), they self-administered a nasal spray (3 puffs per 
nostril each with a dose of 4 IU) containing either a total of 24 IU of oxytocin 
(Syntocinon, Novartis, Basel, Switzerland; N = 23) or a saline solution (a 
placebo; N = 25). At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to 
attempt to identify the nature of the intervention and the dosage of the 
substance they had received using a 7-points Likert scale (substance: from -3 
“I definitely received a placebo” to +3 “I definitely received a drug”; dosage: 
from -3 “I definitely received a low dose” to +3 “I definitely received a high 
dose”). All participants were tested in the afternoon. 
5.2.4. Hormonal and psychometric traits
Cortisol and testosterone levels of participants were measured by obtaining 
saliva samples prior, 15 minutes, and 100 minutes after substance administra-
tion using salicaps (Immuno-Biological Laboratories GmbH, Hamburg, Germany). 
Samples were stored at -25 °C and analysed in duplicate for both cortisol and 
testosterone. Hormone concentration was measured using luminescence 
Immunoassays (Immuno-Biological Laboratories GmbH, Hamburg, Germany). 
We considered the average of the three time points for each hormone and 
performed independent sample t-tests to index if the distribution of steroid 
levels were similar in the Oxytocin and Placebo group. 
Immediately after drug-administration, self-report questionnaires were admin-
istered indexing empathy (Empathy Quotient, EQ and Interpersonal Ractivity 
Index, IRI; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Davis, 1983), systemising 
(Systemising Quotient Revised, SQ; Wheelwright et al., 2006) and social 
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anxiety (Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987). The EQ indexes 
mentalising (cognitive empathy), emotional reactivity to others and social 
skills, all contributing to one index. The IRI indexes empathy according to 
various subscales. The fantasy subscale indexes the tendency to identify 
oneself with a fictional character. The perspective taking subscale indexes the 
tendency to take another’s view point. The empathic concern subscale indexes 
experienced warmth and compassion to others, and the personal distress 
subscale indexes experienced discomfort whilst observing another person in 
distress. The SQ indexes the tendency to explore and analyse a system. The 
LSAS indicates fear and avoidance of social situations. Independent t-tests 
were performed to assess if the distribution of psychometric traits were similar 
in the Oxytocin and Placebo group. 
5.2.5. Image acquisition
Functional images were acquired on a 1.5 T MR scanner (Avanto, Siemens 
Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a 32-channel head coil 
using a multi-echo GRAPPA sequence (Poser, Versluis, Hoogduin, & Norris, 
2006; TR = 2000 ms, 5 TEs: 6.9/16.2/25/35/44 ms, 39 slices, voxel size 3.5 x 
3.5 x 3.0 ms, FoV 224 mm, distance factor 17%, EPI-factor 64; 266 volumes).  
T1 images were acquired subsequently (TR 2730 ms, TE: 2.95 ms, 176 sagital 
slices, voxel size: 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0 mm, FoV: 256 mm, flip angle 7 degrees). During 
rsfMRI data acquisition, participants were asked to lie still in the scanner (9 
minutes), to keep their eyes open and not to focus their thoughts on a single 
topic in particular. Participant’s wakefulness was monitored by verifying with 
an eye-tracker if they had their eyes open.
5.2.6. Data analysis
5.2.6.1. Pre-processing
Multi-echo images were combined using TE-weighting. Pre-processing was carried 
out using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 6.00, part of FSL (FMRIB’s Soft-
ware Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). The following pre-statistics processing was 
applied: motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 
2002); non-brain removal using BET (Smith, 2002), spatial smoothing using a 
Gaussian kernel of 5mm FWHM, and grand-mean intensity normalisation of the 
entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor. Motion artefacts were removed 
with Independent Component Analysis Automated Removal of Motion Artefacts 
(ICA AROMA, aggressive denoising; Pruim, Mennes, Buitelaar, et al., 2015; Pruim, 
Mennes, van Rooij, et al., 2015). Lastly, high-pass temporal filtering was applied 
(Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma=50.0s).
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5.2.6.2. Seed-based analysis
A seed based correlation analysis (M. D. Fox & Raichle, 2007) was used to test 
for oxytocin-related modulations of vmPFC-amygdala resting state connectivity. 
Subject-specific binary masks of the amygdala were created using FIRST, a 
segmentation and registration tool for subcortical brain (Patenaude, Smith, 
Kennedy, & Jenkinson, 2011). The vmPFC [1,55,-5] seed was created by drawing 
a sphere of 8mm radius around the peak voxel isolated in a live communica-
tive game, contrasting brain activity of participants who were solving commu-
nicative problems that were novel or known to them respectively (Stolk et al., 
2014). Then, this sphere was intersected with a grey matter mask (mask size > 
11 voxels).
Seed-to-whole brain analyses were conducted for the left amygdala, the right 
amygdala and the vmPFC. For each seed, the first level model considered the 
seed timeseries and eight nuisance regressors (CSF, WM and 6 head-motion 
parameters). Contrasts of interest were the parameter estimates of the whole 
brain corresponding to the seed regressor. These first-level contrast and variance 
images were then linearly translated from native space to high resolution 
structural space with FMRIB’s Linear Image Registration Tool (Jenkinson et al., 
2002; Jenkinson & Smith, 2001). Registration from high resolution structural  
to standard space was then further refined using FMRIB’s Non-linear Image 
Registration Tool (Andersson, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2007a, 2007b). These 
standard space images were submitted to FSL’s randomise permutation-testing 
tool, testing if there was a difference in seed to whole-brain functional connectivity 
between contrast images of those who self-administered an oxytocin or a placebo 
nasal-spray.
To examine functional coupling between the vmPFC and the amygdala, we 
employed FSL Glm to regress nuisance regressors (WM, CSF and 6 motion 
parameters) out of the pre-processed unsmoothed data. Out of these residual 
images, mean timeseries of the right amygdala, left amygdala and the vmPFC 
were extracted by intersecting the subject-specific binary masks of the 
respective seeds. Correlation coefficients were calculated between the  
mean time-series of the vmPFC and the left amygdala, and the time-series  
of the vmPFC and the right amygdala. Frequentist and Bayesian t-tests were 
performed in JASP to quantify the likelihood of the data given the model with, 
and the model without, the factor DRUG (Love et al., 2015; Morey & Rouder, 
2015; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). Post-hoc Cohen’s d of 
Sripada and colleagues was calculated with G*Power (Version 3.1.9.2; Loffler, 
Radke, Morawetz, & Derntl, 2016; Radke et al., 2016). 
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5.2.6.3. Relation between resting-state connectivity and communicative 
performance
A 2 x 2 frequentist and Bayesian covariate analysis of variance was performed 
to test if cognitive exploration of potential communicative behaviours and 
audience design in a communicative game (Chapter 4) were related to vmPFC- 
amygdala connectivity (left and right). Factors were DRUG (Oxytocin or Placebo), 
STRATEGY (Global or Local), and a continuous variable ADJUSTMENT. In the 
previous chapter we found a difference in the referential quality of the commu-
nicative signals generated by participants, i.e. the number of potential locations 
with which the location of a target object could be indicated (for more details on 
the game and behavioural results see Chapter 4). If participants generated 
communicative signals with which all potential Target-locations could be indicated 
in more than 50% of the trials, their behaviour was rated as “Global” (Nest-Anchor 
and Draw-on-Board signal in Chapter 4). If participants generated signals with 
which only a subset of the potential Target-locations could be indicated in 
more than 50% of the trials (Field-Only and Target-Anchor signal in Chapter 4), 
their behaviour was labelled as “Local”. During the communicative game, 
participants were made to believe they played either with an Adult or with a 
Child Addressee. The ADJUSTMENT score was calculated by measuring the 
magnitude of systematic variations in movement time on the field containing 
the target object as a function of the presumed abilities of the Addressees 
([mean time on Target-fieldChild – mean time on Target-fieldAdult]/[mean time  
on Target-field
Child
 + mean time on Target-field
Adult
]). Frequentist and Bayesian 
ANCOVAs were performed with JASP (JASP Version 0.7.5 and BayesFactor 
package Version 0.9.11-3; Love et al., 2015; Morey & Rouder, 2015).
5.3. Results
5.3.1. Hormonal and psychometric traits
There were no significant differences between cortisol and testosterone levels 
in participants that received an Oxytocin or a Placebo nasal spray (Cortisol 
level for Placebo group: M = 8.9 ± SD = 4.0 nmol/l and for Oxytocin group: 8.5 ± 
3.3 nmol/l, t(46) = -0.65, p = 0.522; Testosterone level for Placebo: 83.9 ± 
58.8 pg/nl and Oxytocin group: 78.5 ± 42.3, t(46) = -0.35, p = 0.721). The 
intra-assay and inter-assay coefficients of variation in cortisol and testosterone 
saliva measurements were less than 4% for cortisol, and 0-2% and 5-9% for 
testosterone respectively. There were no significant differences between these 
groups’ guesses on the identity or dosage of the substance received (Substance 
for Placebo group: -0.26 ± 1.4 and Oxytocin group: -0.04 ± 1.7 with value -3 
meaning “I definitely received a placebo” to value +3 meaning “I definitely 
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received a drug”; dosage; t(46) = -0.48, p = 0.633; Dosage for Placebo group: 
-0.76 ± 1.5 and for Oxytocin group: -0.85 ± 1.6 from value -3 “I definitely received 
a low dose” to value +3 “I definitely received a high dose”; t(39) = -0.18,  
p = 0.859; the number of responses is small as several participants did not  
generate responses if they thought that they received a Placebo nasal spray). 
Furthermore, the psychometric traits of participants in both groups were 
statistically matched for empathy (Empathy Quotient, EQ; Interperesonal 
Reactivity Index, IRI; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Davis, 1983), 
systemising (Systemising Quotient, SQ; Wheelwright et al., 2006), need for 
cognition (Need for Cognition Scale, NCS; Cacioppo et al., 1984) and social 
anxiety (Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987; see Table 5.1).
5.3.2. Seed-to-whole brain analysis
Seed-to-whole-brain analysis with the left amygdala as seed revealed a pattern 
of resting state functional connectivity consisting of the contralateral amygdala, 
accumbens, parahippocampus, hippocampus, MTG and the frontal pole in the 
Oxytocin and Placebo group (see Fig. 5.2A; for statistical information see Table 
5.S1A and 5.S1B). Right-amygdala-seed-to-whole-brain analysis revealed a 
similar pattern (see Fig. 5.2B; for statistical information see Table 5.S1C and 
5.S1D). The connectivity pattern associated with the vmPFC-seed-to-whole 
brain analysis encompassed a network consisting of the medial frontal cortex, 
superior frontal gyrus, precuneus and the temporal poles and the hippo-
campus. Furthermore, this network encompassed the frontal pole, MTG, 
accumbens and the amygdala (see Fig. 5.2C; Table 5.S1E and 5.S1F). There were 
no significant differences after the administration of Oxytocin or Placebo in the 
functional connectivity pattern associated with the left amygdala and the rest 
of the brain, the right amygdala and the rest of the brain, and the vmPFC and 
the rest of the brain (pcluster-corrected < 0.05).
5.3.3. Seed-to-seed analysis
Planned comparisons with frequentist t-tests revealed that there was no significant 
difference in connectivity strength between the vmPFC and the left amygdala 
after the administration of an Oxytocin or Placebo nasal spray (Oxytocin: M = 
0.112 ± SD = 0.177 and Placebo: 0.173 ± 0.123; t(46) = -1.39; p = 0.171; Fig. 
5.3A; Table 5.2), neither was there a significant difference after drug adminis-
tration in connectivity strength between the vmPFC and the right amygdala 
(Oxytocin: 0.150 ± 0.185 and Placebo: 0.192 ± 0.150; t(46) = -0.88; p = 0.383; 
Fig. 5.3B; Table 5.2).
Does oxytocin modulate vmPFC-amygdala resting state functional connectivity? 
A failed replication study
5
109
A. Group Descriptives
Measurement Group N Mean SD SE 
Empathy quotient  Oxytocin 23 -0.198 0.989 0.206
Placebo 25 0.182 0.995 0.199
Interpersonal reactivity index
Fantasy scale  Oxytocin 23 0.024 1.095 0.228
Placebo 25 -0.022 0.927 0.185
Empathic concern Oxytocin 23 -0.099 1.122 0.234
Placebo 25 0.091 0.886 0.177
 Perspective taking Oxytocin 23 -0.184 0.854 0.178
Placebo 25 0.169 1.108 0.222
Personal distress Oxytocin 23 0.212 1.183 0.247
Placebo 25 -0.195 0.771 0.154
Systemising quotient Oxytocin 23 0.201 1.003 0.209
Placebo 25 -0.185 0.981 0.196
Liebowitz social anxiety scale Oxytocin 23 0.11 0.994 0.207
Placebo 25 -0.101 1.015 0.203
Need for cognition scale Oxytocin 23 -0.045 0.991 0.207
Placebo 25 0.042 1.027 0.205
B. T-Tests
Measurement t df p
Empathy quotient -1.324 46 0.192
Interpersonal reactivity index
Fantasy scale 0.16 46 0.874
Empathic concern -0.656 46 0.515
Perspective taking -1.227 46 0.226
Personal distress 1.425 46 0.161
Systemising quotient 1.347 46 0.185
Liebowitz social anxiety scale 0.728 46 0.47
Need for cognition scale -0.298 46 0.767
Table 5.1. Psychometric traits. (A) Descriptive statistics. (B) Independent t-tests.
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Figure 5.3. Descriptive statistics of functional connectivity. (A) Functional 
connectivity between the vmPFC and the left amygdala. (B) Functional 
connectivity between the vmPFC and the right amygdala. Pearson’s  
correlation coefficient; error bars represent the 95% confidence interval.
A. Group descriptives 
  Group N Mean SD SE 
vmPFC  - L Amygdala
  
Oxytocin 23 0.112 0.177 0.037 
Placebo 25 0.173 0.123 0.025 
vmPFC – R Amygdala
  
Oxytocin 23 0.150 0.185 0.039 
Placebo 25 0.192 0.150 0.030 
B. T-tests 
  t df p Mean Difference SE Difference Cohen’s d 
vmPFC – L Amygdala -1.392 46.00 0.171 -0.061 0.044 -0.402 
vmPFC – R Amygdala -0.880 46.00 0.383 -0.043 0.049 -0.254 
C. Bayesian independent samples t-test 
  BF01 error % 
vmPFC – L Amygdala 1.588 6.208e -5 
vmPFC – R Amygdala 2.536 2.229e -4 
Table 5.2. Planned seed-to-seed comparisons. (A) Group descriptives. Mean 
values represent Pearson’s correlation coefficients. (B) T-tests. (C) Bayesian 
t-tests. 
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In order to quantify the evidence for the null hypothesis, we compared the fit  
of the data under the null hypothesis (a model without factor DRUG) and the 
alternative hypothesis (a model with the factor DRUG) with Bayesian statistics. 
An estimated Bayes Factor (null/alternative) suggested that the connectivity 
between the vmPFC and the left amygdala as described in the data acquired in 
this experiment were 1.59 times more likely to occur under the model without 
factor DRUG, than the model with this factor. Connectivity between the vmPFC 
and the right amygdala as reported in this study were 2.54 times more likely to 
occur under the model without factor DRUG, than under the model with this 
factor (see Table 5.2C). 
Our sample should be large enough to replicate the earlier reported increase of 
vmPFC-amygdala connectivity after the administration of exogenous oxytocin 
(Sripada et al., 2013). The effect size of Sripada’s study (Cohen’s d) was calcu-
lated with G*Power’s post-hoc achieved power test. In this test we entered as 
variables: mean and standard deviation of the correlation coefficients (obtained 
from Figure 1 on p. 258) and an assumed correlation between groups of 0.5 since 
Sripada and colleagues employed a within-subject design. This calculation 
lead to a Cohen’s d of 1.43. With such a large effect size and a Power (Beta 
value) of 0.99, a replication of the finding reported by Sripada and colleagues 
should be detectable with a between subject design of 38 participants. We 
measured 48.
5.3.4. Relation between resting state connectivity and communicative  
performance
We did not observe a significant relation between the effect of DRUG, our 
indices of communicative performance (STRATEGY: the exploration of potential 
communicative behaviours and communicative ADJUSTMENT to an Addressee) 
and vmPFC-amygdala connectivity (see Table 5.3). In order to quantify the 
evidence for the null hypothesis, we estimated Bayes Factors (null/alternative). 
The null hypothesis consisted of an intercept-only model without any other 
factors. Alternative hypotheses consisted of models containing the intercept 
and all variations of main and interaction effects with the factors DRUG, 
STRATEGY and ADJUST. Estimated Bayes Factor suggested that the connectivity 
between the vmPFC and the left amygdala measured in this study was more 
likely to occur under the intercept-only model (BF01 > 1; see Table 5.4A for addi-
tional statistical information). A similar pattern was observed for the connectivity 
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between the vmPFC and the right amygdala. For instance, the intercept-only 
model without factors for DRUG, STRATEGY and ADJUST or communicative 
behaviour is 256.49 more likely to occur given the current data than the model 
containing all main effects, two- and three-way interaction effect of these three 
factors (see Table 5.4B for additional Bayesian statistical information).
A. ANCOVA - vmPFC– Left Amygdala connectivity
Cases Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p η² 
Drug 0.051 1 0.051 2.196 0.146 0.049 
Strategy 0.005 1 0.005 0.207 0.652 0.005 
Adjust 0.019 1 0.019 0.808 0.374 0.018 
Drug * Strategy 0.030 1 0.030 1.278 0.265 0.028 
Drug * Adjust 5.173e -4 1 5.173e -4 0.022 0.883 0.000 
Strategy * Adjust 5.327e -6 1 5.327e -6 2.277e -4 0.988 0.000 
Drug * Strategy * Adjust 0.009 1 0.009 0.369 0.547 0.008 
Residual 0.936 40 0.023     
B. ANCOVA – vmPFC - Right Amygdala connectivity
Cases Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p η² 
Drug 0.018 1 0.018 0.571 0.454 0.014 
Strategy 0.002 1 0.002 0.055 0.815 0.001 
Adjust 8.856e -5 1 8.856e -5 0.003 0.958 0.000 
Drug * Strategy 0.017 1 0.017 0.550 0.463 0.013 
Drug * Adjust 8.249e -5 1 8.249e -5 0.003 0.959 0.000 
Strategy * Adjust 0.003 1 0.003 0.085 0.772 0.002 
Drug * Strategy * Adjust 0.012 1 0.012 0.378 0.542 0.009 
Residual 1.237 40 0.031     
Table 5.3. Relation between vmPFC-amygdala resting-state connectivity and 
the effect of DRUG (Oxytocin, Placebo), STRATEGY (the exploration of potential 
communicative behaviours; Global, Local) and ADJUST (continuous, communica-
tive adjustments for an Addressee). (A) Connectivity between the vmPFC and the 
left amygdala. (B) Connectivity between the vmPFC and the right amygdala.
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5.4. Discussion
In this study, we investigated if the administration of intranasal oxytocin altered 
functional connectivity between the vmPFC and the amygdala. There were no 
significant differences in the functional connectivity pattern associated with the 
seeds (vmPFC, left and right amygdala) and the rest of the brain after the admin-
istration of oxytocin or placebo. Neither were there significant differences after 
drug administration in planned seed-to-seed analysis of vmPFC-amygdala 
connectivity (left and right). Evidence for the null hypothesis that there was no 
difference in vmPFC-amygdala connectivity strength after drug administration 
was quantified with Bayesian statistics. In that framework, the current observa-
tions are more consistent with the hypo thesis that there is no difference 
between vmPFC-amygdala functional connectivity after oxytocin administration 
than with the hypothesis that there is a difference between vmPFC-amygdala 
connectivity strength after oxytocin administration. 
Based on an earlier study (Chapter 4) we observed that oxytocin does not 
only influence social-emotional behaviour, but that it also leads participants 
to explore more pervasively the potential communicative solutions and diverse 
mental models of the addressee with whom they played an interactive commu-
nication game. Therefore, we also assessed if oxytocin’s influence on this 
enhanced communicative exploration is reflected in vmPFC-amygdala connectivity. 
VmPFC-amygdala resting state connectivity did not mediate the effect of oxytocin 
on communicative performance, and Bayesian analysis confirmed that the 
current observations are more consistent with a model where vmPFC-amygdala 
connectivity was not modulated by the type of administered drug or by commu-
nicative performance.
5.4.1. Oxytocin effects on vmPFC-amygdala connectivity
Our finding is not in line with the report by Sripada et al., who found enhanced 
vmPFC-amygdala functional connectivity after the administration of intranasal 
oxytocin in healthy males (Sripada et al., 2013). Failure of replication might be 
due to several reasons. 
First, replication failure might be related to a lack of power. However, our 
sample size is large enough to detect a large effect of oxytocin such as 
reported by Sripada and colleagues (Cohen’s d of 1.43). There remains a 
possibility that our failure of replication is a Type II error, should the effect 
of oxytocin on vmPFC-amygdala connectivity be small. 
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Second, replication failure might be related to the timing of resting-state data 
acquisition in relation to the administration of oxytocin (see Fig. 5.1). Namely, 
resting-state fMRI data were collected fifty minutes after drug administration. 
The cerebral effects of oxytocin might have faded away. However, this possibility 
seems unlikely, given three observations. There were clear cerebral effects of 
oxytocin in a task performed immediately before resting state data collection 
(Radke et al., 2017). The pharmacodynamic evidence indicates that oxytocin 
levels remain elevated fifty minutes after the administration of a (booster) 
spray, both in the cerebrospinal fluid as well as in plasma (Born et al., 2002; 
Striepens et al., 2013). Finally, post-hoc exploratory analyses revealed that 
oxytocin significantly enhanced resting state correlation between a  
frontotemporal-cerebellar network and an occipital-parietal-network. While 
this finding indicates that oxytocin was still cerebrally active during the 
resting-state fMRI measurements, we are reluctant to interpret its functional 
relevance given the post-hoc and exploratory character of this observation. 
Third, replication failure might be related to differences in study design. The 
nature of the communicative experiment did not allow for a within-subject 
design as employed by Sripada et al. Here, the main aim of the study is to 
investigate a mechanism supporting the emergence of novel communicative 
strategies. The novelty would have been hard to control if participants were  
to play the game a second time. However, we tried to carefully account for 
possible sources of between-subjects variations that could affect the current 
experimental design. For instance, as both context and individual traits may 
influence to what extent oxytocin affects brain and behaviour (Bartz et al., 
2011), we indexed individual variations between the oxytocin and placebo 
group on testosterone, cortisol and psychometric scores related to empathising 
(Empathy Quotient; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index; Davis, 1983), systemising (Systemising Quotient; Wheelwright et al., 
2006), social anxiety (Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale; Liebowitz, 1987) and 
need for cognition (Need for Cognition Scale; Cacioppo et al., 1984). There 
were no significant differences in the measured individual variations between 
the two groups (see Table 5.1). Exploratory analysis of the relation between 
individual variation and vmPFC-amygdala connectivity did not reveal a clearly 
discernible pattern of results. Further analysis on the effects on the oxytocinergic 
effect on vmPFC-amygdala connectivity related to, for instance, individual 
variation in systemising/empathising, social anxiety, and early life stress may 
help to unravel the circumstances under which oxytocin may affect connectivity 
strength between these neural correlates and when not (Dodhia et al., 2014; Fan 
et al., 2014; Kumar et al., 2014; Riem et al., 2013; Takeuchi et al., 2014). 
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Fourth, differences in data acquisition and pre-processing between these two 
studies might be a reason for the replication failure, in particular in the way by 
which motion artefacts were removed. In this study, we employed stringent ICA 
based automated motion artefact removal. Lack of appropriate motion artefact 
removal has been associated with the appearance of spurious connectivity 
patterns (Power, Barnes, Snyder, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2012). 
Fifth, the vmPFC and amygdala seeds might not capture relevant sources of 
variance. However, the amygdala seed was anatomically tailored on a subject-
by-subject basis, and amygdala seed-to-whole brain analysis revealed a 
connectivity pattern similar to the pattern reported in the literature. This 
pattern included the contralateral amygdala, accumbens, parahippocampus, 
hippocampus, MTG and the frontal pole in both the oxytocin and placebo 
group (see Fig. 5.2A and B and Table 5.S1; similar pattern of activation as in 
Kim, Loucks, et al., 2011; Roy et al., 2009; van Wingen, Mattern, Verkes, Buite-
laar, & Fernandez, 2010). The vmPFC seed was functionally defined according 
to an independent fMRI study (Stolk et al., 2014), and seed-to-whole brain 
analysis revealed that this region was part of the default mode network in both 
groups, a connectivity pattern in line with previous reports (see Fig. 5.2C; see 
Table 5.S1; Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Greicius, Supekar, 
Menon, & Dougherty, 2009; Uddin, Kelly, Biswal, Castellanos, & Milham, 
2009). 
Sixth, it may be argued that the failure to replicate the findings of Sripada et  
al. might arise from the choice of different seed regions between studies. 
However, a post-hoc analysis on the seeds used by Sripada and colleagues did 
not yield significant differences (see “Supplementary information” and Table 
5.S2). Taken together, these data suggest that, should there be an effect of 
oxytocin on vmPFC-amygdala connectivity, that this effect most likely is small.
In fact, a failure of replication of the results reported by Sripada et al. is in line 
with three earlier studies that do not find a moderating effect of oxytocin on 
vmPFC-amygdala connectivity. Those negative findings were obtained in the 
context of a study on oxytocin’s effect on healthy males (Kumar et al., 2014), 
early life stress (Fan et al., 2014) and maternal love withdrawal (Riem et al., 
2013). More generally, there is an increasing number of reports on replication 
failures on the effect of oxytocin, such as a replication failure of the seminal 
findings that oxytocin enhances trust or mind-reading (Lane et al., 2015; Nave 
et al., 2015; Radke & de Bruijn, 2015; Walum et al., 2016). These mixed results 
might be related to our lack of understanding of oxytocin’s neurodynamics 
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(Churchland & Winkielman, 2012). For instance, it is under debate if intranasally 
administered oxytocin can actually cross the blood-brain barrier, and how 
endogenous peripheral and central oxytocin levels interact with this nasal 
spray to alter brain activity and behaviour (Leng & Ludwig, 2016; McEwen, 
2004; Striepens et al., 2013; Veening & Olivier, 2013; Walum et al., 2016). 
Therefore, further research on the processes that underlie the effect of oxytocin 
on brain and behaviour are of high importance. 
Obviously, the null or small effect of oxytocin on vmPFC-amygdala functional 
connectivity does not exclude the possibility that this neuropeptide alters 
resting state functional connectivity in other parts of the brain. Potential candi-
dates are the amygdala-anterior cingulate connectivity (Kovacs & Keri, 2015), 
amygdala-precuneus connectivity (Kumar et al., 2014) and/or other regions 
that are involved in social-emotional processing such as the nucleus accumbens 
and the temporal poles (Bos et al., 2012). Should oxytocin enhance processing 
of social information (Bartz et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory & Abu-Akel, 2016) or 
the exploration of internal models of the social environment, then oxytocin’s 
effect might be observed as well in neural correlates outside the “social” brain, 
such as regions that are involved in sensory processing (Marlin et al., 2015; see 
for a further discussion of this possibility Chapter 6). 
5.4.2. Oxytocin effects on communicative performance mediated by 
vmPFC-amygdala connectivity
We did not find a relation between the effect of oxytocin, vmPFC-amygdala 
connectivity strength and indices of communicative performance. This might 
be due to an absence of an oxytocinergic effect on this particular cerebral 
correlate in general for the reasons described above. Alternatively, there might 
be no relation between vmPFC-amygdala connectivity and our indices of commu-
nicative performance. It seems unlikely that the vmPFC region of interest is not 
involved in human communication, as it is involved in higher-order (social) 
processing such as mentalising (Amodio & Frith, 2006; C. D. Frith & Frith, 
2006; or, more generally, the integration of novel information to existing 
knowledge, see for instance Stolk et al., 2015) and in paradigms similar to the 
paradigm employed in this study that index the same cognitive processes 
(Stolk et al., 2014). Neural coupling between the vmPFC and the amygdala is 
associated with emotion and anxiety regulation (Banks et al., 2007; Bishop, 
2007; Fan et al., 2014; Kim, Gee, et al., 2011; Kim, Loucks, et al., 2011; Liao et 
al., 2010; Stanton et al., 2009; van Wingen et al., 2014). We hypothesised that 
in addition to social-emotional processing, this cerebral correlate might be 
related to the ability to rapidly explore and update internal models of the (social) 
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environment (Stolk et al., 2015). As we do not find a relation between this 
cerebral correlate and communicative behaviour, there currently is no direct 
evidence for either one of the hypotheses.
5.4.3. Conclusion
Taken together, this study provides no evidence for alteration of vmPFC-amygdala 
connectivity after the administration of oxytocin; neither did we find a relation 
between the intranasal administration of this neuropeptide, vmPFC-amygdala 
connectivity and communicative performance. Large variations in different 
study design, individual variation and methodology make it hard to compare 
studies, but given these data and earlier reports that fail to find an alteration of 
vmPFC-amygdala connectivity strength after the administration of oxytocin, it 
seems unlikely that there is a large effect of oxytocin on this cerebral correlate. 
This study emphasise the importance of careful interpretation of current reports 
on the effect of oxytocin and stresses the need of replication studies so that we 
can understand the circumstances under which oxytocin may affect brain and 
behaviour in humans. 
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5.5. Supplementary information
5.5.1. Control analysis of motion artefacts
There was no significant difference between relative and absolute head displace-
ment between the oxytocin and placebo group (Relative displacement for the 
Placebo group: M = 0.08 ± SD = 0.06 and for the Oxytocin group: 0.07 ± 0.02; 
t(46) = -8.86, p = 0.393; Absolute displacement for Placebo group: 0.30 ± 0.65 
and for the Oxytocin group: 0.30 ± 0.65; t(46) = -0.06, p = 0.951). 
5.5.2. Additional seed-based analysis
As we were interested to know if the effect of oxytocin on vmPFC-amygdala 
functional connectivity was related to earlier observed effects in communicative 
behaviour, the location of our region of interest was based on neural correlates 
observed in an fMRI study employing a similar paradigm contrasting brain 
activity during the generation of novel vs. known communicative problems 
(Stolk et al., 2014). An additional analysis was conducted in order to attempt to 
directly replicate the reported increased connectivity strength between the 
right amygdala and the exact same region of interest described by Sripada et 
al. (MNI: [-3,32,-4] with a radius of 5mm; Sripada et al., 2013). Pre-processing 
and data-analysis were kept similar as those described in the main text. Similar 
to the analysis in the main text, the amygdala seed was created based on 
subject-specific binary masks using FIRST (Patenaude et al., 2011). 
Planned-comparison did not reveal a significant difference after the adminis-
tration of oxytocin between connectivity of the vmPFC seed based on the study 
by Sripada et al. and the amygdala (t(46) = 0.638, p = 0.527; see Table 5.S2A 
and 5.S2B for additional statistical information). Bayesian analysis revealed 
that the data were 2.94 times more likely under the model without the factor 
DRUG than with this factor (see Table 5.S2C).
5.5.3. Relation between individual variation and functional connectivity
We explored if a presumed oxytocinergic effect on vmPFC-amygdala connectivity 
strength was altered by individual variation. An exploratory stepwise regression 
analysis was employed for each separate drug group, entering as independent 
variable participant’s scores on psychometric questionnaires indexing empathy 
(Empathy Quotient, EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index, IRI; Davis, 1983), systemising (Systemising Quotient, SQ; 
Wheelwright et al., 2006), need for cognition (Need for Cognition Scale, NCS; 
Cacioppo et al., 1984) and social anxiety (Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, LSAS; 
Liebowitz, 1987). The dependent variable was vmPFC-amygdala (left or right) 
functional connectivity. 
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In the Oxytocin group, none of the psychometric measures explained variation 
in connectivity strength between the vmPFC and the left amygdala. In the 
Placebo group, a higher score on the IRI Empathic Concern predicted stronger 
functional connectivity between the vmPFC and the left amygdala (B = 0.06, 
SE = 0.03; F(1,23) = 4.9, p = 0.037). Additional exploratory analysis with as 
dependent variable connectivity between the vmPFC and the left amygdala, 
and with as independent variables DRUG, IRI Empathic concern psychometric 
scores and their interaction revealed that there was an interaction effect of 
DRUG*IRI Empathic Concern (F(1,44) = 4.31, p = 0.044; no main effect of DRUG: 
F(1,44) = 1.89, p = 0.177 and IRI Empathic Concern: F(1,44) = 0.32, p = 0.574). 
In the Oxytocin group, a higher score on the SQ predicted weaker connectivity 
between the vmPFC and the right amygdala (B = -0.86, SE = 0.36; F(1,21) = 
5.85, p = 0.025). None of the psychometric measures explained variation in 
connectivity between the vmPFC and the right amygdala in the Placebo group. 
Additional exploratory analysis was conducted with as dependent variable the 
connectivity between the vmPFC and the right amygdala, and with as independent 
variables DRUG, SQ psychometric scores, and their interaction. Right amygdala- 
vmPFC connectivity strength was attenuated in participants who were more 
interested in analysing and exploring a system (main effect Systemising 
Quotient: F(1,44) = 4.78, p = 0.034; no main effect of DRUG: F(1,44) = 0.22, 
p = 0.641 and no DRUG*SQ interaction effect (F(1,44) = 3.1, p = 0.155). These 
findings should be interpreted very carefully and future studies are necessary 
to further explore a potential relation between vmPFC-amygdala connectivity 
and systemising/empathising (Baron-Cohen et al., 2005; Takeuchi et al., 2014). 
Does oxytocin modulate vmPFC-amygdala resting state functional connectivity? 
A failed replication study
5
123
A. Seed to whole brain analysis L Amygdala for the Oxytocin group
Coordinates
Peak voxel of cluster Size x y z Z (max)
L Amygdala / L Parahippocampus / L Hippocampus 15446 -16 -4 -22 11.5
R Planum Temporale/White Matter 18 38 -30 4 4.5
L Heschl’s Gyrus/L Planum Temporale/White Matter 11 -42 -28 4 5.7
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 5 60 -4 -22 5.54
B. Seed to whole brain analysis L Amygdala for the Placebo group
Coordinates
Peak voxel of cluster Size x y z Z (max)
L Amygdala / L Parahippocampus / L Hippocampus 8611 -16 -4 -22 12.2
R Frontal Pole 509 2 60 2 5.92
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 153 -54 -20 -2 5.21
R Frontal Pole/R Orbitofrontal Cortex 24 34 34 -10 5.31
L Precentral Gyrus 17 -58 0 12 4.57
L Planum Temporale/White Matter 11 -36 -38 14 5.03
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 9 60 -4 -22 5.54
C. Seed to whole brain analysis R Amygdala for the Oxytocin group
Coordinates
Peak voxel of cluster Size x y z Z (max)
R Amygdala 14591 18 -2 -20 15
L Precentral Cortex 54 -52 2 34 5.48
L Precentral Cortex 11 -54 -4 18 4.28
L White Matter 10 -16 22 -10 4.86
Out of Brain 2 -6 -42 -16 4.11
Table 5.S1 continues on the next page
BETWEEN THE LINES124
D. Seed to whole brain analysis R Amygdala for the Placebo group
 Coordinates
Peak voxel of cluster Size x y z Z (max)
R Amygdala 9516 18 -2 -20 18
L Paracingulate Gyrus/L Frontal Pole 165 -2 56 4 6.18
L Paracingulate Gyrus/L Superior Frontal Gyrus 131 -10 48 22 4.66
L Brainstem 101 -2 -36 -22 4.34
R Anterior Cingulate Gyrus/R Paracingulate Gyrus 16 12 42 6 4.38
R Cerebellum 13 24 -48 -22 4.19
R Frontal Pole 11 8 60 34 5.74
L Temporal Pole 1 -60 6 -8 5.96
E. Seed to whole brain analysis vmPFC for the Oxytocin group
 Coordinates
Peak voxel of cluster Size x y z Z (max)
L Paracingulate Gyrus/L Frontal Medial Cortex/L Frontal Pole 11553 0 52 -6 17.6
L Precuneus/L Posterior Cingulate Gyrus 2252 -6 -56 12 7.54
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 230 62 -4 -16 6.49
R Temporal Pole 16 44 22 -38 6.05
R Temporal Pole 13 46 22 -30 5.71
F. Seed to whole brain analysis vmPFC for the Placebo group
Coordinates
Peak voxel of Cluster Size x y z Z (max)
L Medial Frontal Cortex/L Paracingulate 16786 -2 52 -6 20.6
L Posterior Cingulate/L Precuneus 4695 -2 -42 36 9.18
R Anterior Middle Temporal Gyrus 908 64 -4 -16 7.86
R Cerebellum 50 6 -50 -42 8.21
R Hippocampus 6 32 -38 -6 4.25
L Posterior Middle Temporal Gyrus 5 -64 -20 -22 4.34
Table 5.S1: Whole brain analysis. Displayed are a description of the peak of 
the activated clusters, the size of the cluster in voxels (2x2x2 mm), the MNI 
coordinates of the maximally activated voxel within that cluster and the  
corresponding Z values. For a visual display of the clusters see Fig. 5.2.
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A. Group descriptives 
Group N Mean SD SE 
vmPFC (Sripada) – R Amygdala Oxytocin 23 0.049 0.157 0.033 
  Placebo 25 0.076 0.143 0.029 
B. T-test 
t df p Mean Difference SE Difference Cohen’s d 
vmPFC (Sripada) –  
R Amygdala 
-0.638 46.00 0.527 -0.028 0.043 -0.184 
C. Bayesian independent samples t-test 
 BF01 error % 
vmPFC (Sripada) – R Amygdala 2.945 2.154e -4 
Table 5.S2. Planned seed-to-seed comparisons. (A) Group descriptives. Mean 
values represent Pearson’s correlation coefficients. (B) T-tests. (C) Bayesian 
t-tests. 
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There is a many-to-many mapping between intention and behaviour. Communi-
cators need to select from a potentially infinite number of behaviours, the one 
that best reflects their intention. What is the “best” behaviour to convey their 
intention is strongly dependent on the addressee’s mental state and the current 
state of the world (see Box 1.1 for further definitions of “best” and which external 
proxy of this concept is employed throughout the thesis). Over time, both 
factors can quickly change. The process underlying the generation of commu-
nicative behaviours can be described as an instance of inference to the best 
explanation (Blokpoel, 2015; Levinson, 2006; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). The 
selection of the “best” comprehensible behaviour implies that there is a given 
set of candidate hypotheses to select from (Blokpoel, 2015). When there are 
communicative conventions, these candidate hypotheses already exist and at 
least need to be retrieved from memory. However, when communicative inno-
vation takes place, these candidate hypotheses need to be generated de novo. 
As inference to the best explanation is strongly dependent on the set of candi-
date hypothesis available, and the generation of (novel) candidate hypotheses 
could be described as an instance of abduction proper (Haselager, 1997; 
Lipton, 1991). I will refer to these processes together as abductive inference 
(Blokpoel, 2015). 
In this thesis, I address the question whether the cognitive architecture under-
lying the generation of communicative behaviours and their neural and endocrine 
underpinnings are generic or specific in nature. One’s viewpoint on this 
matter strongly depends on the assumption of the nature of architecture 
underlying cognition in general. A seminal description of cognitive architecture 
is given by Fodor (see Box 1.2; Fodor, 1983, 2001). A (social) module is defined 
as a cognitive sub-capacity that fulfils to “some interesting extent” the criteria 
of information encapsulation, domain-specificity, limited central accessibility, 
mandatory and fast processing, shallow outcomes and characteristic breakdown 
patterns, development and neural underpinnings. In Chapter 1, I argued that  
a generic, non-modular cognitive architecture is conceptually more viable than 
a mass-modular or modest-modular architecture, and that I think that the 
computational intractability that comes with a commitment to non-modularity 
can be overcome by determining constraints under which generating commu-
nicative behaviour can be performed in real life (Blokpoel et al., 2011; van Rooij 
et al., 2011). In this chapter, I will argue why I think that the empirical observa-
tions described in this dissertation provide support for a generic, non-modular 
cognitive, neural and endocrine architecture underlying the generation of 
communicative behaviours.  
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6.1. Summary and discussion of findings in relation to the 
central research question
6.1.1. Individual variation in psychometric indexes underlying generation of 
communicative behaviours
In Chapter 2, I employed individual variation to investigate which cognitive 
abilities underlie the generation of communicative behaviours. Communicators 
(n = 16) played an interactive verbal language game in the MRI scanner (neuro-
imaging data presented in Chapter 3). In this word game named the “Taboo 
game”, they were asked to generate description of a Target-word without using 
five words (Taboo-words) that were not allowed in the Target-word description 
(see for more details about this game Box 1.4 and Chapter 2). The communica-
tive setting and linguistic difficulty were independently manipulated. The 
communicative setting was manipulated by asking participants to either address 
a recipient that was familiar or unfamiliar with the Target-word (Targeted or 
Non-targeted condition). Linguistic difficulty was manipulated by varying the 
semantic distance between the Target-word and five words that were not 
allowed in the Target-word description (Difficult when the Target and Taboo-
words were tightly related, Easy when the Target and Taboo-words were seman-
tically loosely related; see for example trials Box 1.4). In a separate experiment, 
the quality of the communicator’s Target-word descriptions was evaluated by  
a group of naive raters (n = 16). The communicator’s cognitive traits were 
assessed with psychometric scores indexing “social specific” skills such as 
mentalising (EQ and IRI respectively; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Davis, 
1983), motivation to solve complex tasks (as indexed with the Need for Cogni-
tion Scale; NCS; Cacioppo et al., 1984), linguistic ability (as indexed with the 
GIT matrix reasoning subscale; Kooreman, 1987; and the WAIS vocabulary and 
similarity subscales; WAIS-III., 1997) and general-purpose cognitive abilities 
(Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices; RAPM; J. Raven et al., 1995). It was 
tested which of these psychometric scores best predicted communicative 
quality. It was found that communicator’s linguistic ability, as indexed with the 
WAIS vocabulary subscale, best predicted communicative quality of Difficult 
trials. Motivation, as indexed by the motivation to solve complex tasks, and 
general intelligence, as indexed with the RAPM, were the psychometric indexes 
that best predicted communicative quality of utterances generated in the 
Targeted setting and in the Targeted setting compared to the Non-targeted 
setting. Similar factors predicted signal accuracy during the innovative  
generation of communicative behaviours in a non-verbal communicative 
game (Volman et al., 2012). 
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A communicator’s high general intelligence may be beneficial for the generation 
of efficient messages in several ways. It may help storage of speaker history 
(Galati & Brennan, 2010; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Shintel & Keysar, 2009), 
executive control (Ybarra & Winkielman, 2012), and working memory capacity 
(Lin et al., 2010). General intelligence may reflect one’s capacity for “abductive 
inference“; the cognitive mechanism that underlies solving complex (potentially, 
open-ended or ill-defined) problems, of which inferring which behaviour “best” 
conveys one’s intention given the mental state of the addressee and the 
current state of the world can be considered an instance (Blokpoel, 2015; 
Levinson, 2006; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). This idea fits with recent evidence 
showing tightly matched neural dynamics in subjects solving communicative 
and rule-based solo problems (Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013). In a similar way, 
the observation that motivation predicted behaviours with higher communicative 
quality points in the direction of a non-modular architecture underlying the 
communicative capacity. This finding is interesting in particular, because the 
psychometric score indexing motivation was measuring motivation for complex 
problems, and not so much motivation of social nature. Interpretation of these 
data as evidence for a mass-modular or modest-modular architecture underlying 
generation of communicative behaviours is unlikely as none of our indexes 
specifically addressing social-modular abilities predicted communicative quality.
6.1.2. Neural underpinnings of linguistic and communicative abilities
In Chapter 3, the neuroimaging data are described that were collected while 
the participants of Chapter 2 were planning the utterances generated during 
the Taboo game. It was found that the neural underpinnings of communicative 
and linguistic abilities employed during this task are dissociable. Neural  
activation in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) was sensitive to  
the manipulation of communicative setting, but not to the manipulation of 
linguistic difficulty. The opposite pattern was observed in the inferior frontal 
and inferior parietal cortex: neural activation in these regions was sensitive to 
the linguistic difficulty of the task, but not to the communicative setting in 
which the task was performed. An interaction effect between communicative 
setting and linguistic difficulty was observed in the left posterior superior 
temporal sulcus (pSTS). These data are in line with the observation that the 
right pSTS was involved in the generation of novel communicative behaviours 
in an interactive communicative game in the non-verbal domain (Noordzij  
et al., 2010). This suggests that pSTS activation may be influenced by the 
modality in which the communicative behaviour is generated (in case of the 
verbal-domain left-lateralised and in case of the non-verbal domain right- 
lateralised). 
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At first sight, these data seem to provide evidence for a modest-modular neural 
correlate underlying the generation of communicative behaviour. The linguistic 
and communicative ability have fixed and separate neural architectures, which 
seem to be in line with Fodor’s criterion of functional dissociable neural under-
pinnings (see Box 1.2). The region sensitive to the manipulation of communica-
tive setting (dmPFC) is known to be involved in both the production and 
comprehension of communicative behaviours, in particular in ascribing 
unobservable mental states to others based on their observable behaviours 
(mentalising; Amodio & Frith, 2006; Welborn & Lieberman, 2015). The activation 
of the right pSTS during Difficult trials in the Targeted setting can be interpreted 
as the neural underpinning of non-modular/central processes. Its function 
seems non-modular because the criterion of domain-specificity is violated; this 
region might be involved in the integration of different types of input, namely, 
“linguistic” and “communicative” information3. 
However, the data presented in Chapter 3 could also be interpreted as evidence 
for a non-modular architecture. First, the neural activity in the dmPFC is not 
limited to social-specific processes. It also underpins non-social-specific 
functions such as value based decision making and schema based memory 
processing (V. E. Ghosh et al., 2014; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Rushworth et al., 
2011; Stolk et al., 2016; van Kesteren et al., 2012; Warren et al., 2014). It is 
suggested that this cerebral correlate is involved in integrating novel information 
to existing information in general and not for social-information specifically 
(Stolk et al., 2016). Secondly, the manipulation of communicative setting 
(Targeted, Non-targeted) did not evoke brain activation in regions that are 
hypothesised to involve reflex-like mirror processing (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004). Rather, our results support the notion that planning an effective commu-
nicative behaviour involves the generation of mental models of the addressee 
(what an agent supposes his or her interlocutors know and believe) that guide 
selection of an appropriate communicative action (C. D. Frith & Frith, 2006; 
Levinson, 2006; Toni et al., 2008). As argued in Chapter 1, a mass-modular or 
modest-modular architecture underlying such a cognitive process is theoreti-
cally not viable. Taken together, the findings in Chapter 3 could be considered 
to be evidence in line with a non-modular cognitive architecture underlying the 
generation of communicative behaviours.
3. These neural data are not in line with a mass-modular architecture, as it is unclear which 
process would account for the integration of information of different modules (violation of  
the criteria of domain-specificity and information encapsulation).
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6.1.3. Oxytocin’s influence on cognitive processes underlying the generation 
of communicative behaviours and its neural correlates at rest
In chapter 4, I considered three non-mutually exclusive possibilities grounded 
on different models of oxytocin function. Two of the models are not explicit 
about if oxytocin could influence (social) modular or generic processes or both, 
namely that oxytocin enhances prosociality or increases sensitivity to social 
cues. The third model, that oxytocin promotes (social) exploration, hypothesises 
that this hormone influences central processes in general. In order to test these 
models, participants (between-subject design; oxytocin: n = 24; placebo: n = 
27) played a non-verbal live interaction game in which they had to innovatively 
generate an idiosyncratic communication system (see Box 1.4 and Chapter 4 
for a more extensive explanation of the characteristics of this game). First, it 
was found that males who self-administered an oxytocin nasal-spray generated 
signals with a larger referential flexibility, that is, with these signals more of the 
communicative problems could be solved (see Box 6.1). Second, it was found 
that communicators who received oxytocin more quickly adapted their 
communicative behaviours on the basis of the information about the addressee 
obtained during the course of the interaction (“local information”) than on the 
information provided beforehand (“global information”). Oxytocin’s effect  
on these two distinguishing features of communication suggests that this 
neuropeptide leads participants to explore more pervasively the potential 
communicative behaviours and different mental models of the recipients. 
In Chapter 5, I investigated if oxytocin’s effect on (social) exploration is 
reflected in altered functional connectivity between the amygdala and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). I compared resting-state functional 
connectivity measured in 48 males (a subset of the sample measured in 
Chapter 4) who self-administered 24 IU of oxytocin nasal spray (N = 23) or  
a placebo control (N = 25) in a randomised double-blind between-subject 
design. Earlier reported findings that oxytocin administration altered functional 
connectivity strength between the amygdala and the vmPFC could not be 
detected, even though our sample size was large enough to replicate an earlier 
study (Sripada et al., 2013). This null finding should encourage the execution 
and publication of replication studies on the effect of oxytocin on (social) brain 
and (social) behaviour.
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Box 6.1. Communicative signals of the Tacit Communication Game
Target problem Step 4Step 1 Step 2
Field-Only signal
Step 3
Target problem Step 4Step 1 Step 2
Target-Anchor signal
Step 3
Target problem Step 4Step 1 Step 2
Nest-Anchor signal
Step 3
Target problem Step 4Step 1 Step 2
Draw-On-Board signal
Step 3 Step 5 Step 6
Figure 6.1. Communicative signals of the tacit communication game.  
Arrows on the grid are added for clarification purpose only.
In the tacit communication game (TCG), the joint goal of the Communicator 
and the Addressee was to retrieve a target. Only the Communicator (bird 
token) was aware of the location of the target and he attempted to convey 
its location to the Addressee. As Communicators and Addressees could 
not hear or see each other, and were in separate rooms, the only means of 
communication were movements across a digital game board. Communica-
tors could not directly overlay their bird token across the Target-location. 
Namely, their token could only move horizontally or vertically, and could 
only be placed at the centre of one of the nine fields (squares in Fig. 6.1), 
whilst a Target-field could contain multiple Target-locations (white circles 
in Fig. 6.1). This spatial disparity could be solved in different ways by 
deviating from the shortest and fastest path to the Target-location by 
employing systematic detours in time and location. These deviations seem 
intuitive, but in fact these signals need to be generated de novo. Gener-
ating idiosyncratic signals requires complex relational reasoning (Blokpoel, 
2015). The categories of signals described below achieve a balance between 
identifying an interpretable number of categories whilst capturing the 
variability of signals between and within participants. 
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Videos can be found here: 
www.miriamdeboer.nl/thesis
Video S1. Field-Only. Moving the token to the field that contains the 
target and spending more time on that field than on fields that do not 
contain the target. The referential flexibility of these signals is suffi-
cient to indicate the Target-location on the Target-fields where there is 
only one potential Target-location (white circle).
Video S2. Target-Anchor. Making a detour to the field adjacent to the 
Target-field to indicate the Target-location. This signal has medium refer-
ential flexibility as for Target-locations at the edge of the 3x3 grid; it is 
not possible to move to the adjacent Target-field as in that case the 
bird token would have to move “off the board”. 
Video S3. Nest-Anchor signal. Making a detour to the field adjacent to the 
nest to indicate the Target-location. In this signal type the spatial relation 
between the visited field and the Nest was similar to the spatial relation 
between the Target-location and the centre of the Target-field. This 
signal has maximum referential flexibility as all Target-locations could 
be indicated with this signal type.
Video S4. Draw-On-Board signal. Making a detour in order to “draw” the 
configuration of Target-locations across the entire board and revisiting or 
pausing longer on the field where the target is located. This signal has 
maximum referential flexibility as all Target-locations could be indicated 
with this signal type.
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Figure 6.2. The influence of oxytocin on brain and behaviour. Six scenarios by 
which oxytocin could influence neural substrates and cognitive processes. 
Areas of influence are marked in gray. Image is courtesy of Mark Blokpoel.
6.1.4. Oxytocin influences non-modular processes
Below, I will speculate how the theoretical considerations of Chapter 1, the 
data presented in Chapter 4 and the existing literature on the effect of oxytocin 
on social brain and behaviour may inform us on the question if the cognitive 
and neural architecture underlying the generation of communicative behaviours 
is mass-modular, modest-modular or non-modular.
 
There are different ways by which oxytocin could influence the generation of 
communicative neural correlates and behaviours (see Fig. 6.2). The interest on 
oxytocin as a social hormone comes from its well-known role in the physiology 
of reproductive behaviours across species. This observation may lead to the 
hypothesis that oxytocin’s influence is limited to activation in “social” brain 
regions and “social” cognitive processes only (Fig. 6.2A and 6.2B). This hypoth-
esis appears to be in line with the vast amount of existing literature focussing on 
the neuropeptide’s effect on relatively simple social tasks reflected in neural 
correlates that are supposed to be part of the “social” brain (see for instance 
Domes, Heinrichs, Glascher, et al., 2007; Domes, Heinrichs, Michel, et al., 
2007; Riem, 2012; Riem et al., 2012). It may seem as if the behavioural data 
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presented in Chapter 4 provide supporting evidence for this hypothesis, when 
one would consider referential flexibility and recipient design as “social” 
modular. In that case, the cognitive architecture underlying the generation  
of communicative behaviours could be both mass-modular as well as 
modest-modular4.
Should one support the view that the mind is modest-modular, then it may be 
hypothesised that oxytocin influences both cognitive processes and neural 
substrates that are social-specific as well as non-modular (as part of the central 
processor; see Fig. 6.2C and 6.2D). This scenario seems to be in line with the 
observation that there is a variation in complexity in the processes underlying 
the generation of communicative behaviours, where simpler processes can be 
executed solely by the “social” modules and “social” brain regions, and where 
more complex processes rely on the central processor and its neural correlate(s). 
This scenario may give a more complete account of the data reported in Chapter 
4, because referential flexibility and recipient design (both forms of belief 
fixation) may be considered as instances of such a complex process. The influ-
ence of oxytocin on “non-social” modular processes might be an indirect effect 
of its effect on central/non-modular processes (Fig. 6.2C) or a direct effect on 
the “non-social” modular processes themselves (Fig. 6.2D). Surprisingly, there 
is little experimental evidence that explicitly tests for the hypothesis if the 
influence of oxytocin encompasses these “non-social” modules (but see for an 
exception Rimmele, Hediger, Heinrichs, & Klaver, 2009).
Then, there is the possibility that oxytocin influences non-modular/central 
processes and activation in their neural correlates (see Fig. 6.2E and 6.2F). 
Should one support the view of modest-modularity, there may be a possibility 
that oxytocin would influence central processing and activation in its under-
lying neural substrates, but that it would not influence processing in “social” 
modules and their cerebral correlates (see Fig. 6.2E). In that case, oxytocin’s 
effect would be limited to “social” processes that rely on central/non-modular 
processes while “simple” processes that would solely be executed by “social” 
modules would not be affected by the increase of this neuropeptide in the 
central and/or peripheral system. This hypothesis is not in line with the existing 
literature, where oxytocinergic effects are observed both on “higher-level” 
4.  It is unclear how oxytocin’s influence could be limited to social behaviour should the cognitive 
architecture underlying this process be non-modular in nature, as in that instance, there 
would be no modularity of mind at all, and, as a consequence, no specific “social” modules 
either.
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(see for instance Chapter 4) as well as “lower-level” social processes, such as 
emotion recognition (see for instance Domes, Heinrichs, Glascher, et al., 2007; 
Domes, Heinrichs, Michel, et al., 2007; Riem, 2012; Riem et al., 2012). 
The last possibility (see Fig. 6.2F) and the possibility that I think best reconciles 
the theoretical considerations of Chapter 1, the data of Chapter 4 and the 
existing literature, is that the architecture underlying the generation of commu-
nicative behaviours is non-modular, and that oxytocin may affect both “social”, 
as well as “non-social” processes (in fact, the distinction between these two 
processes is mute) and the activation in their cerebral correlates (see Fig. 6.2F). 
As I have argued in Chapter 1, there are several theoretical drawbacks on a 
modular architecture underlying communicative behaviours. First, the genera-
tion of novel communicative behaviours cannot be automatic nor have a shallow 
outcome, as the potential intention-to-behaviour mapping do not exist yet and 
need to be generated ex novo. Second, this process may well involve information 
from outside the assumed “social” module (violation of criteria of information 
encapsulation and domain-specificity). The findings in Chapter 4 seem to be in 
line with this hypothesis, I have added to the existing literature the finding that 
besides the generation and interpretation of more “simple” communicative 
behaviours, oxytocin may also influences generation of “complex” communica-
tive behaviours. If the architecture underlying the generation of communicative 
behaviours is non-modular, this opens the possibility that oxytocin would not 
only influence “social” but also “non-social” behaviours. Not only would this 
neuropeptide enhance the exploration of potential communicative behaviours 
and alternative mental models of the recipient in social contexts, but it would 
also influence the exploration of novel situations in general (Bale et al., 2001; 
Chang & Platt, 2014; Hare et al., 2007; Ring et al., 2006; Windle et al., 1997) or 
in creativity (De Dreu et al., 2013). Although further research is necessary to 
provide additional evidence, the study by Ye et al. (2016) seems to point in the 
direction of a generic exploratory effect of oxytocin. In this study, it was 
found that oxytocin attenuated the N400 signal, a well-known electrophysio-
logical marker of semantic integration, suggesting that the neuropeptide drives 
listeners to comprehend speech containing information that was incongruent 
with facts of the world, possibly by promoting the exploration of alternative 
world scenarios.
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Box 6.2. Empirical evidence presented in this thesis for a non-modular 
architecture underlying the generation of communicative behaviours
• Individual variations in non-modular or central-processes such as 
general-purpose intelligence and motivation for complex task predicted 
the quality of generated communicative behaviours (Chapter 2).
• Neural activation after a manipulation of communicative setting 
evoked activation in the dmPFC and the left pSTS. It is shown in 
existing literature that the dmPFC is not only involved in mentalising, 
but that it might be more generally involved in integration of novel 
information to existing knowledge. The left pSTS is involved in the 
integration of different types of information (namely linguistic and 
communicative information) so that information processing cannot  
be encapsulated (one of the core criteria of modularity), pointing to 
non-modular processing. Brain areas that are associated with manda-
tory and fast processing (the mirror neuron system) were not activated 
during the manipulation of communicative setting. Therefore, it seems 
likely that the processes that support the generation of communicative 
behaviours are non-modular in nature (Chapter 3 and 6).
• Oxytocin influences complex communicative behaviours, namely, the 
exploration of different potential novel communicative behaviours and 
the exploration of different mental models of a recipient, irrespective 
of communicative context. These findings open the possibility that this 
neuropeptide not only influences exploration in social behaviour, but 
that it may also enhance exploratory behaviour in general. In a similar 
way, oxytocin may affect activation in neural substrates that are not 
part of the “social brain” (Chapter 4).
• Oxytocin did not alter functional connectivity between the vmPFC and 
the amygdala. This null finding should encourage the execution and 
publication of replication studies on the effect of oxytocin on (social) 
brain and (social) behaviour (Chapter 5).
6.2. Outlook
The work in this thesis raises a number of outstanding issues that deserve 
further investigation. As I have mentioned in Chapter 1, the complexity of 
communicative behaviours can vary. And even though the generation of flexible 
and generative intention-to-behaviour mapping occurs more often than one 
would think, this does not mean that the generation of communicative behaviour 
cannot also be relatively “simple”, for instance when generating stereotypical 
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facial expressions to convey for instance anger, sadness or happiness. In this 
thesis, I have focussed on the generation of communicative behaviours that 
are particularly complex, flexible and generative. What unified architecture can 
facilitate both simple and complex (i.e., innovative) communicative behaviours, 
and is fast and flexible? Bayesian inference might be a plausible candidate; 
however, this type of inference is known to be computationally intractable as 
well. Informally, this means that information processing by Bayesian infer-
ences cannot be fast for all possible situations and can take astronomically 
long in some cases. It has been shown that under certain conditions Bayesian 
inference can be computationally tractable, informally meaning that these 
processes can be performed quickly given specific situational constraints 
(Blokpoel, Kwisthout, van der Weide, Wareham, & van Rooij, 2013; Kwisthout & 
Van Rooij, 2013; van Rooij et al., 2011). Additionally, current models of Bayesian 
inference cannot yet explain where novel communicative behaviours come 
from (Blokpoel, 2015; Perfors, 2012). Here, combining Bayesian inference 
with a productive counterpart (cf. Blokpoel, 2015; Lipton, 1991) may provide 
a possible explanation (though the computational tractability challenge 
remains, or is even aggravated).
This thesis takes the perspective of the individual that generates communicative 
behaviours. I realise that successful communication is dependent on all individ-
uals involved in the interaction. Communicator and addressee(s) play an active 
role in the dynamical and reflexive process of getting to know each other’s 
mental states (establishing common ground; Brennan & Clark, 1996): the 
communicator takes into account the recipient’s mental states when gener-
ating a communicative message, the recipient takes into account that the 
communicator takes into account her mental state and so on and so forth 
(Hastorf, Schneider, & Polefka, 1970). Therefore, it might be argued that our 
task setting fails to capture the rapid multimodal nature of the interactions 
occurring during daily human communication. For instance, communicators in 
our experiment had fixed roles with one participant being the communicator or 
director, and the other being the addressee or matcher, oftentimes being a 
confederate. Furthermore, participants were only allowed to respond within a 
certain time window so that natural turn-taking did not occur. Yet, even within 
the constraints of these experimental simplifications, it has been shown that 
the experimental tasks in this thesis involve crucial elements of communicative 
interactions. Both experimental tasks in this thesis have participants actively 
involved in the events occurring during the experiment and entail relevant 
communicative adjustments to the recipient. In the task employed in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3, communicative adjustments were observed in the generation of 
BETWEEN THE LINES142
Target-word descriptions after the recipient did not correctly understand the 
utterance made by the communicator. In Chapter 4, the communicative strategy 
employed by the participants was developed based on the shared communica-
tive history of a pair over multiple trials, and communicators made adaptations 
based on their beliefs about the cognitive abilities of the addressee, and their 
on-going communicative behaviour (a similar observation can be found in 
Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Stolk et al., 2015; Stolk, Hunnius, et al., 2013).
In this dissertation, I focussed on the cognitive architecture underlying the 
generation of communicative behaviours at the level of the conceptualiser (in 
the sense of Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999). It remains to be seen if communica-
tive intent is also closely integrated at “lower” level verbal and non-verbal 
productive processes such as lexical processing, morphological encoding, 
phonological and phonetical encoding and action execution (see for a review 
Brennan & Hanna, 2009; for more recent experimental evidence cf. Murillo 
Oosterwijk et al., under review; Peeters, Chu, Holler, Hagoort, & Özyürek, 
2015; Schoot, Hagoort, & Segaert, 2014). 
We have limited knowledge about oxytocin’s synthesis, storage, release, and 
metabolism. Fundamental questions related to the physiological processes 
underlying oxytocin’s working include if and how peripheral oxytocin levels 
influence central oxytocin levels (see amongst others Leng & Ludwig, 2016; 
Veening & Olivier, 2013), how oxytocin nasal spray exactly reaches the brain 
and how oxytocin receptors are distributed in the human brain. Understanding 
the mechanism by which oxytocin operates may restrict and inform the possible 
ways at which oxytocin influences neural and behavioural processes. Effects of 
oxytocin on brain and behaviour might be subtle and strongly dependent on 
context and individual variations. Potentially, there is a publication bias for 
reporting effects of the neuropeptide over reporting null findings (see for 
instance Bartz et al., 2011; Nave et al., 2015; Walum et al., 2016). Due to large 
variations in study design and methodological differences, it is hard to compare 
the reported findings in the current literature. Failed replications such as 
reported in Chapter 5 may therefore occur, emphasising careful interpretation 
of current reports on the effect of this neuropeptide on brain and behaviour 
and stressing the importance of further replication studies. 
It remains an open question if the observations in this thesis could be general-
ised to the affective domain, i.e. the ability to share one’s emotional state given 
the affective mental state of the other. Evidence for a distinctive ability for the 
generation of (complex) cognitive and affective mental states (empathic accuracy; 
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Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008) comes from observations in individuals with 
psychopathy. It is hypothesised that they are able to infer others’ intentions and 
goals, but not their emotions (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005). In Chapter 2 and in 
line with a study by Newman-Norlund et al. (2009), it was found that the genera-
tion of successful communicative behaviours is predicted by general intelli-
gence (Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices; Volman et al., 2012), whilst 
psychometric scores indexing empathy, emotional reactivity and social skill 
(Empathy Quotient; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Lawrence et al., 
2004) predict the magnitude of communicative adjustments when addressing 
recipients with different age and cognitive ability (an adult or a child). The 
cognitive abilities described in this thesis (abduction and inference to the best 
explanation) might be necessary to cope with the complex, flexible and gener-
ative nature of the generation of communicative behaviour, while empathy 
might provide the motivation to understand the feelings of others and make 
communicative adjustments accordingly. The ability to accurately ascribe 
affective mental states to others may also help to accurately convey one’s own 
emotions, which may lead to mutual understanding between interlocutors at 
the emotional level. 
Another important open question is how the generation of communicative 
behaviours is acquired. A non-modular social brain and behaviour opens the 
possibility that these abilities follow the same phylogenetic path as generic 
human intelligence. In this way, the hypothesis might be tested that demand 
of the complexity of social interactions may have driven the development of 
general human intelligence and increase in overall brain size (Dunbar, 1998; 
Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 2008). Phylogenetic and ontogenetic questions 
might teach us something about how deficits in the generation of communica-
tive behaviours come about. The experimental set-up in Chapter 4 might provide 
an excellent window to look into this matter (see for instance Stolk, Hunnius, et 
al., 2013). Lastly, there is the fascinating question as to what extent the ability 
to successfully communicate can be learned and improved, and what the role 
of motivation is. In typical individuals, for instance, it was found that monetary 
reward can enhance empathic accuracy (Klein & Hodges, 2001). It would be 
interesting to further investigate the opportunities and limitations of social 
learning in individuals with deficits in the generation of communicative behav-
iours (for instance individuals with autism spectrum disorder), potentially 
providing novel insights that can be implemented in clinical interventions.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Je bent onderweg naar huis en iemand vraagt je of je haar de weg naar het 
station wilt wijzen. Je weet waar het is en je zou haar graag helpen. Op welke 
manier kun je nu het beste uitleggen hoe ze naar de trein komt? Je zult misschien 
denken dat het bedenken van een goede routebeschrijving voor de verdwaalde 
persoon erg gemakkelijk is. Deze veronderstelling is echter niet juist. Er zijn 
namelijk een oneindig aantal mogelijkheden waarop je iemand iets duidelijk 
kunt maken. Je kunt je uitleg bijvoorbeeld aanpassen voor iemand die met het 
openbaar vervoer is, op de fiets of te voet. Ook kun je nieuwe manieren 
verzinnen om de route naar het station uit te leggen, je kunt er bijvoorbeeld 
voor kiezen om met behulp van gebaren de route uit te leggen als je merkt dat 
degene die verdwaald is geen Nederlands spreekt. Het zal van de persoon die 
je voor je hebt, de situatie en het moment afhangen wat de beste manier is om 
de weg naar het station uit te leggen. Hoe werken de processen die het mogelijk 
maken om uit een oneindig aantal mogelijke boodschappen juist diegene te 
kiezen die zo goed mogelijk is afgestemd op de ander?
Je zou je kunnen voorstellen dat er voor het bedenken van communicatieve 
boodschappen speciale denkprocessen nodig zijn. Deze speciale processen 
zouden nodig kunnen zijn om er rekening mee te houden dat degene met wie 
je interacteert niet een ding is maar een mens, die net zoals jij ook dingen kan 
voelen, waarnemen, denken en willen. Uit de theoretische overwegingen van 
Hoofdstuk 1 en de bevindingen uit dit proefschrift blijkt echter dat het heel erg 
moeilijk is om het precieze onderscheid te maken tussen specifiek sociale en 
algemene, niet-sociale denkprocessen.
“Algemeen probleemoplossend vermogen” zou een goede omschrijving kunnen 
zijn van het proces dat ten grondslag ligt aan het bedenken van een goed 
afgestemde boodschap als we geen onderscheid hoeven te maken tussen 
specifiek sociale en niet-sociale denkprocessen. Er zijn namelijk veel overeen-
komsten tussen het vinden van oplossingen voor sociale “problemen” en het 
vinden van oplossingen voor niet-sociale “problemen”. Een niet-sociaal prob-
leem kan bijvoorbeeld zijn: hoe vind ik de snelste weg naar het station? Ook in 
het geval van het oplossen van niet-sociale problemen zijn er vaak meerdere 
bestaande oplossingen mogelijk of dienen er, mocht de oplossing nog niet 
bestaan, nog nieuwe oplossingen bedacht te worden. En ook bij het oplossen 
van niet-sociale problemen is het vaak afhankelijk van de context en het 
moment wat de beste oplossing is omdat de wereld, net zoals de “mentale 
toestand” van de mensen om ons heen, continu verandert. Tijdens het vinden 
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van de snelste weg naar het station bijvoorbeeld, zou het zo kunnen zijn dat 
de weg die je eigenlijk had willen inslaan is afgezet en dat je daarom een 
andere route moet nemen. 
Cognitieve processen
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzocht ik welke individuele verschillen het best voorspellen 
of een communicatieve boodschap succesvol begrepen werd. Hiervoor onder-
zocht ik de invloed van talig vermogen, empathisch vermogen, algemene 
intelligentie en de motivatie voor het oplossen van complexe problemen. 
Tijdens een communicatiespel (het “verboden woord spel”) probeerde de 
“Communicator” aan een “Geadresseerde” een woord te omschrijven zonder 
daarbij gebruik te maken van een aantal verboden woorden. Proefpersonen 
werd bijvoorbeeld gevraagd om het woord “baard” te omschrijven zonder 
gebruik te maken van de verboden woorden “kin”, “man”, “scheren”, “haar” 
en “snor”. Een mogelijke omschrijving zou kunnen zijn: “Het zit op je gezicht 
en loopt van oor tot oor”. Nadat de Geadresseerde (iemand die bekend was 
met het experiment) de woordomschrijving had gehoord, probeerde hij op 
grond van de door de Communicator gemaakte omschrijving het woord te 
raden. Als hij het omschreven woord goed geraden had, kon het volgende 
woord omschreven worden. Raadde hij het omschreven woord niet, dan mocht 
de Communicator een nieuwe poging doen om het woord te omschrijven en de 
Geadresseerde mocht dan een nieuwe poging doen om het woord te raden. 
Op deze manier werd live interactie tussen de Communicator en de Geadresseerde 
mogelijk gemaakt. Op een later tijdstip werd een nieuwe onafhankelijke groep 
proefpersonen gevraagd om de woordomschrijvingen van de Communicator te 
evalueren. Een woordomschrijving werd als succesvoller beschouwd naarmate 
het woord vaker door deze groep werd geraden. 
Uit mijn onderzoek bleek dat hoe hoger de score van de Communicator op de 
algemene intelligentietest en een test die de motivatie voor het oplossen van 
complexe problemen meet, hoe succesvoller de woordomschrijvingen die 
bedacht werden door deze Communicator. De hoogte van de score van de 
Communicator op de empathietesten en het succes van de woordomschrijvingen 
hingen niet met elkaar samen. De uitkomst van het onderzoek uit Hoofdstuk 2 
lijkt in overeenstemming te zijn met de veronderstelling dat de denkprocessen 
die ten grondslag liggen aan het bedenken van goed afgestemde communi-
catieve boodschappen niet per se specifiek sociaal van aard zijn.
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Neurale processen
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzocht ik met behulp van de MRI scanner welke neurale 
processen betrokken zijn bij het bedenken van communicatieve boodschappen. 
De hersenactiviteit van de Communicatoren van Hoofdstuk 2 werd gemeten, 
terwijl zij de eerder genoemde woordomschrijving verzonnen in het kader van 
het “verboden woord spel”. Tijdens het uitvoeren van deze taak varieerden de 
“communicatieve setting” en de “talige moeilijkheid”. De communicatieve 
setting varieerde doordat gedurende de helft van de tijd de Geadresseerde niet 
wist wat het omschreven woord was en gedurende de andere helft van de tijd 
de Geadresseerde al wel wist welk woord de Communicator zou omschrijven. 
De Communicator kon zien in welke communicatieve setting zij was en nam 
deze informatie mee in het bedenken van haar boodschap. Talige moeilijkheid 
varieerde doordat in sommige gevallen het te omschrijven woord en de verboden 
woorden sterk aan elkaar gerelateerd waren. In dat geval was het verzinnen van 
een woordomschrijving moeilijk, zoals bijvoorbeeld in het eerder genoemde 
“baard” voorbeeld. In andere gevallen was het juist makkelijk om een woordom-
schrijving te verzinnen, bijvoorbeeld als de proefpersoon gevraagd werd het 
woord “regenboog” te omschrijven zonder gebruik te maken van de niet sterk 
gerelateerde verboden woorden “water”, “geluid”, “gedicht”, “klaver” en “violet”. 
Ik vond een dubbele dissociatie tussen hersengebieden die betrokken zijn 
bij de manipulatie van communicatieve setting en van talige moeilijkheid.  
De mate van activatie van de dorsomediale prefrontale cortex (dmPFC) hing 
samen met de manipulatie van communicatieve setting maar niet met de 
manipulatie van talige moeilijkheid. De mate van hersenactiviteit in de inferieure 
frontale cortex en inferieure pariëtale cortex toonde het omgekeerde patroon: 
hun activatie hing samen met de manipulatie van talige moeilijkheid, maar 
niet met die van communicatieve setting. De linker posterieure superieure 
temporaal groeve (pSTS) was het meest actief wanneer de Geadresseerde het 
te omschrijven woord niet kende en de taak talig moeilijk was. 
In eerste instantie lijken deze bevindingen te wijzen op de mogelijkheid dat er 
hersengebieden bestaan waarvan de functie specifiek gerelateerd is aan ons 
communicatieve vermogen. De dmPFC zou hiervoor een mogelijke kandidaat 
kunnen zijn. In eerdere studies werd inderdaad gevonden dat dit gebied 
betrokken is bij het bedenken en begrijpen van communicatieve gedrag. Dit  
is echter niet de enige functie van de dmPFC, dit gebied is namelijk ook 
betrokken bij niet-sociale denkprocessen. Enkele voorbeelden van zulke 
processen zijn het maken van beslissingen en het verwerken van informatie 
om deze te kunnen onthouden. Een mogelijke hypothese is dat dit hersen-
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gebied betrokken is bij het integreren van nieuwe informatie in bestaande 
kennis, of deze informatie nu sociaal of niet-sociaal van aard is.
Hormonale processen: de rol van oxytocine
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzocht ik of het mogelijk is dat oxytocine het bedenken 
van communicatieve boodschappen beïnvloedt. Teneinde het effect van dit 
hormoon op deze gedragingen te meten ontving de ene helft van een nieuwe 
groep Communicatoren een oxytocine neusspray en ontving de andere helft 
een neusspray die de werkzame stof oxytocine niet bevatte (een placebo). 
Nadat proefpersonen zichzelf deze neusspray hadden toegediend, werd hun 
communicatieve vermogen gemeten met behulp van de “Tacit Communication 
Game” (TCG). Tijdens dit computerspel probeerde de Communicator aan de 
Geadresseerde uit te leggen waar een object (in dit geval een eikel) verstopt 
lag. De Communicator en de Geadresseerde bevonden zich in verschillende 
ruimtes, waardoor ze elkaar niet konden zien of horen. De enige manier 
waarop ze met elkaar konden communiceren was via een computerscherm. 
Met behulp van de TCG onderzocht ik twee belangrijke kenmerken van inter-
menselijke communicatie: het vermogen om nieuwe communicatiestrategieën 
te verzinnen en het vermogen om de communicatieve boodschap aan de 
eigenschappen van de Geadresseerde aan te passen. De noodzaak voor  het 
verzinnen van een nieuwe communicatiestrategie ontstond omdat de Communi-
cator niet precies kon aangeven op welke van de vijftien potentiële locaties 
(“verstopplekken”) de eikel te vinden was. Om dit probleem op te lossen 
verzonnen proefpersonen vele verschillende communicatiestrategieën. Het 
bleek dat de proefpersonen die oxytocine hadden ontvangen veel vaker commu-
nicatiestrategieën bedachten waarmee alle mogelijke verstopplekken konden 
worden aangeduid dan de proefpersonen die een placebo hadden gekregen.
De mate waarin Communicatoren hun boodschap aanpasten aan de eigen-
schappen van de Geadresseerde onderzocht ik door Communicatoren te 
vertellen dat ze de TCG met twee verschillende personen speelden. Hen werd 
verteld dat ze het spel de helft van de tijd met een volwassene speelden en 
de andere helft van de tijd met een kind. Proefpersonen werden herinnerd 
aan de identiteit van de Geadresseerde door middel van een foto. In werkelijk-
heid echter waren de volwassene en het kind dezelfde persoon. Deze persoon 
was wel bekend met de aard van het experiment, maar wist niet waar de eikel 
verstopt zou zijn, noch of ze als een volwassene of als een kind speelde.  
Ik vond dat proefpersonen in de placebogroep hun gedrag aanpasten door 
nadrukkelijkere bewegingen te maken voor het kind dan voor de volwassene. 
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Proefpersonen in de oxytocine groep pasten in eerste instantie hun gedrag aan 
door nadrukkelijker te bewegen voor het kind. Naarmate zij echter merkten dat 
het kind en de volwassene hen even goed begrepen, stopten zij met dit gedrag 
en behandelden ze beide Geadresseerden op gelijke wijze.
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzocht ik met behulp van de MRI-scanner of de oxytocine 
gedreven gedragsveranderingen uit Hoofdstuk 4 weerspiegeld werden in de 
hersenen. In het bijzonder keek ik naar het hersencircuit dat gevormd wordt 
door de amandelkern en de ventrale mediale prefrontale cortex (vmPFC). Van 
de amandelkern is namelijk bekend dat dit een belangrijk knooppunt is in het 
oxytocine systeem van het centrale zenuwstelsel en dat deze kern sterke 
anatomische verbindingen heeft met de vmPFC. Het vmPFC-amandelkern 
netwerk zou betrokken zijn bij emotie- en angstregulatie. Eerdere studies 
toonden aan dat oxytocine de sterkte van de neurale verbindingen in dit 
netwerk zou veranderen. Het lukte echter niet om deze bevinding te repli-
ceren. Er werd eveneens geen relatie gevonden tussen de oxytocine gedreven 
gedragsveranderingen uit Hoofdstuk 4 en de sterkte van de neurale verbindingen 
in het vmPFC-amandelkern netwerk. Deze resultaten tonen het belang aan van 
het uitvoeren en publiceren van replicatiestudies in relatie tot de invloed van 
oxytocine op (sociale) gedragingen en hersenactiviteit.
In Hoofdstuk 6 bediscussieerde ik de vraag of er een mogelijkheid is dat 
oxytocine, een hormoon waarvan impliciet aangenomen wordt dat het alleen 
sociaal gerelateerde denk- en hersenprocessen beïnvloedt, ook niet-sociale 
denkprocessen en hersenactiviteit zou kunnen beïnvloeden. Op grond van de 
nul-bevinding van Hoofdstuk 5 is deze vraag lastig te beantwoorden. Op grond 
van de bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 4 onstond een hypothese die zowel een 
sociaal als een mogelijk niet sociaal-specifiek effect van oxytocine zou kunnen 
verklaren. Deze hypothese was dat oxytocine exploratief/verkennend gedrag in 
het algemeen bevordert. Je zou kunnen stellen dat de oxytocine groep gedurende 
de TCG meer exploratief gedrag vertoonde. De oxytocine groep zou mogelijk 
uitgebreider verkennen welke communicatiestrategieen er mogelijk waren om 
dan vervolgens daaruit die strategie te kiezen die het meest geschikt is voor 
het aanduiden van elk van de mogelijke verstopplekken. De aanpassing aan 
het gedrag van de Geadresseerde zou als meer exploratief beschouwd kunnen 
worden door te veronderstellen dat de oxytocine groep meerdere mogelijke 
eigenschappen van de Geadresseerde verkende. Bijvoorbeeld de mogelijk-
heid dat een kind even goed zou kunnen zijn in het spelen van de TCG als een 
volwassene in plaats van het meer algemene idee dat kinderen doorgaans 
minder goede cognitieve vermogens hebben dan volwassenen.
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Tot slot
In dit proefschrift heb ik een aantal cognitieve, neurale en hormonale processen 
onderzocht die ten grondslag liggen aan het bedenken van een zo goed 
afgestemd mogelijke communicatieve boodschap. Tijdens dit onderzoek  
heb ik zoveel mogelijk geprobeerd om de flexibele aard en complexiteit van 
werkelijke communicatie tussen twee mensen te vangen. De experimenten 
die in dit proefschrift omschreven zijn, lijken erop te wijzen dat deze processen 
die in eerste instantie sociaal van aard lijken, niet te onderscheiden zijn van de 
processen die ten grondslag liggen aan het oplossen van complexe problemen 
in het algemeen. Deze bevinding heeft consequenties voor de interpretatie van 
bestaande data en voor het stellen van nieuwe onderzoeksvragen.
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Thank you!
Ivan aka “il Padrino”! Thank you for listening patiently to my wild scientific 
ideas and for never getting annoyed when I wanted to build yet another impos-
sible experimental set-up. I admire your genuine curiosity and broad knowledge 
of intention, action and beyond. Thank you for your trust in the project!
Iris, wat fijn dat je mijn co-promotor wilde zijn en me verwelkomde in jouw 
CCS-groep. Ik heb enorm genoten van onze discussies over de complexiteit (en 
de schoonheid) van de menselijke cognitie. Hartelijk dank voor je bevlogen-
heid, je altijd scherpe commentaar en de inspirerende en bemoedigende 
gesprekken over equality. Namasté!
Mijn lieve paranimfen Mark en Anne. Mark, heel erg bedankt voor de vele 
gesprekken over de details en de grote lijnen van het onderzoek, je verhelderende 
vragen en je vertrouwen in mijn wetenschappelijke kunnen. Wat fijn dat we 
vrienden zijn! Anne, het begon allemaal met het chocoladepasta experiment 
tijdens ons eerste jaar. Dankjewel dat je al zolang dichtbij bij me bent in leuke 
en in minder leuke tijden. Dat we samen nog maar veel tijd in de Anne-en-Miriam 
space mogen doorbrengen!
Roel, fijn dat ik bij jou als stagiair het wetenschappelijke avontuur mocht 
beginnen. Dankjewel dat je deur altijd voor me openstond, dank voor je kalmte 
en pragmatisme en dat je me leerde hoe ik mijn enthousiasme kon stroomlijnen.
Gero, wat een avontuur bleek het te zijn om oxytocine-onderzoek te verrichten 
bij vrouwen. Gelukkig vergat je nooit de vrolijke kant van de zaak in te zien en 
is het ons gelukt de dataverzameling tot een goed einde te brengen. Ik weet 
zeker dat er baanbrekende resultaten in die data zitten, ik verheug me al op 
het oxy-feest!
Jan, dankjewel voor de fijne samenwerking tijdens het vertalen van wetenschap 
naar de klas. Je hebt me veel geleerd over onderzoekend leren, over mijn eigen 
onderzoek en over wie ik ben als wetenschapper. Ik hoop dat nog veel schol-
ieren mogen leren en genieten van het werk van het WKRU.
Mijn student- en onderzoeksassistenten: hartelijk dank voor jullie waardevolle 
input en betrokkenheid bij mijn projecten. Martin: snorkel en zwemvliezen 
lijken me nog steeds de beste outfit voor een confederate om niet op te vallen, 
Frauke: dankjewel voor je vriendschap en voor het maken van het allermooiste 
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stimulusmateriaal ter wereld, Steffi: wat een precisie, betrouwbaarheid en 
toewijding, dankjewel! Merle en uiteraard alle andere dames van het oxy-meet-
team, dank voor jullie hulp bij de dataverzameling.
Members of the Intention and Action group, thank you for your sharp questions 
and great suggestions! Stolkie: dankjewel voor je geïnspireerde groupmeetings 
en je overvloed aan analyse-ideeën, Idil: thanks for letting me collaborate with 
you on your well-organised and fascinating oxy-data, Anke: wat heerlijk om 
met jou te nerden over director-matcher game designs, gezellig dat je naast me 
zat in de gang, Lennart: dankjewel voor het uren meehelpen met coden (“en 
scroll” :)) en je wijsheid. Frank: voor je optimisme en nimmer aflatende 
enthousiasme, Marieke: voor de overheerlijke kook projecten in zeer goed 
gezelschap, Anke Marit: voor het samen zingen, de heel-veel-schrijfweek en de 
kookavonturen, Marius: voor soep bij de Klinker en Inge: voor de thee en taart. 
Many thanks as well to EgbeRRRt, Rui, Loek, Rick, Sasha, Dilene and Ian.
Roomies, it was a joy being in the office with you every day: Tobias: MadNes op 
het Donders en erbuiten!!!, Diego: step-by-step, Erik: de Egghunter, Miriam: de 
fijne gesprekken en lol op die rode bank, Lindsey: 0.83 dansjes, Niels, Krissie 
en natuurlijk de Stagekamers: Ivar, Susanne, Heleen, Roemer, Lisa, Frauke, 
Emily en Vincent. Dankjulliewel voor alle Superleuke S-activiteiten!
The people that make the Donders run smoothly: Peter, David, the welcoming 
people of the administration, the always-ready-to-help TG, Bram: voor de 
magic matrices, Paul de dungeon master, Erik: voor je advies en dat er altijd 
iemand in de buurt was om over schaatsen te praten, Tildie: voor je goede 
zorgen, de gesprekken over lekker vegetarisch eten (groente!) en Lucia voor je 
interesse, het gezellige geklets in de gang en je attente Sinterklaasgedichten. 
Dankjewel jullie samen voor de lekkere theesessies! 
Thank you so much for all the fun and merry moments Social Donderians, among 
many others: Marlieke: hoorde ik daar M&Ms?, Katrien: vegaliciousness en 
wandelingen met Lucy, Anne: taartenbaksessies, Stephen: multidisciplinaire 
meditatie, Flora: bedankt voor onze fijne discussies over ons favoriete onder-
werp: common ground, ik bewonder de heldere manier waarop je denkt en 
waarop je je uitdrukt, the members of the infamous Hugo and the Donders band: 
Tom, Stephen, Hugo and Flora, the Pleasure Palace girls: Jeanette, Winke, 
Susanne and Anke Marit for being such lovely neighbours, de Oranjesingel 
homies Rudy de Ruudster en Linda voor de barbecue- en aspergefestijnen, 
Sean the FAD poet, Thomas voor de goede gesprekken, Iske: voor je nuchter-
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heid en de voorpret bij het bespreken van onze trouwavonturen, Peter en 
Hanneke: was het nu Oxmegen of Nijford?, René, Mieke, Sybrine, Hubert, 
Kirsten, Jeroen G., Jana, Atsuko, Joost, Lorijn, Verena L., Verena B., Ruben  
en de buurtjes Desiree en Michiel.
Mijn lieve vrienden, wat ben ik jullie dankbaar voor jullie interesse in mijn 
onderzoek en alles wat daarbij komt kijken, jullie support en alle gezellige 
activiteiten over de jaren heen. De Zjiland-gang: Eveleen, Marlies, Maarten 
en Daphne voor de ambiance in de kjite!, Johan en Marleen: voor de Bunnikse 
gedragsstudies en de avonturen van Totoro, Geert en Maeva: omdat jullie de 
helden van de Nibbrigkade zijn, bedankt voor de lekkere etentjes thuis en uit, 
Hedde and Vivian: thanks for pancakes with honey and banana on tropical 
islands en Martijn voor de discussies en de verwondering over hoe de dingen 
werken en natuurlijk voor het feit dat je je Sprachen sprecht, the holiday 
girls: Mattia: voor het nuttigen van al die zoete troep en de eindeloze Skype 
gesprekken, Marieke: voor het introduceren van een haffeltje kaas, voor de 
pret en ooh… dat Skypegesprek was nóg niet klaar, Cheyenne: thanks for forti-
fying coffees before visiting the old shit and for the great title suggestion!, de 
Graafsehuisbewoners: Coosje, Isaäc, Michiel en Jeroen, Wake Up Nijmegen, in 
het bijzonder Reinier en Anneke, Annemarie: voor je lieve complimenten, je vrolijk-
heid en je eerlijkheid, Mirjam voor de Colombiaanse avonturen en voor je frisse 
blik, Paul voor de mooie reisverhalen en Sondra voor de tandemritten door weer 
en wind. Mogen we samen nog veel moois beleven in de toekomst!
Mijn familie: Oma, papa en Marike, Hester, Daan en Fientje, Jorrit, Maud en de 
kleine Jip en natuurlijk Lenie. Wat fijn om te weten dat jullie trots op me zijn en 
dat ik werkelijk altijd bij jullie terecht kan. Ik vind het heel fijn dat ik bij jullie 
mag horen! Mama, dankjewel dat je me een nieuwsgierige en zelfstandige 
levens houding hebt bijgebracht.
Eelke Visser, wat fijn dat je er bent! Dankjewel voor alles en zoals je weet is 
dat echt heel veel. Ik hou van je!
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Donders graduate school for cognitive neuroscience
For a successful research Institute, it is vital to train the next generation of 
young scientists. To achieve this goal, the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition 
and Behaviour established the Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuro-
science (DGCN), which was officially recognised as a national graduate school 
in 2009. The Graduate School covers training at both Master’s and PhD level 
and provides an excellent educational context fully aligned with the research 
programme of the Donders Institute.
The school successfully attracts highly talented national and international 
students in biology, physics, psycholinguistics, psychology, behavioural 
science, medicine and related disciplines. Selective admission and assess-
ment centres guarantee the enrolment of the best and most motivated 
students. 
The DGCN tracks the career of PhD graduates carefully. More than 50% of PhD 
alumni show a continuation in academia with postdoc positions at top institutes 
worldwide, e.g. Stanford University, University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, 
UCL London, MPI Leipzig, Hanyang University in South Korea, NTNU Norway, 
University of Illinois, North Western University, Northeastern University in 
Boston, ETH Zürich, University of Vienna etc. Positions outside academia 
spread among the following sectors: specialists in a medical environment, 
mainly in genetics, geriatrics, psychiatry and neurology. Specialists in a 
psychological environment, e.g. as specialist in neuropsychology, psychological 
diagnostics or therapy. Positions in higher education as coordinators or 
lecturers. A smaller percentage enters business as research consultants, 
analysts or head of research and development. Fewer graduates stay in a 
research environment as lab coordinators, technical support or policy advisors. 
Upcoming possibilities are positions in the IT sector and management positions 
in pharmaceutical industry. In general, the PhDs graduates almost invariably 
continue with high-quality positions that play an important role in our knowledge 
economy.
For more information on the DGCN as well as past and upcoming defences 
please visit:
http://www.ru.nl/donders/graduate-school/phd/
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